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In this thesis, I attempt to study the effects of fiscal policy on inflation, the current account
balance and private consumption. The first chapter focuses on the relationship between fis-
cal policy and inflation. The study is conducted using a panel VAR approach based on data
for 44 countries over the period 1960-2018, while accounting for the difference in monetary
policy frameworks and the levels of fiscal space. Results suggest that fiscal deficits are less
likely to cause inflation when monetary policy is based on targets. In addition, budget deficits
are inflationary in the group of countries without a solid national monetary policy framework
(such as dollarized Latin American economies). Finally, the fiscal space level is not useful
in explaining the relationship between fiscal policy and inflation. In the second chapter, I
try to verify whether cyclicality can shed some light on the relationship between government
spending and the current account balance. This study is conducted based on quarterly panel
data for 51 countries, from 2002Q1 to 2018Q4, using a heterogeneous structural panel vector
autoregression (VAR) methodology. Findings confirm the importance of cyclicality in un-
derstanding the dynamics between aggregate variables. On the other hand, the relationship
between the current account and disaggregate fiscal variables is characterized by substan-
tial heterogeneity. Therefore, the panel study is supplemented with a time series approach
to uncover the main public spending components that affect the current account by country.
Two components are found to be connected to the current account in some cases: subsidies
and property income. Finally, in the third chapter, I use a New-Keynesian model with non-
Ricardian households to analyze the impact of different fiscal policy measures on private con-
sumption. A Markov-switching approach is applied to solve and estimate the model outside
and at the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). Estimation is based on Japanese data over the period
1980Q1-2020Q3. I also analyze the changes in the model’s behavior following two different
fiscal rule specifications. Results show that consumption does not respond positively to fiscal
stimulus measures, even after inclusion of rule-of-thumb consumers. This results from the
prevalence of Ricardian behavior in the model, in addition to the decline in real wages that
follows most measures. Inclusion of distortionary taxation alters the variables’ responses
through the impact of tax rate movements. Conversely, the presence of the ZLB is not found
to affect the model substantially, except after a consumption or a wage income tax cut. Al-
though both measures are generally detrimental to the economy, they have the potential to
yield better results over the long-run when the ZLB is binding. A capital income tax cut is
found the be the optimal fiscal stimulus measure. Its impact mainly results from the increase
in investment which shifts the economy’s productive capacity upward, thereby boosting con-
sumption and real wages. Finally, a variance decomposition analysis shows that consumption
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The recent growing interest in fiscal policy marks an important shift in macroeconomic
thought. So far, the common belief in macroeconomics has been that monetary policy (and
especially the use of interest rates to control inflation) is the primary tool to conduct stabi-
lization. But the difficulties that have arisen in the recent years (a lackluster growth, higher
welfare expenditures, uncertainty about the efficacy of unconventional monetary policy, etc)
proved challenging for the traditional macroeconomic policy approaches.
At the same time, the renewed attention towards fiscal policy revealed that many steps
still need to be done before it can be used efficiently. First, a better understanding of the
way government expenditures, taxation and debt interact with the aggregate economy is of
immense importance. The present thesis attempts to partially address this issue by studying
the effects of fiscal policy on inflation, the current account and private consumption.
The first chapter focuses on the question of whether large, sustained government deficits
cause higher inflation. The choice of this topic as a subject of investigation is motivated
by the concerns raised by excessive budget deficits in the past years. The present situation is
unprecedented not only because the size of these deficits reached a level that hasn’t been seen
since the end of World War II but also because they have been accompanied by a persistently
low inflation. Therefore, it is important to build a better insight into the conditions that can
make budget deficits inflationary in order to understand why inflation has stayed at a low
level despite a growing public debt in the recent period. Such an understanding would also
be useful to know whether an inflation uproar is to be expected in the forthcoming years.
To study this topic, I adopt a panel VAR approach based on data for 44 countries over the
period 1960-2017. The use of a panel approach to deal with this issue is not very common
in the literature but is justified by the many advantages it offers over a pure time series or
cross-sectional analysis. The most significant benefit is the fact that it provides a broader
view on the subject since panel data contain more information and variability than individual
country data. I additionally control for two elements that I consider as important in explaining
differences among countries: the monetary policy framework and the level of fiscal space.
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Conclusions from this chapter suggest that a fiscal determinacy of the price level is less
likely to occur when monetary policy is based on targets. In addition, budget deficits are
inflationary in the group of countries without a solid national monetary policy framework
(such as dollarized Latin American economies). Finally, the fiscal space level is not useful in
explaining the relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation.
In the second chapter, I attempt to understand how fiscal policy is related to countries’
external balances. The high fiscal deficits of the recent years justify the need for this inquiry.
In addition, although the concurrence of large fiscal and current account deficits in the early
1980s gave rise to the label of ‘twin deficits’, empirical evidence suggests that both deficits do
not always move in the same direction. My main contribution is to incorporate cyclicality as
a fundamental element that explains the diverging empirical evidence on the topic. I also use
both aggregate and disaggregate fiscal variables. This study is conducted based on quarterly
panel data for 51 countries, from 2002Q1 to 2018Q4, using an approach that relies mainly
on the heterogeneous structural panel vector autoregression (VAR) methodology of Pedroni
(2013). The core advantage of this methodology lies in the fact that it offers the possibil-
ity of decomposing impulse responses into common and idiosyncratic components, while
considering the underlying sample heterogeneity. I conclude from this study that cyclicality
matters when modeling the relationship between the current account and fiscal policy at the
aggregate level. More specifically, a negative relationship between government spending and
the current account is found to hold only for countries with a countercyclical fiscal policy
and a procyclical current account. This result is mainly explained by a negative response to
property income (mostly interest payments) in this group (and also to social benefits in some
countries). In general, results at the disaggregate level reveal a substantial heterogeneity
across countries. Therefore, the panel approach is supplemented with a country by country
investigation using Bayesian VAR methods. Findings from this part show that subsidies and
property income are the government spending components that are most likely connected to
the current account. In the particular case of property income, a relationship with the current
account is especially noted for countries where sovereign credit risk is perceived as relatively
high by international markets.
In the last chapter, I turn to the issue of macroeconomic stabilization using fiscal stim-
ulus measures. In the recent crisis, with monetary policy facing the liquidity trap and the
financial sector in an unstable state, governments resorted to fiscal policy to sustain demand
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and avert an aggravation of macroeconomic conditions. Still, the use of fiscal measures to
smooth business cycle fluctuations does not have unanimous support, especially that its ef-
fects are the matter of sizable controversy in economic discussions. In this study, I attempt
to analyze the effects of a government spending increase and different tax cuts on private
consumption, using Japanese data. Reasons for the focus on consumption are twofold. First,
there is a considerable disagreement in the literature about how it reacts to fiscal stimulus.
Second, I consider that it can be a key lever in the success of fiscal measures since it often
represents the largest component of output. I use a standard New-Keynesian model (based
on Smets and Wouters (2003)) and incorporate different elements in the analysis to verify
if they can improve consumption’s response to fiscal policy: non-Ricardian consumers, two
different assumptions on the fiscal rule (lump-sum taxes and distortionary taxation) and the
Zero Lower Bound on interest rates. Estimation of the model is based on a Markov-switching
regimes approach applied to Japanese data over the period 1980Q1-2020Q3. The main find-
ings are as follows. First, although the inclusion of rule-of-thumb consumers generates a
greater dependence of consumption on income, it is not sufficient to generate a crowding-in
effect of consumption after fiscal stimulus measures. This results from the fact that Ricardian
behavior remains prevalent in the model but also from the decline in real wages that can be
observed after most measures. Second, including distortionary taxation alters the model’s be-
havior through the adjustments of the different tax rates (that follow a hump-shaped pattern).
Nonetheless, consumption remains closely linked to lump-sum taxes’ response even after
inclusion of the other taxes. Third, no difference can be observed in the model’s response
after a government spending increase and a capital income tax cut between the regime at the
ZLB and the regime outside it. But a difference between both regimes can be seen after a
consumption or a wage income tax cut. These two measures are generally both detrimental
to the economy, but they have the potential to yield better results over the long-run at the
ZLB. Fourth, by comparing the different fiscal stimulus measures, a capital income tax cut
appears to be the most beneficial policy, although it has the disadvantage of increasing public
debt more significantly. Finally, a variance decomposition analysis shows that consumption
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1.1 Introduction
In recent decades, many countries attempted to bolster weak economic growth using fiscal
policy. The resulting increase in public debt, macroeconomic imbalances, and more partic-
ularly, effects on the price level, are now a source of public concern. Nonetheless, the fears
of an inflation outburst resulting from high indebtedness can only be justified if a verifiable
relationship between inflation and fiscal policy exists.
The literature usually links inflation to monetary policy factors. For example, the mon-
etarist view suggests that inflation is the result of too much money chasing too few goods
and often considers the demand for money, interest rates, and exchange rates. In general, the
conduct of monetary policy is considered as a major determinant of inflation dynamics and
the primary explanation for the recent low levels of inflation.
Fiscal determinacy of the price level, on the other hand, is based on the idea that govern-
ments running persistent deficits will eventually have to finance those deficits through money
creation (seigniorage), thus producing higher inflation, especially when GDP growth rates are
lower than interest rates (Sargent and Wallace (1981)). Most popular works in this respect are
those on the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). Nevertheless, prior empirical studies find
little success in uncovering strong evidence for its validity or in deriving consistent results
across advanced and developing economies.
I believe that the absence of conclusive empirical evidence in this area of research can
be partially justified by the fact that effects of monetary policy are not usually controlled for.
The main hypothesis in this chapter is that inflation is more likely to respond to fiscal policy
measures when monetary policy is based on some particular approaches (typically coinciding
with regimes of passive monetary policy/active fiscal policy). It is therefore important to
account for the difference in monetary policy frameworks across periods and countries. In
addition, I assume that the fact that it is more common to find a closer relationship between
inflation and fiscal deficits in developing rather than advanced economies can be explained
by a difference in the debt repayment capacity. I therefore also control for this factor by
including a measure of fiscal space in the analysis.
Based on a linearized equation derived from a government’s intertemporal budget con-
straint, the present study employs a panel vector auto-regression (VAR) model for a sample
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of 44 countries over the period 1960–2017. The panel approach presents several advan-
tages over the more traditional country by country analysis. First, it provides estimates that
reflect the common behavior of the sample while controlling for individual heterogeneity.
Therefore, it offers a more general conclusion on the topic than would be possible from a
time-series approach. Second, the additional cross-sectional dimension allows for a gain in
degrees of freedom (compared to time-series). Finally, the greater variability that character-
izes panel data improves the efficiency of econometric estimates.
The underlying theoretical model used in this study links the inflation rate to both fiscal
and monetary policy variables, in addition to economic growth rates. Both a restricted and
an unrestricted panel VAR approaches are adopted in the estimation. Changes of inflation’s
response to fiscal variables are analyzed based on the categories of monetary policy frame-
works. The main findings indicate that fiscal variables are less likely to affect inflation when
monetary policy is based on targets. In particular, inflation is less responsive to fiscal shocks
in inflation targeting regimes (and also to interest rates shocks). On the other hand, the cat-
egory that encompasses countries without a national monetary policy framework (such as
partially dollarized Latin American countries) is the one in which budgets deficits are infla-
tionary. In a subsequent step, the fiscal space variable is included into the model but is not
found to be useful in explaining the relationship between the primary balance and inflation.
1.2 Literature review
There are three broad approaches to link fiscal policy with inflation. The traditional approach
is based on the government budget constraint. It has been first used by Sargent and Wallace
(1981) to establish a link between fiscal policy and the price level. They derived the fiscal
determinacy of prices from the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, expressed as
Gt + it−1Bt−1 = Tt + (Bt − Bt−1) + (Ht − Ht−1) (1.1)
where Gt is government expenditures on goods, services, and transfers at time t and Tt is the
tax revenue. it−1 is the interest rate, Bt is interest-bearing debt, and Ht is the stock of base
or high-powered money. Thus, it−1Bt−1 represents interest payments on total outstanding
debt and Bt − Bt−1 denotes new issues of interest-bearing debt. Equation (1.1) shows that
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the government can fund its expenditures either through taxes, newly issued debt, or printing
new currency (Ht − Ht−1).1 Their model predicts that if interest rates on bonds are higher
than the economy’s growth rate, then the real stock of bonds will grow faster than the econ-
omy. However, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds, the
government will finance both the principal and the interest eventually through seigniorage.
In other words, the fiscal authority’s decisions can induce the printing of more money, and
therefore inflation.
Most of the existing empirical studies on the fiscal determinacy of the price level use the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint as the starting point to determine both the ana-
lytical approach and the explanatory variables. Some of these studies (Table 1.1) focus on the
link between fiscal deficits and inflation, while others examine the relationship between fiscal
surpluses and public debt or use a different approach. However, most studies do not provide
conclusive evidence for the existence of the fiscal determinacy of prices. For example, Catao
and Terrones (2005) and Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (2002) conclude that fiscal deficits are the
main drivers of high inflation only for high-inflation developing countries. Bohn (1998) and
Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán, and Esteve (2009) follow a different approach using the primary
surplus and the debt-to-GDP ratio.2 They conclude that the fiscal authority acts in a Ricar-
dian fashion,3 as do Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) and Creel and Le Bihan (2006).
Conversely, Favero and Monacelli (2005) show the presence of alternating Ricardian and
non-Ricardian regimes.
Another theory that advocates the fiscal determinancy of prices is the Fiscal Theory of
the Price Level (FTPL). It is based on the assumption of a dominant fiscal policy. The central
equation of the FTPL is the government debt valuation equation, which sets the real value of
1Based on equation (1.1), Sargent and Wallace (1981) provide an expression for the inflation rate depending on
the stock of interest-bearing government debt per capita, assuming that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy.
That is, the fiscal authority independently sets its budget, announcing current and future deficits and surpluses.
The amount of revenue to be raised is then determined based on these decisions. The monetary authority then
finances the discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the number of bonds that
can be sold to the public with seigniorage. Leeper (1991) defines this as an “active” fiscal policy and “passive”
monetary policy scenario, where the fiscal authority’s actions constrain monetary policy, which simply reacts to
government debt shocks.
2Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán, and Esteve (2009) focus on a sample of 11 EU countries, while Bohn (1998)
studies only the US.
3According to Sargent (1982) (pp. 6–7), in a Ricardian regime, the issuing of additional Interest-bearing
government securities is always accompanied by a planned increase in future explicit tax collections which is
sufficient to repay the debt. In the second polar regime (non-Ricardian), additional interest-bearing government
securities signify the government’s promise to eventually monetize the interest-bearing debt.
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where Bt−1 is the one-period nominal debt issued at t − 1 due at t, pt is the price level,
st is the real primary government surplus including seigniorage, and mt,t+j is the discount
factor. Several studies provide the derivation of this equation, such as those by Sims (1994)
and Woodford (1994) and Woodford (1995). The valuation equation is usually obatined from
the intertemporal government budget constraint, with the government debt (Bt−1 in the LHS)
expressed in nominal terms and the present value of primary surpluses (RHS) in real terms.4
A direct way to verify the FTPL is through an estimation of equation (1.2). However,
this approach poses many challenges. First, the variable representing the present value of
future primary surpluses would be hard to measure and analyze.5 Second, the choice of the
discount rate would have a significant impact on the results. A change in inflation could
reflect a change in the discount rate rather than a movement in fiscal variables (Cochrane
(2019b)). Furthermore, inferring concrete policy implications from this formal expression is
not straightforward. Using a similar expression with alternative empirical approaches, some
studies were however able to confirm the validity of the FTPL, for instance, Loyo (1999) and
Tanner and Ramos (2003) for Brazil or Fan, Minford, and Ou (2013) for the UK.6
Another limit of the government’s valuation equation is the fact that it omits many im-
portant economic variables that play a key role in inflation dynamics. One example is the
economic growth rate. As pointed out by Sargent and Wallace (1981), the fiscal determinacy
of prices occurs when economic growth rates are below interest rates. Such a condition can-
not be verified through the valuation equation. Therefore, a more comprehensive theoretical
framework is needed, one with assumptions that are closer to the actual economic dynamics.
Sims (2011) suggests such a framework. It is a New-Keynesian style model with long-
term debt and sticky prices.7 One important implication of this framework is that, even
4Cochrane (2005) presents this relation as an asset pricing model based on a different logic. The underlying
idea is that nominal debt, including the monetary base, is a claim on the government’s future primary surpluses
(in the same way a stock is a claim on future earnings). As argued by the author, the market determines bond
prices depending on bond yields and future streams of expected primary surpluses (also see Cochrane (2019a)).
5In addition, the judgment could be biased by business cycle fluctuations, as primary surpluses are likely to
fall during recessions and increase thereafter.
6Fan, Minford, and Ou (2013) find that the 1970s inflation outburst resulted from an increased level of expen-
diture unmatched in the previous decades.
7Cochrane (2018) provides the derivation and solution of this model.
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in an active fiscal/passive monetary policy equilibrium, the monetary variables still have a
powerful effect on both output and inflation. In this model, contractionary monetary policies
first lead to a drop in inflation, then produce exactly the opposite effect with a time lag. Fiscal
variables can be considered a part of this dynamic in the sense that interest rate changes
affect the market value of bond prices. More precisely, when interest rates are high, the
real value of government debt appears to be greater than its real market value for investors.
Consequently, the demand for government debt increases at the expense of the demand for
goods and services, which leads to lower aggregate demand, and therefore, lower prices. On
the other hand, the model also shows that an expansionary fiscal shock creates a boom in
consumption and an upward unanticipated spurt in the inflation rate. In this case, inflation is
fiscally determined through the output transmission channel.8
More recently, Cochrane (2019a) studied the fiscal roots of inflation based on the follow-
ing log linearized identity.
vt + rnt+1 − πt+1 − gt+1 = st+1 + vt+1 (1.3)
where vt represents the market value of debt; rnt , the nominal returns on the government debt
portfolio with a maturity length of n; πt, the inflation rate; gt, the GDP growth; st, the real
primary surplus; and rnt − πt − gt, the discount rate for the RHS terms. More details on
this model are provided in Appendix A. An expression derived from this identity (see Ap-
pendix) shows that unexpected inflation less the unexpected nominal return on government
bonds must equal the innovation in the present value of future surpluses to GDP. Therefore,
it links the unexpected inflation rate to both the monetary and fiscal variables, in addition to
GDP growth (included in the discount rate of the present value). Using US data on govern-
ment bonds from the database of Hall, Payne, and Sargent (2018), Cochrane reports that a
positive monetary policy shock (defined as a shock to interest rates not accompanied by a
movement in future primary surpluses) is super-Fisherian and raises inflation immediately.
A negative fiscal shock (defined as a shock to future primary surpluses not accompanied by
a movement in interest rates) induces a protracted inflation. The disinflation resulting from
a recessionary shock corresponds entirely to a decline in discount rates, leading to higher
debt. In the present paper, I apply a similar approach based on different assumptions using
8This mechanism is described with more details in Cochrane (2018).
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panel data for 44 countries (over the period 1960-2017). I also attempt to compare the find-
ings across subsamples constructed based on monetary policy frameworks and on the level
of fiscal space.
1.3 Theoretical model
I follow Cochrane (2019a) in deriving a model for inflation that accounts for the effect of
fiscal policy, in addition to two important determinants of inflation in theory: monetary policy
(through the interest rate) and aggregate demand (through GDP growth). Nonetheless, the
model I use is based on the intertemporal government budget constraint and not on an asset
pricing approach. In addition, I consider the stock of government debt instead of the market
value of bonds.9 Finally, money is not included in the variable of government debt as this
may generate a bias when studying the relationship between debt and inflation.
Considering the following government intertemporal budget constraint:
Bt − Bt−1 − RtBt−1 = Gt − Tt (1.4)
where Bt denotes the stock of government debt in nominal terms at time t; Rt, the nominal
interest rate on government bonds; Gt, nominal government spending and Tt, taxes. This
relation states that government spending and interest payments are financed through taxes or
new issuance of debt.
The percent change in the value of the government bond portfolio can be expressed by h,
such that: Bt = (1 + h) Bt−1. Then, equation (1.4) becomes:
Bt−1 (h− Rt) = Gt − Tt = −PSt (1.5)
where PSt is the primary surplus at time t.
Since the change in public debt also depends on government bond yields, I assume that it
can be expressed as a linear function of this variable such that h = kRt for a given coefficient
9It is more challenging to empirically verify a model that includes bond prices for different maturities in a
panel study due to the lack of data.
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Taking logs and bringing real debt over GDP to the RHS, the following equation is obtained:








+ log (Rt) + log (1− k) (1.12)
In this equation, it appears that both fiscal and monetary policy, in addition to growth,
affect the inflation level. Based on this model, I expect a positive relationship between infla-
tion and public debt and a negative relationship between inflation and the primary balance.
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Moreover, the response of inflation to interest rates is assumed to be positive.10 These ex-
pectations are consistent with the neo-Fisherian view and the conclusions in Sims (2011) and
Cochrane (2018).
Finally, a negative relationship between inflation and the GDP growth rate is expected.
This result contradicts the conventional Keynesian and neo-Keynesian frameworks, accord-
ing to which this relation should be positive (the AD-AS model, Phillips Curve). Nonetheless,
this assumption is consistent with the findings of several empirical studies and theoretical
models.11
1.4 Data and approach
Unlike previous studies that focus on a single country, I study the inflation-fiscal variables
relationship using a panel VAR (PVAR) model over a long time-span to draw more general
conclusions on the issue. Equation (1.12) contains the key variables required for the analysis.
I examine their relationship using a sample of 44 countries listed in Appendix B from 1960
to 2017. Data and sources are defined in Appendix C. I further use the monetary policy clas-
sification compiled by Cobham (2018) and data related to government revenues to determine
the fiscal space level for the sample countries, as explained in this section.
The importance of accounting for monetary policy frameworks is justified by the common
belief that the 1990s shift in monetary policy thinking by setting up rules or targets (money,
credit, exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation) has played a major role in controlling
the inflation rate and addressing the dynamic inconsistency issue.12 A consensus among this
10The term representing bond yields (Rt) can be proxied by short term interest rates. In reality, it varies
depending on debt maturity, but if we assume only one category of bonds with maturity (n), the term structure
equation implies Rnt = itit+1it+2 . . .it+n−1, where (it) is the annualized short-term interest rate. And the relation
(1.12) becomes:
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11For example, Stockman (1981) establishes that an increase in the inflation rate results in a lower steady-state
output level by reducing the purchasing power of money balances, and thus the demand for goods and capital
(this model assumes that part of the investment projects is financed through cash). Similarly, most money and
endogenous growth models conclude that the inflation rate reduces both the return on capital and the growth rate
in the long-run (Arawatari, Hori, and Mino (2018), Vaona (2012)). Empirically, several studies reveal an overall
negative effect of inflation on growth and detect the presence of non-linearity in this relationship (e.g., Kormendi
and Meguire (1985), Fischer (1993), Gomme (1993), De Gregorio (1992), Andres and Hernando (1997)).
12Dynamic inconsistency refers to changes in the decisions of monetary authorities and the absence of commit-
ment to a single optimal policy. Especially when output is below the optimal level, monetary authorities have the
incentive to move away from an announced target to generate “surprise” inflation, and thereby create a short-term
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literature is that commitment is a better policy because it generates lower average inflation
in the long run (Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985)). The gains from commitment are
the direct consequence of the role of expectations in shaping economic conditions. More
specifically, inflation targeting regimes are thought to contribute to lower inflation levels and
higher monetary policy credibility.
I verify this assumption by applying Cobham (2018)’s MPFs classification to the sam-
ple.13 This author distinguishes between different frameworks based on whether the mone-
tary authorities publish targets for some objectives and whether such targets exist for mon-
etary aggregates, exchange rates, inflation, and other variables. Based on this definition and
some additional criteria, Cobham identifies 32 categories (Appendix D). Data are available
only for the period between 1980 and 2016. I therefore reduce the sample to this duration
when including the MPF classification. By introducing this classification, I conjecture that a
scarcity of fiscal dominance episodes would be reflected in the results through a difference
in outcomes across frameworks, as monetary policy would be considered as the main driver
of inflation in that case. More particularly, a weaker reaction of inflation to fiscal policy is
expected in MPFs that correspond to an active monetary policy regime.
In addition to MPFs, sample countries are also classified depending on their fiscal space
level14 in a subsequent step. The reason why fiscal space is considered to be an important
factor is that higher deficits are more likely to cause macroeconomic imbalances and distur-
bances in the price level when countries have a limited capacity to repay their debt and ensure
sovereign solvency.
The literature on fiscal space introduces many different measures. One frequently used
approach is the “fiscal gap” approach, which is based on the difference between a given level
of public debt or fiscal balance and a benchmark level considered as the sustainable level (Os-
try et al. (2010), Ghosh et al. (2013)).15 Other studies (e.g., Buiter (1985), Buiter, Corsetti,
and Roubini (1993), Auerbach and Gale (2011) derive an index of fiscal sustainability based
increase in growth. Hence, it is usually based on the idea that the relationship between inflation and GDP growth
is positive.
13Cobham (2018) defines a MPF as a combination of objectives, constraints, and conventions for monetary
authorities. Constraints and conventions include “rules or disciplines to which authorities are subject (voluntarily
or involuntarily), the nature of the financial and monetary markets and institutions, the understanding of key
macroeconomic relationships, and the political environment” (Cobham (2018), p. 6). More details by country
can also be found in the following link http://monetaryframeworks.org/countries.
14See definition in Heller (2005).
15This benchmark level can be estimated in various ways, such as the signal approach by Kaminsky, Lizondo,
and Reinhart (1998) or the present value of future primary balances (Bohn (1998) and Bohn (2008), Ostry et al.
(2010), Ghosh et al. (2013).
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on the projections of future balances depending on the macroeconomic outlook and fore-
casts of the discount rate. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2010) suggest an alternative fiscal space
measure called the “de facto fiscal space,” defined as the inverse of the number of tax-years
needed to repay the debt. This ratio requires an estimation of the de facto tax base corre-
sponding to the realized tax collection averaged across multiple years to smooth for business
cycle fluctuations. I use a similar definition in this study. First, the ratio of public debt divided
by total government revenues is calculated. This ratio reflects the number of years of revenue
needed to repay the outstanding public debt on a given date. Then, fiscal space is defined as
the inverse of that ratio. In Appendix E, I summarize the most recent available value (2016),
some descriptive statistics of the calculated measure, and the correlation coefficients with the
primary balance for all sample countries.
1.5 Econometric methodology
After a correlation analysis (see following section), I proceed with the estimation of a panel
VAR model using the variables of equation (1.12). The panel VAR model is as follows.
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Where psy denotes the primary surplus over GDP, by the log of public debt over GDP, θ
the GDP growth rate, i the short-term interest rate and π the inflation rate. Since the model
is estimated based on panel data, the vectors zt, c and wt can be interpreted as the stacked
version of vectors zit, ci and wit, respectively, where the index i indicates the different cross-
sections (sample countries).
Panel VAR models are built on the same logic as standard time-series VARs and can
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be estimated using similar methods. However, they offer some key advantages over a time-
series approach. First, panel VARs rely on the assumption that the cross-sectional units share
the same underlying data generating process with common parameters across units.16 As
a result, the obtained estimates reflect the common behavior of the group while controlling
for individual heterogeneity. Second, the additional cross-sectional dimension is beneficial
because it provides a gain in degrees of freedom. In addition, panel data are characterized
by a greater variability than time-series. And because of this variability, the prospects for
obtaining accurate estimates are improved and the model is more likely to efficiently capture
the relationship between macroeconomic variables.
The estimation of standard VAR models in their reduced-form can be straightforwardly
performed through OLS. However, the interpretation of the estimation results would be bi-
ased if the different variables are correlated with each other (as is typically the case in macroe-
conomic models). Such correlation creates a dependence between the different error terms
across equations. To overcome this identification problem, many techniques have been de-
veloped. One of them is the recursive VAR approach which rests on the inclusion of some
contemporaneous values as regressors. In that case, estimation by OLS produces residuals
that are uncorrelated across equations.
I apply this approach in a first step using a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance
matrix, which yields a unique lower triangular matrix. The Cholesky decomposition is based
on an active fiscal policy/passive monetary policy setting, with the following ordering of the
variables: the primary balance over GDP (most exogenous), public debt over GDP, GDP
growth rate, short-term interest rates, and inflation (same as in (1.13)). I adopt this order-
ing because if fiscal policy is active, then the fiscal variables would be the most exogenous,
and the short term interest rate would, on the contrary, be more endogenous. In this set-
ting, I expect that inflation fluctuations would result from dynamics affecting both the fiscal
and monetary variables. Analysis of this recursive VAR model is made based on variance
decompositions.
Despite the advantages of the recursive approach, it is subject to the so-called ordering
problem. The chosen ordering determines which variables are contemporaneously unaffected
by which other variables and it may not always be accurate. Therefore, I use other meth-
ods that address the endogeneity issue without relying on the recursive VAR restrictions. I
16Cross-sectional heterogeneity can be modeled as panel-specific fixed effects.
1.6. Correlation analysis 17
first re-estimate the panel VAR model based on the generalized method of moments (GMM)
methodology suggested by Sigmund and Ferstl (2017). This approach is particularly useful
to eliminate the Nickell bias (Nickell (1981)) that arises when the demeaning process, which
subtracts the individual’s mean values from the respective variables, induces a correlation
between error terms and regressors, thereby leading to inconsistent ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates. Sigmund and Ferstl (2017) provide an extension to Anderson and Hsiao
(1982) for the first difference GMM estimator using lags of the endogenous variables as in-
struments (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991)) and to the
more complex system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond (1998)). Details on the estimation
are provided in Appendix F.
Analysis of this unrestricted VAR model is based on generalized impulse response func-
tions as suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1998). The main advantage of this approach is that
response functions are not sensitive to the ordering of variables in the VAR model (as op-
posed to orthogonalized impulse response functions (OIRF)). Therefore, as opposed to OIRF
that can yield different results depending on the estimation assumptions, the generalized im-
pulse responses are unique and fully take account of the historical patterns of correlations
observed amongst the different shocks. More details on GIRF estimation compared to OIRF
are provided in Appendix G.17 The choice of relying on both a restricted and an unrestricted
VAR approach in the analysis is motivated by robustness concerns.
1.6 Correlation analysis
Table 1.2 exhibits correlation coefficients between the main variables of the model for the
whole sample. The highest correlation coefficient is the one between interest rates and infla-
tion, with a positive sign (66%). The inflation rate’s correlation with fiscal variables is very
weak. Finally, GDP growth is negatively correlated with public debt and positively with the
primary balance.
As shown on Table 1.3, these correlation coefficients differ significantly across monetary
policy frameworks. The highest correlation coefficient between inflation and the primary
balance is 23% in the case of discretionary regimes. The correlation coefficient between
17GIRF also have some shortcomings. Some authors (e.g.Kim (2013)) posit that GIRF are based on restric-
tions that are more extreme than OIRF since they imply that each variable is ordered first and therefore rest on
assumptions that contradict each other.
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inflation and interest rates is also the strongest for this same category (88%). In both cases,
the relationship is positive. A negative relationship between the primary balance and inflation
is only noted in three cases: absence of a national framework (excluding EU countries),18
mixed targets, and monetary targets. As opposed to other categories, regimes of mixed targets
and monetary targets contain only a few observations (the mixed targets category applies to
a few years in the 1980s for three countries (France, Germany and Italy) while monetary
targets apply to 7 countries during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s). Finally, in
the case of EU countries (mostly Euro zone countries), the correlation between inflation and
interest rates is very high and positive, while the correlation between inflation and the primary
balance is very low.
I then split the sample into two fiscal space categories based on the middle quantile. S1 is
the subsample of higher fiscal space countries that require few years of revenue to repay their
debt and S2 is the subsample of economies with lower fiscal space, which require many years
of revenue to repay their debt. Correlation coefficients for these two categories are shown on
Table 1.4. The correlation between inflation and the primary balance appears as positive and
higher for economies with the lowest levels of fiscal space. Correlation between inflation and
public debt is negative for the S1 subsample, implying that higher debt for countries with
enough revenues is accompanied by lower inflation. Conversely, this coefficient is positive
but very small for the S2 subsample. Finally, correlation coefficients between inflation and
short-term interest rates are positive and high in both groups of countries.
1.7 Empirical results
In this section, I estimate and analyze the dynamics within the panel VAR model based on two
approaches. In the first approach, the Cholesky decomposition is used to impose a recursive
structure on the model. Then, estimation is made based on the OLS methodology and forecast
error variance decompositions are derived. In the second approach, I relax the restrictions on
the VAR model and re-estimate it using a GMM methodology. Then, generalized impulse
response functions are calculated for different shocks and inflation’s response for the whole
sample is examined. At this stage, I also compare the results across different monetary policy
frameworks and different levels of the fiscal space.
18This category contains mostly countries in which there is a significant use of a foreign currency with limited
monetary policy operations for a large part of the sample period.
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1.7.1 Estimation of a recursive Panel VAR model
1.7.1.1 Model OLS estimates
Table 1.5 shows the reduced-form VAR estimates in addition to the contemporaneous co-
efficients of the structural model based on the recursive Cholesky orthogonalization. The
relationship between fiscal variables appears to be weak in both the reduced-form model and
the contemporaneous coefficients matrix. In contrast, the relationship between inflation and
the short-term interest rate is highly statistically significant. Finally, it can also be noted that
the sign of the contemporaneous coefficient of the interest rate in the inflation equation is
negative.19
1.7.1.2 Forecast error variance decomposition
The contribution of each variable to the overall variation in inflation is estimated using the
model described previously and the recursive restrictions. Results of the forecast error vari-
ance decomposition of inflation (see Figure 1.1) clearly indicate that exogenous shocks to the
interest rates or past inflation explain a significant share of the inflation’s variation (between
10% at the beginning and 21% at the end of the observation period for the interest rate and
88% in period 1 for past inflation). The impact of public debt on inflation is almost absent
(around 0.6%). The share of shocks to the primary balance, although not zero, is also very
small (from 1.4% to 2.7%). Therefore, fiscal policy affects inflation but not to the same extent
as monetary policy.
Using the same model to generate the forecast error variance decomposition of public
debt (Figure 1.2), I find no evidence of a contribution of inflation to public debt (limited
to 0.5%). Public debt is significantly affected by past debt (around 70%) and a growing
contribution of the primary balance (as expected) (progressively reaching 28.8%); however,
the other variables are insignificant.
1.7.2 Estimation of an unrestricted Panel VAR model
1.7.2.1 GMM estimates
I derive the first difference GMM estimator as described in Appendix F, after applying for-
ward orthogonal transformation to the data (see Appendix H). The estimation results (Table
19Consistent with the theoretical assumptions of Cochrane (2018) and Sims (2011).
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1.6) indicate that public debt, economic growth, interest rates, and inflation all have a sig-
nificant autoregressive coefficient. Conversely, in the inflation equation, the only significant
variable is the interest rate, with a high positive coefficient. The fiscal variables’ coefficients
are negative but not statistically significant.
1.7.2.2 Generalized impulse response functions after fiscal, monetary and recession-
ary shocks in the whole sample
I then examine the impact of shocks to different variables on inflation using the generalized
impulse response functions. I first examine the effects of a fiscal policy shock, monetary
policy shock, and recessionary shock on all variables. In a subsequent step, I incorporate two
additional elements that represent idiosyncratic characteristics: the monetary policy frame-
works and the fiscal space level.
Fiscal policy shocks
A positive one SD innovation in the primary balance (Figure 1.3) generates a positive but
small movement in growth and interest rates (less than 0.02 units). Public debt reacts neg-
atively and significantly (a response that reaches -0.07 after 6 periods as the effect of fiscal
surpluses cumulates). Conversely, inflation’s response is poorly statistically significant. A
positive shock to public debt (Figure 1.4) leads to lower primary balances, an increase in
interest rates, higher inflation and lower growth.
Monetary policy shocks
A positive one SD innovation in short-term interest rates (Figure 1.5) causes a positive and
notable response in the inflation rate (almost one to one response). Movements in other vari-
ables are relatively smaller in magnitude. The reaction of primary balances and public debt is
positive in the short-run. But the response of public debt eventually gets negative indicating
the efficacy of the contractionary policy in reducing debt. Finally, as expected, GDP growth
responds negatively and significantly.
Recessionary shocks
In the final step, I apply a negative shock to growth to determine the impact of a recessionary
episode (Figure 1.6). Inflation’s response is negative, although not very significant. It quickly
returns to its initial level (this is consistent with a Phillips curve as the growth level also ad-
justs). Impacts on the primary balance and the interest rate are very small in magnitude with
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large confidence bands. Finally, public debt also responds positively and significantly (which
is consistent with expectations).
1.7.2.3 Inflation’s response by Monetary Policy Framework (GIRF)
I split the data using the MPF classification by Cobham (2018) (for the period 1980–2016).
Findings indicate that the relationship between inflation and the primary balance is not uni-
form across monetary policy regimes (Figure 1.7). A significant and negative response in
inflation can only be seen in cases of absence of a national framework (and after the second
quarter).20 Response of inflation in discretionary regimes is of a high magnitude but poorly
statistically significant. Response of EU countries is relatively significant but very small and
positive (suggesting that higher deficits are accompanied by a low inflation). Finally, re-
sponse of inflation in other frameworks is extremely small in magnitude and not significant.
On the other hand, I find a very strong and positive response of inflation to interest rate
shocks in discretionary regimes. Inflation also responds positively and significantly to interest
rates in exchange rate targets frameworks (although with a smaller magnitude). Reaction
to interest rates in the absence of a national monetary policy framework is also positive
and relatively high. Finally, inflation responds poorly to interest rates in inflation targeting
regimes and in EU countries.
The response of inflation to primary balance shocks in countries with no solid national
monetary policy framework suggests that a policy that increases taxation or reduces govern-
ment expenditure in this group would eventually lower inflation. This finding does however
not necessarily imply inflationary budget deficits as fiscal policy might have asymmetrical ef-
fects. I therefore apply a negative shock to the primary balance to verify inflation’s response
after a shock of opposite sign. Results (reported on Figure 1.8) confirm that inflation after a
negative fiscal shock only occurs in the group with no national MPF.
1.7.2.4 Inflation’s response by level of the fiscal space (GIRF)
Impulse response functions by fiscal space level after a positive shock to primary balances
are reported on Figure 1.9. The relationship between primary balances and inflation appears
to be positive and significant in the short-run for high fiscal space countries. On the other
20This subsample includes the following countries: Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Honduras, Haiti and Colombia. It also includes Ghana.
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hand, response of inflation in low fiscal space countries is poorly significant. After applying a
negative shock to the primary balance, response is not significant in both cases (Figure 1.10).
Conversely, the relationship between inflation and the short-term interest rate is strong and
positive in both groups as shown on Figure 1.11. These first results imply that the fiscal space
level is not useful in explaining the relationship between the primary balance and inflation.
This is unsurprising as the low fiscal space group contains countries with very different char-
acteristics (See Appendix E). But even if countries of the low fiscal space group are separated
based on their income level, no homogeneous response is found. However, when the distinc-
tion is made based on monetary policy frameworks, a negative and significant relationship
between the primary balance and inflation is once again found in the group of countries with
no national MPF (Figure 1.12)
1.8 Discussion and concluding remarks
Previous empirical studies, notably those by Bohn (1998), Bajo-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán, and
Esteve (2009) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001), reject the fiscal determinacy of the
price level and conclude that governments act in a Ricardian fashion. This claim is justi-
fied by the presence of an adjustment of primary surpluses to changes in public debt. In the
present paper, I reach a similar conclusion for the following reasons. First, the forecast error
variance decomposition shows almost no relation between public debt and inflation (Figures
1.1 and 1.2). The primary balances’ contribution to inflation variations is also relatively
weak. Second, inflation’s response to movements in primary balances for the whole sample
is not statistically significant. And after controlling for monetary policy frameworks, a sig-
nificant response only occurs in cases where there is no national monetary policy framework.
Contrariwise, inflation is not sensitive to fiscal policy when monetary policy is based on tar-
gets. I especially note that inflation is less sensitive to both shocks to the primary balance
and those to interest rates in inflation targeting regimes.
This outcome is not surprising; it is consistent with conclusions from previous discus-
sions on monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983)), accord-
ing to which, inflation’s sensitivity to shocks decreases when central banks operate under
commitment. The main justification for this is that such regimes require independent mon-
etary authorities. Therefore, in these cases, governments are less likely to pressure central
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banks to finance their deficits by generating excess liquidity or to keep interest rates low in
order to minimize the borrowing costs. In the language of Leeper (1991), fiscal policy is “pas-
sive” and monetary policy is “active,” such that there is no fiscal dominance. Consequently,
I conclude that a fiscal determinacy of the price level typically occurs in passive monetary
policy regimes. In the sample, the "no national framework" category (which includes many
partially dollarized Latin American economies) provides one example of such regimes. The
main implication of this finding is that running persistent deficits will not lead to unexpected
higher inflation unless monetary policy is not active. Finally, the analysis based on fiscal
space levels shows that the fiscal space is not useful in explaining the relationship between
primary balances and inflation. It is only possible to find a significant relationship within
fiscal groups after isolating the group of countries with no national MPF, which further cor-
roborates the study’s main conclusion on the importance of monetary policy.
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TABLE 1.2: Correlation coefficients between the model’s main variables
psy by π i θ
psy 100%
by -13% 100%
π 2% 0% 100%
i 5% -1% 66% 100%
θ 15% -19% 3% 0% 100%
Notes: psy: primary surplus over GDP, by: log of public debt over GDP, π: inflation rate, i:
short-term interest rate, θ: growth rate of GDP per capita
TABLE 1.3: Correlation coefficients of inflation with interest rates and the
primary balance by monetary policy framework
Correlation Inflation and Interest rates Inflation and primary balance
Discretionary regimes 88% 23%
Inflation targeting (IT) 40% 8%
Exchange rate targets (ERTs) 51% 15%
EU countries 87% 1%
No national framework (exclud. EU) 28% -15%
Mixed targets 85% -30%
Monetary targets (MTs) 75% -16%
Notes: Classification of the sample by monetary policy framework is based on the database
of Cobham (2018). The categories of "Mixed targets" and "Monetary targets" contain a small
number of observations over the sample period
TABLE 1.4: Correlation coefficients of inflation with the fiscal variables
and interest rates by fiscal space categories
Correlation S1 S2 Global
Inflation/ primary balance 7% 33% 32%
Inflation/ public debt -13% 3% -3%
Inflation/short-term interest rate 90% 82% 86%
Notes: S1: High fiscal space (50th upper percentile); S2: low fiscal space (50th lower percentile)
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TABLE 1.5: Panel VAR OLS Estimation
Reduced-form VAR
psy by θ i π
Lag 1 psy 0.830*** -0.667*** 0.252*** -0.130 -0.986
(0.0116) (0.1012) (0.0663) (0.0887) (0.9052)
Lag 1 by 0.001 0.947*** -0.009* -0.006 -0.020
(0.0006) (0.0054) (0.0035) (0.0047) (0.0483)
Lag 1 θ -0.007 -0.116*** 0.233*** -0.027 0.274
(0.0036) (0.0309) (0.0203) (0.0271) (0.2765)
Lag 1 i 0.001 -0.035* 0.032** 0.879*** 1.924***
(0.0020) (0.0171) (0.0112) (0.0150) (0.1525)
Lag 1 π 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.010*** 0.312***
(0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0228)
Constant -0.003 0.219*** 0.081*** 0.041* -0.057
(0.0023) (0.0205) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.1835)
Contemporaneous coefficients
psy by θ i π
psy 1 1.172*** -0.291** -0.538*** 1.656
(0.1757) (0.1094) (0.1553) (1.3234)
by 0 1 0.228*** -0.0445* -0.148
(0.0126) (0.0190) (0.1618)
θ 0 0 1 0.156*** -0.836***
(0.0289) (0.2471)
i 0 0 0 1 -5.828***
(0.1734)
π 0 0 0 0 1
Notes: *** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in brackets psy: primary surplus
over GDP, by: log public debt/GDP, θ: growth rate, i: interest rate, π: inflation rate.
Contemporaneous coefficients obtained through Cholesky orthogonalization using the ordering
of the variables that is displayed on the table
TABLE 1.6: Panel VAR GMM Estimation
psy by θ i π
Lag 1 psy 8.1820 -1.0367 0.2123 -2.2192 -11.4538
(10.7477) (0.6839) (0.4580) (3.4129) (8.5006)
Lag 1 by -0.3483 0.9448*** 0.0004 0.1029 -0.1038
(0.4910) (0.0284) (0.0248) (0.1571) (0.1534)
Lag 1 θ -3.3278 -0.0786 0.4696* 0.9481 0.9424
(4.7177) (0.2211) (0.2077) (1.4744) (0.6138)
Lag 1 i -0.3201 0.0947 -0.0026 0.8783** 3.8592**
(1.8159) (0.2080) (0.1238) (0.2925) (1.2843)
Lag 1 π 0.033 -0.0176 0.0027 -0.0005 0.1168*
(0.2301) (0.0277) (0.0152) (0.0319) (0.0501)
Notes: *** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Standard errors in brackets psy: primary surplus
over GDP, by: log public debt/GDP, θ: growth rate, i: interest rate, π: inflation rate. Forward
orthogonal transformation is applied to the variables. Hansen test of overidentified restrictions:
chi2(1375)=35.2, proba >chi2=1
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Figures
FIGURE 1.1: Variance decomposition of inflation using Cholesky (d.f. ad-
justed) factors
ps/y: primary surplus over GDP, b/y: log of public debt over GDP, π: inflation rate, i: short-
term interest rate, θ: growth rate of GDP per capita
FIGURE 1.2: Variance decomposition of public debt using Cholesky (d.f
adjusted) factors
ps/y: primary surplus over GDP, b/y: log of public debt over GDP, π: inflation rate, i: short-
term interest rate, θ: growth rate of GDP per capita
Figures 33
FIGURE 1.3: Response to a positive shock to the primary balance (with
95% confidence intervals)
FIGURE 1.4: Response to a positive shock to public debt (with 95% confi-
dence intervals)
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FIGURE 1.5: Response to a positive shock to interest rates (with 95% con-
fidence intervals)
FIGURE 1.6: Response to a negative shock to growth (with 95% confidence
intervals)
Figures 35
FIGURE 1.7: Response of Inflation to a positive shock to the primary bal-
ance and interest rates by Monetary Policy Framework
Notes: Regimes of Mixed and Monetary targets are excluded due to the low number of observations
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FIGURE 1.8: Response of Inflation to a negative shock to the primary bal-
ance by Monetary Policy Framework (with 95% confidence intervals)
Notes: Regimes of Mixed and Monetary targets are excluded due to the low number of observations
FIGURE 1.9: Response of Inflation to a one SD positive shock to the pri-
mary balance by Fiscal space group (with 95% confidence intervals)
Notes: The value of the shock corresponding to a one standard deviation of the primary balance is 0.02 in S1 and 0.026 in S2
Figures 37
FIGURE 1.10: Response of Inflation to a negative shock to the primary
balance by Fiscal space group (with 95% confidence intervals)
FIGURE 1.11: Response of Inflation to a one SD positive shock to interest
rates by Fiscal space group (with 95% confidence intervals)
Notes: The value of the shock corresponding to a one standard deviation in interest rates is 0.15 in S1 and 0.21 in S2
FIGURE 1.12: Response of Inflation to a shock to primary balances in low
fiscal space countries (with 95% confidence intervals)
38 Chapter 1. Effects of fiscal policy on inflation: a panel VAR approach
Appendix A: A short summary of the model of Cochrane (2019a)












t + Mt (1.14)
Where Q(t+j)t denotes the time t price for bonds with maturity t + j, B
(t+j)
t−1 the number of
these bonds at time t-1 and Mt−1 non-interest-bearing money at time t − 1. The variable
spt is the real primary surplus or deficit (excluding interest payments). This expression
therefore indicates that money at the end of period t corresponds to money available from
the previous period, plus the effects of bonds sales or purchases, less money soaked up by








And the nominal return on the portfolio of government debt as
Rnt+1 ≡










Shifting the time index forward in the above expression (1.14) to t+ 1, using the definition of



























and linearizing in terms of syt+1 leads to the expression
vt + rnt+1 − πt+1 − gt+1 = st+1 + ρvt+1 (1.15)
Where st+1 = ρ
syt+1
ev and ρ ≡ e−(r
n−π−g)21
Cochrane uses this identity to infer the value of st+1 from US bonds data. The analysis is on
the other hand based on the following expressions derived from this same identity. First, a


















21For rn − π = g, the expression becomes vt + rnt+1 − πt+1 − gt+1 = st+1 + vt+1.
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Second, an unexpected inflation identity obtained from time t + 1 innovations defined as
∆Et+1 = Et+1 − Et









































Where ω j is the rate of decline of the face value of debt with maturity j
All of these expressions imply the existence of a relationship between inflation, fiscal vari-
ables, GDP growth and returns on bond portfolios. In particular, equation (1.16) indicates
that a decline in the present value of surpluses (resulting from lower surpluses, lower GDP
growth or higher discount rates) corresponds to lower real market value of debt over GDP.
At the same time, equation (1.17) implies that a reduction of the present value of future sur-
pluses may be caused by unexpected inflation or negative returns on bonds. These negative
returns can be explained by a decline in nominal long-term bond prices. Similarly, these two
expressions can also be used to explain the mechanism by which changes in public debt or
expected future surpluses can affect unexpected inflation.
Equation (1.18) implies that a shock to the present value of future surpluses can lead to
a drawn-out period of inflation that slowly devalues the outstanding of long-term bonds.22 It
also implies that a government that funds itself with near-perpetuites (case of ω = ρ) can pay
off its current debt while completely ignoring real interest rate variation. Finally, it shows
that a rise in expected future inflation not accompanied by a change in the present value of
surpluses results in a decline in current inflation.23
22On the condition that ω > 0.
23We can note the parallel with the "stepping on a rake" mechanism described in Cochrane (2018) and Sims
(2011) by which an increase in interest rates by the monetary authority leads to a temporary decline in inflation,
followed by higher future inflation.
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Appendix C: A general overview of data
Based on the theoretical model, I use the following variables in the empirical study.
• Level of Primary Balance/GDP (%): data for primary balances are retrieved from the
dataset of Mauro et al. (2013). Missing data are completed from various databases such
as the OECD, the World Bank and the website http://moxlad-staging.herokuapp.com/home/es
for Latin American economies.
• Log of public debt to GDP: I use the underlying dataset of the paper Mauro et al.
(2013). Missing data are then completed from various sources such as the website
"tradingeconomics.com" and the database of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
• GDP growth (%): data of GDP per capita are extracted from the World Bank database.
• Short term interest rates: data are collected from several sources, more specifically
from the IFS, Eurostat, the OECD database and in some cases from central banks’
websites.
• Inflation rate: data are calculated from the Consumer Price Index (with 2010 as the
base year), taken from the World Bank database. Missing data are completed based on
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
Yearly evolution of data shows that the level of indebtedness has overall been increasing over
the recent years. By revenue groups (using the IMF classification), economies affected the
most by this increase are advanced economies (see figure below); whereas developing and
emerging economies have been deleveraging in the recent decade. In the particular case of
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low-income developing economies, the most extreme levels of debt have been observed in
the 1980s (scaled on the right axis on the figure below).
Inflation levels became very low for all countries after 1995 (see figure below, emerging
economies and total average are modeled on right axis). The most extreme levels have been
observed in the 1970s hyperinflation episode (not included in the figure), especially for ad-
vanced economies. In emerging economies, the maximum level of inflation is observed in
1990 (because of a very high inflation level in Argentina, Brazil and Peru).
Average Public debt to GDP evolution
(Low-income developing se-
ries plotted on the right axis)
Average Inflation
(Emerging middle-income and
total average series plotted on
the right axis)
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Appendix D: Classification of monetary policy frameworks
Cobham (2018) identified 32 different monetary policy frameworks, aggregated into the fol-
lowing 9 broad categories (based on target variables). Some of these categories are not rep-
resented by any country from the sample.
• Direct controls: multiple exchange rates and/or controls on direct lending, interest
rates, etc
• Fixed exchange rates: exchange rate fixed by intervention, some or no monetary in-
struments in use or pure currency board (domestic currency 100% backed by foreign
currency, no monetary instruments in use)
• Exchange rate targets (ERT)
• Monetary targets (MT)
• Inflation targeting (IT)
• Mixed targets: monetary targets and exchange rate fixes or targets, monetary dominant
or use of three full targets (or fixes) (money, ER and IT), whichever dominant
• Unstructured, loosely structured discretion: ineffective set of instruments and incoher-
ent mix of objectives
• Well structured discretion
• No national framework: this category encompasses cases where a different sovereign
currency is used (such as dollarization) in addition to membership in a currency union
(euro) (I distinguish between both cases during the analysis)
Using this classification for the sample (see following figure), it can be noted that the IT
regime has spread significantly after the 1990s, while the framework of "Monetary targets"
disappeared and "Exchange rate targets" and discretionary regimes24 became less frequent.
Number of countries by monetary policy framework (sample countries)
24Corresponding to the category "Unstructured or loosely structured discretion".
Appendix E: Estimated fiscal space 43
Appendix E: Estimated fiscal space
Table(a) provides the most recent available value (2016), the average and some descriptive
statistics of the calculated fiscal space measure. From a simple observation of data, the link
between the fiscal balance and fiscal space does not seem obvious, since both groups of
countries running substantial budget deficits and those with high surpluses can have either
low or high fiscal space.
Primary balance and fiscal space by country 2016
(Average primary balance plotted on the right axis)
However, correlation coefficients between fiscal space and the primary balance appear to
be significant in many countries (see table (b)), even though the correlation sign varies (it is
negative in cases like Japan, Australia, Brazil and the USA, and positive in some other cases,
such as Belgium, Mexico and Pakistan, etc). It can also be noted that, after the 2007 crisis,
the fiscal space measure has worsened for advanced economies in particular (for example
Japan, from 3.4 to 6.9 or the USA, from 1.8 to 2.9), reflecting the use of fiscal stimulus
after the recession. In contrast, emerging and developing economies, which suffered from a
deteriorating fiscal stance during the 1980s debt crisis, have had a better fiscal space indicator
over the last decade.
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Table (a): Inverse of fiscal space ratio (in years): descriptive statistics by country
2016






economies 2.00 1.55 0.25 7.38 1.01 851
Australia 1.13 0.64 0.26 1.13 0.22 37
Austria 1.69 1.31 0.81 1.70 0.21 37
Belgium 2.08 2.23 1.58 2.80 0.35 37
Canada 2.28 1.90 1.18 2.36 0.31 37
Denmark 0.71 0.97 0.50 1.45 0.25 37
Finland 1.16 0.71 0.25 1.16 0.30 37
France 1.82 1.11 0.45 1.82 0.42 37
Germany 1.52 1.29 0.74 1.93 0.32 37
Greece 3.64 2.67 1.04 3.82 0.73 37
Iceland 0.90 1.20 0.55 2.47 0.52 37
Ireland 2.70 2.05 0.67 3.52 0.81 37
Italy 2.80 2.42 1.74 2.84 0.27 37
Japan 7.09 4.33 1.75 7.38 2.02 37
Netherlands 1.41 1.38 0.91 1.68 0.20 37
New Zealand 0.65 0.97 0.40 1.71 0.35 37
Norway 0.65 0.71 0.52 1.04 0.16 37
Portugal 3.01 1.64 0.70 3.01 0.61 37
South Korea 1.11 0.74 0.31 1.13 0.26 37
Spain 2.62 1.35 0.35 2.62 0.60 37
Sweden 0.83 0.92 0.63 1.29 0.18 37
Switzerland 0.84 1.53 0.84 2.18 0.37 37
United Kingdom 2.12 1.44 1.02 2.23 0.37 37




2.16 3.16 0.16 236.11 11.32 666
Argentina 1.53 2.33 0.50 8.06 1.46 37
Brazil 1.66 1.49 0.85 2.23 0.36 37
Chile 0.93 1.21 0.16 4.00 1.05 37
Colombia 1.99 12.27 0.61 236.11 46.64 37
Costa Rica 4.25 4.63 1.60 8.88 2.36 37
Dominican
Republic
3.18 3.32 1.19 10.20 2.28 37
India 3.45 2.67 1.36 3.78 0.92 37
Mexico 1.96 2.28 1.50 3.73 0.59 37
Morocco 2.49 3.41 1.45 6.27 1.30 37
Pakistan 4.29 4.97 3.64 6.85 0.77 37
Panama 1.86 2.84 1.57 5.14 0.87 37
Paraguay 1.28 2.38 0.67 5.58 1.47 37
Peru 1.59 2.69 1.04 5.50 1.18 37
Philippines 2.78 3.78 2.23 6.62 0.93 37
South Africa 1.39 1.20 0.78 1.68 0.22 37
Thailand 1.88 1.75 0.21 3.39 0.78 37
Turkey 0.86 1.27 0.72 2.46 0.41 37
Uruguay 1.45 2.31 0.79 5.39 1.15 37
Low-income
developing 2.07 6.51 0.77 53.23 8.44 185
Bolivia 1.31 5.05 0.83 45.89 7.85 37
Ghana 4.25 3.99 1.45 10.12 2.03 37
Haiti 1.81 7.78 0.81 35.02 7.79 37
Honduras 1.18 3.19 0.77 6.76 1.57 37
Nicaragua 1.77 12.56 1.77 53.23 13.02 37
TOTAL 2.07 2.72 0.16 236.11 7.79 1702
Notes: Fiscal space is defined as the sum of total government revenues divided by public debt. The inverse of this
measure reflects the number of years of revenue needed to repay the outstanding of public debt at a given date
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Table (b): Correlation coefficients between the primary balance and the inverse of the
fiscal space ratio (The number of years of revenue needed to repay the debt)
Inverse of fiscal space ratio (years) Correlation coefficient
1980-2016 1980-2006 2007-2016 1980-2016 1980-2006 2007-2016
Argentina 2.3 2.6 1.6 31% 18% 67%
Australia 0.6 0.6 0.7 -47% -41% -41%
Austria 1.3 1.2 1.5 -47% -51% 16%
Belgium 2.2 2.3 2.0 63% 61% -57%
Bolivia 5.1 6.5 1.0 -71% -73% -8%
Brazil 1.5 1.4 1.7 -65% -64% -10%
Canada 1.9 1.8 2.1 -3% 40% -84%
Chile 1.2 1.5 0.5 15% 8% -71%
Colombia 12.3 16.3 1.4 -1% -3% -87%
Costa Rica 4.6 5.4 2.5 57% 47% -6%
Denmark 1.0 1.1 0.7 29% 10% -90%
Dominican Rep. 3.3 3.7 2.3 26% 25% -48%
Finland 0.7 0.6 0.9 -62% -45% -86%
France 1.1 0.9 1.6 -49% -27% -18%
Germany 1.3 1.2 1.7 -3% -6% -77%
Ghana 4.0 4.5 2.7 10% -6% 28%
Greece 2.7 2.4 3.4 -21% 10% 19%
Haiti 7.8 9.9 2.0 -2% 10% 18%
Honduras 3.2 3.9 1.3 45% 41% -82%
Iceland 1.2 1.0 1.8 -60% -42% -87%
India 2.7 2.4 3.3 35% 56% -56%
Ireland 2.0 1.9 2.6 -37% -12% -24%
Italy 2.4 2.4 2.6 9% 17% -14%
Japan 4.3 3.4 6.9 -84% -75% -92%
Mexico 2.3 2.5 1.8 66% 54% -35%
Morocco 3.4 3.9 2.0 -29% -33% -58%
Netherlands 1.4 1.4 1.4 -11% 19% -79%
New Zealand 1.0 1.1 0.7 -29% -72% -94%
Nicaragua 12.6 16.2 2.8 -1% 19% 74%
Norway 0.7 0.7 0.8 52% 43% 60%
Pakistan 5.0 5.2 4.4 55% 63% -52%
Panama 2.8 3.3 1.7 12% -11% -21%
Paraguay 2.4 2.9 1.0 19% 19% 23%
Peru 2.7 3.2 1.3 -43% -50% -24%
Philippines 3.8 3.9 3.4 22% 13% -58%
Portugal 1.6 1.3 2.5 -42% 3% 9%
South Africa 1.2 1.2 1.1 -10% 4% -88%
South Korea 0.7 0.6 1.0 -63% -49% -73%
Spain 1.4 1.1 2.0 -34% 58% -52%
Sweden 0.9 1.0 0.8 7% 9% -37%
Switzerland 1.5 1.6 1.2 -1% -33% 88%
Thailand 1.7 1.7 2.0 -44% -42% -34%
Turkey 1.3 1.3 1.1 46% 49% -26%
United Kingdom 1.4 1.3 1.9 -69% -15% -64%
United States 2.1 1.8 2.9 -66% -6% -49%
Uruguay 2.3 2.5 1.8 8% 1% 89%
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Appendix F: GMM methodology for estimating panel VAR models
The baseline PVAR model extends the model by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988)
to allow for p lags of m endogenous variables, k predetermined variables, and n strictly
exogenous variables, such that:








Alyi,t−l + Bxi,t + Csi,t + ε i,t (1.19)
with Im being an m × m identity matrix, yi,t representing an m × 1 vector of endogenous
variables, yi,t−l representing an m × 1 vector of lagged endogenous variables, xi,t being a
k × 1 vector of predetermined variables, si,t being an n × 1 vector of strictly exogenous
variables, and ε i,t being the idiosyncratic error vector. Al (m×m), B (m× k), and C (m× n)
being the parameter matrices. µi is an individual error component representing the fixed
effects.
First, fixed effects are removed. This can be done by transforming this relation into its
first difference or by applying the forward orthogonal transformation (suggested by Arellano
and Bover (1995) to minimize data losses resulting from data gaps (Appendix H)). Based on
the first difference representation, the derived first difference GMM moment conditions are
E(∆ε i,tyTi,j)=0 j ∈ {1,. . . , T-2}














After stacking the model over time, the moment conditions for each i are
E[QTi (∆Ei)] = 0
Considered as equivalent to the sample average g(Φ) = 1N ∑
N
i=1 gi(Φ) where:
gi(Φ) = (Qi ⊗ Im×m)(vec(∆Ei))
The number of moment conditions depends on the values of p, m, k, and n. There are two
solutions to reduce this number, namely to fix a maximal lag length after which no further
instruments are used, or to start with a different minimal lag. This idea can be applied to
the lagged endogenous variables and predetermined variables. The other is collapsing the








In addition, Qi reduces to a (T − 2)× (T − 2) matrix. The GMM estimator is derived by
minimizing the function
Π(Φ) = (∑Ni=1 Z
T





i vec(∆Yi − [∆Yi,−1∆Xi∆Si]Φ)),
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where Φ is an m× (m× p + k + n) matrix of parameters, defined as [A B C], where the
parameter matrices A, B, and C have the same dimensions as in equation (1.19); Zi is equal
to Qi ⊗ Im×m; and ΛZis the GMM weighting matrix. This matrix is defined in line with the
relevant literature through a one- or two-step estimation procedure. In the one-step estimation
procedure, it is defined following Binder, Hsiao, and Pesaran (2005)




where D serves as a (T − 1)× T linear transformation matrix such that for any matrix Vi,
DVi=∆Vi The two-step estimation uses the residuals of the one-step estimation as ∆Ei. In
addition, Sigmund and Ferstl (2017) address the case of a system GMM estimator, which
performs better than the first difference GMM estimator. The additional moment conditions
in this case are
E[ε i,t + (I −∑
p
j=1 Aj)µi(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)T]= 0 , t ∈ 3, 4, . . . T
E[ε i,t + (I −∑
p
j=1 Aj)µi(xi,t − xi,t−1)T]= 0 , t ∈ 2, 3, . . . T




i,t]= 0 , t ∈ 2, 3, . . . T
Appendix G: Orthogonalized and Generalized impulse response
functions
Suppose we have the following standard VAR(1) model





















Backward iteration yields the following expression
Zt = θ0 + θ(θ0 + θZt−2 + εt−1) + εt
Zt = θ0 + θ × θ0 + θ2Zt−2 + θ × εt−1 + εt
Similarly
Zt = θ0 + θ × θ0 + θ2(θ0 + θZt−3 + εt−2) + θ × εt−1 + εt
Zt = θ0 + θ × θ0 + θ2 × θ0 + θ3Zt−3 + θ2εt−2 + θ × εt−1 + εt
Zt = θ0(1 + θ + θ2) + θ3Zt−3 + (θ2εt−2 + θ × εt−1 + εt)
More generally




If the stability condition holds, then θn+1 would tend towards 0 as n approaches infinity. This
leads to the MA representation of the VAR model
Zt = µ + ∑ni=0 θ
iεt−i
Impulse response functions express the response of one endogenous variable to an impulse
in another endogenous variable. Based on the MA representation of the VAR model, IRF can
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where k is the number of periods after the shock to the rth component of and er is a 2× 1
vector with 1 in the rth column and 0 otherwise.
In the traditional impulse response functions, the disturbances terms are correlated since
they incorporate the contemporaneous effects of all the endogenous variables. To use the















































AZt = φ0 + φZt−1 + Wt (1.23)
In this case, Wt is a vector of uncorrelated white-noise disturbances.
Also
Zt = A−1φ0 + A−1φZt−1 + A−1Wt (1.24)
With: θ0 = A−1φ0, θ = A−1φ and εt = A−1Wt
Also



























It is clear that the error terms of εt are composites of the two shocks from the two variables
of the model. Because of this feedback effect, it is difficult to estimate the structural model.
But after estimating the reduced-form VAR model, it is possible to decompose εt by finding
a matrix A such that εt = A−1Wt
Since the objective is to isolate a disturbances vector that would have a diagonal variance
covariance matrix, one way is using the Cholesky decomposition on the variance covariance
matrix of εt to find a lower triangular matrix A−1, such that A−1A′−1 = E(εε′). Simultane-
ously, the variance covariance matrix of Wt will be diagonal since E(ww′) = AE(εε′)A′ =
AA−1A′−1A′ = I
Using the structural model, the orthogonal impulse response function are obtained




such that Bk = θk A−1
The main limit of using the Cholesky-decomposition is its dependence on the ordering
of the variables. To remedy this issue, Pesaran and Shin (1998) suggested an alternative ap-
proach which is the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRF). They described GIRF
as the outcome of a conceptual experiment in which the effect over time of a hypothetical
vector of shocks δ hitting the economy at time t is compared with a base-line profile at time
t + k given the economy’s history. Therefore the disturbances vector comprises both the
shocks expected to hit the economy before t and the vector δ. Formally:
GIRF(k, δ, Ωt−1) = E[Zi,t+k|ε i,t = δr, Ωt−1]− E[Zi,t+k|Ωt−1] (1.26)
With Ωt−1 being the set of available information about economic history at time t− 1. The
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idea of Pesaran and Shin (1998) approach is choosing to shock only one element (the rth
element) and integrate the effects of other shocks using the historically observed distribution
of the errors. The Σε being the variance covariance matrix of εt, GIRF are thus expressed as
GIRF(k, r, Σε) = E[Zi,t+k|ε i,t,r = δr, Σε]− E[Zi,t+k|Σε] (1.27)
As pointed out by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996), if the vector of random shocks is consid-
ered as jointly normally distributed, then the conditional expectation of the shocks is a linear
function of δ
E(εtεt,r = δr) = (σ1r, σ2r, . . . , σmr)
′
σ−1rr δr = Σεσ
−1
rr δr (1.28)
The generalized impulse response of the effect of a shock to the rth equation at time t on
Zt+k is given by






By setting δr =
√
σrr , and considering that σr,r is the r-th diagonal element of Σε, the
following expression is obtained
GIRF(k, r, Σε) = θkΣε(σr,r)−1/2 (1.29)
Appendix H: Forward orthogonal transformation
The forward orthogonal transformation was suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) to min-
imize data losses due to data gaps. Based on the following panel VAR model that includes
fixed effects




Alyi,t−l + Bxi,t + Csi,t + εi,t (1.30)
where (yi,t) is a vector of endogenous variables for the (ith) cross-section at time (t), (yi,t−1) a
vector of lagged endogenous variables, (xi,t) a vector of predetermined variables potentially
correlated with past error terms, (si,t) a vector of strictly exogenous variables independent
from error terms and (εi,t) a vector of i.i.d. disturbance terms. When the first difference





Al∆yi,t−l + B∆xi,t + C∆si,t + ∆εi,t (1.31)
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2.1 Introduction
Among macroeconomic issues raised by recent years’ expansionary fiscal policies, the ex-
pected response of the current account (CA) balance is one of the most ambiguous and dif-
ficult to understand and predict. On the one hand, some theoretical models suggest that
fiscal deficits are accompanied by CA deficits if the relationship between private savings and
investment is constant. On the other hand, large budget deficits increase interest rates and re-
duce the ability to borrow in international markets and, thereby, affect investments negatively
and domestic savings positively, leading to CA surpluses. Understanding the relationship
between fiscal policy and the CA is important especially that many countries have simulta-
neously suffered from fiscal and CA deficits in the recent years, and have highly prioritized
improving these deficits by formulating appropriate economic policies.
So far, the existing empirical research on the topic produced mixed results across re-
gions and countries. The main focus of the present paper is to understand whether fiscal
cyclicality explains some of this heterogeneity based on data for 51 countries, from 2002Q1
to 2018Q4. Using the intertemporal model of the CA as a theoretical basis, the empirical
investigation includes correlation coefficients, a panel VAR and a times series VAR analy-
ses. The main novelty of the approach I use lies in the following features: (1) the adoption
of a fully structural panel VAR that decomposes impulse responses into common and id-
iosyncratic components, while considering the underlying sample heterogeneity (based on
Pedroni (2013)), (2) the use of quarterly disaggregate fiscal data in addition to aggregate
fiscal variables, and (3) the use of fiscal cyclicality to explain the relationship between the
main variables. More particularly, the decomposition of impulse responses between com-
mon and idiosyncratic components provides the advantage of accounting for cross-sectional
dependence since responses of shocks that are common across members of the panel can be
isolated. In addition, this approach is useful in assessing the homogeneity within groups of
countries by comparing between idiosyncratic and common responses to shocks of the same
nature, in terms of sign and magnitude.
In the panel VAR study, the obtained results indicate that the ability of fiscal policy to
affect the CA varies based on the interaction of both variables with the business cycle. In-
deed, the expected negative impact of aggregate government spending only appears clearly
in countercyclical economies, with a procyclical CA. This is mainly exlained by a negative
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response of the CA to property income (and also to social benefits in some countries), in
this group. Nevertheless, accounting for cyclicality is not sufficient to explain the dynamics
between disaggregate fiscal data and the CA in all country groups. This results from a sub-
stantial heterogeneity within each group, reflected in both quartile impulse responses and the
decomposition into idiosyncratic and common shocks.
In a subsequent step, I derive the main determinants of the CA by country from the
present value model using a time-series Bayesian VAR approach. Results show that the
largest components of public spending (compensation of employees, intermediate consump-
tion, and social benefits) do not strongly contribute to the CA variation. This finding implies
that aggregate demand (specifically the change in imports of goods and services resulting
from changes in government consumption and wages) is not the main channel through which
fiscal policy affects the current account. In contrast, property income is found to be a sig-
nificant CA determinant in countries where sovereign credit risk is perceived as relatively
high by the market over the sample period (such as Italy, Spain and Portugal). Additionally,
subsidies play a significant role in the CA variation of some countries (e.g. Croatia, Austria,
Spain and Bolivia).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, a literature
review on the relationship between the CA and fiscal policy is provided. Section 3 discusses
the theoretical background. Section 4 shortly reviews some contributions of the literature
on fiscal cyclicality. In Section 5, the dataset and methodology are decribed. The main
stylized facts from a preliminary correlation analysis are provided in Section 6. Sections
7 and 8 present the main findings of the empirical study based on the Structural-panel and
time-series VAR analyses. Finally, the last section offers some concluding remarks.
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2.2 Literature review
There are numerous literatures and theories on the link between the CA and fiscal policy.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that the CA moves in the same direction as the fiscal
balance (as in the twin deficits hypothesis1 or the Mundell-Fleming framework2). In contrast,
some other theories suggest that fiscal deficits might actually improve the CA. One example
is the two-country real business cycle model of Baxter (1995) that shows that a transitory
reduction in distortionary tax rates on labor income, financed by future lump-sum taxes,
may improve the CA but worsen the government budget. Another example is the model of
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a) which states that a government spending increase tends to lead
to an improvement of the CA as consumers smooth consumption (following the movement
in output caused by the increase). In addition, this model also implies that fiscal expansions
may depreciate the nominal and real exchange rate as a result of higher interest rates.
Similarly, opposing views can be found in the literature on the relationship between the
CA and components of the budget balance. For instance, the Ricardian Equivalence Hy-
pothesis (Barro (1974)) implies that there is no relationship between a CA deficit and taxes
because tax changes have no impact on private consumption. Conversely, the intertemporal
model of the CA implies a straightforward and negative relationship between the CA and
government expenditures (see following section).
In the empirical literature, the link between fiscal policy and the CA is analyzed through
different approaches. One approach is based on the "twin deficits" theoretical literature and
consists in directly examining the relationship between fiscal and CA balances (see exam-
ples in Appendix A). Another approach aims at uncovering the main determinants of the
CA using broader models that also include fiscal variables (e.g. Chinn and Prasad (2003)).
Finally, another category of research attempts to empirically verify the implications of the
intertemporal model for the CA (discussed in the following section). Overall, the empirical
literature is also characterized by a lack of consensus. Litsios and Pilbeam (2017) explain
this disaccord by the different methodologies used and the underlying structural forces in the
sample countries that may lead to different correlations.
1Formally, the relationship between the CA and the fiscal balance is clear based on the identity Sp− I + FB =
CA, derived from national income identities, where Sp represents private savings, I national investment, and FB
is the fiscal balance, with FB = T − G = Sg (which is government savings). G is government expenditures on
goods and services and T is tax revenues.
2This model shows that a budget deficit leads to a CA deficit through an increase in interest rates, in addition
to other transmission channels that depend on the exchange rate regime and the nature of capital mobility.
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2.3 Theoretical background
The main theoretical background for the present study is the intertemporal model of the
current account as discussed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995b). It is based on an expression
for the current account that can be derived from two elements. The first element is the national
income identity and is used to get the following expression of the CA
CAt = rt At + Yt − Ct − Gt − It (2.1)
where At is the economy’s stock of net foreign claims at the end of period (t− 1), rt is the
net interest rate paid on these assets, Yt is the net domestic product, Gt is government con-
sumption, and It is net investment. The second element is the permanent income hypothesis
that implies the existence of a relationship between consumption and the present value of the
income path (equivalent to the present value of the constant income). Based on this idea, the
permanent level of consumption can be expressed in terms of the permanent levels of the net
domestic product, investment, and government expenditures.
These two elements yield the following expression that constitutes the prevalent theoret-
ical framework for studying the dynamics of the CA (details on the derivation of the model
are provided in Appendix B).






r̃t At + Ỹt − G̃t − Ĩt
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The letters with a tilde represent the permanent level of the variables and (β̃/R)σ is the









where the market discount rate for consumption at time s is
Rt,s =
1
∏sv=t+1 (1 + rv)
(2.4)
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It can be clearly seen from this approach that the intertemporal model rests on the funda-
mental idea that the CA movements can be explained by permanent income fluctuations. In
other words, the model implies that the CA can be perceived as a consumption smoothing
tool by domestic residents (through foreign borrowing and lending). This idea is reflected
in Equation (2.2) where the CA appears to depend on the short-run components of output,
government spending, investment, in addition to net foreign claims multiplied by the short-
run component of interest rates and a final term that represents consumption tilting due to
differences between world interest rates and the domestic rate of time preference.3 This last
term implies that if the domestic rate of time preference is lower than future world interest
rates,4 there will be a secular tendency toward CA deficits, higher external debt and declining
consumption (because in that case (̃β\R)
σ
< 1).
Still, empirically, short-run dynamics are not often accounted for in studies of the in-
tertemporal model of the CA. Instead, the most common approach is based on the following










where the net output NOt is given by NOt = Yt − It − Gt and ∆NOt+i = NOt+i −
NOt+i−1, with Yt, It, Gt representing output, investment and government spending, respec-
tively. The non-stochastic world real interest rate r is assumed to be positive. This model can
be obtained from the total income identity with the use of an expression for the permanent
level of consumption (see more details in Appendix C). The commonly used approach to
verify the present value model (PVM) of the CA is the methodology of Campbell (1987) and
Campbell and Shiller (1987) (see Appendix C).
Some authors succeeded in verifying the PVM through empirical data (Campa and Gav-
ilan (2011); Hoffmann (2013)). However, more frequently, the PVM is rejected in the em-
pirical literature (Ghosh and Ostry (1995); Milbourne and Otto (1992); Otto (1992); Sheffrin
and Woo (1990)). Usually, the modeled CA exhibits less volatility than the actual data.
Many studies attempted to uncover the reasons behind the empirical failure of the PVM.
3It can be noted that consumption for a consumer that does not tolerate intertemporal substitution (σ = 0)
is always set at the permanent level of r̃t At + Ỹt − G̃t − Ĩt. Therefore, consumption tilting from the permanent
value mainly depends on the term defined in (2.3)
4Implying the home country is more impatient than the rest of the world and therefore the present value of
future income is perceived as lower than in the rest of the world
2.3. Theoretical background 57
In some of them, inclusion of shocks to interest rates has been reported to improve the fit of
the PVM (Bergin and Sheffrin (2000)). Some other reasons have been discussed by Nason
and Rogers (2006).5 Most of these discussed factors were found to matter in some way but
not sufficiently to replicate the PVM predictions. For instance, the attention paid to transitory
fiscal shocks was found to be justified but lacking some other important factors. In particular,
the internalized risk premium6 and exogenous world real interest rate shocks were identified
as some of the important factors that had to be included.
In the present research, I focus on the impact of changes in government spending on
the CA. Fiscal shocks have been found to significantly explain some of CA variability in
many studies. Abbas et al. (2011) identified three major channels of transmission of these
shocks to the CA (changes in aggregate demand and in the real exchange rate caused by
government’s consumption or investment, and interest rates). On the other hand, Ahmed
(1986) and Ahmed and Rogers (1995) explained the importance of fiscal shocks by the fact
that they affect external borrowing decisions. External borrowing is also closely related to the
spread between domestic and world interest rates (as discussed in Nason and Rogers (2006)).
This spread determines the costs of using the CA to smooth consumption for a given open
economy (through foreign assets). Therefore, shocks that affect these costs (e.g. shocks to
a country’s risk premium) and those that affect fiscal variables in general (e.g. by increasing
debt), are important in explaining the CA’s response to fiscal policy.
One example of such shocks are those to the business cycle. Formally, it can be seen
from the expression (2.2) that there is an interaction between the CA and cyclical components
of the permanent income variables. Among those components are short-run fluctuations in
government spending. For this reason, I consider that the nature of the response of fiscal
variables to business cycle fluctuations is a determining factor in the interaction between
the CA and government spending. More concretely, there are more chances of observing
a reaction of the CA to fiscal shocks in a context where fiscal policy strongly adjusts to
the business cycle than in a context where fiscal policy is acyclical (because of the size of
the cyclical component). This intuition is present in the intertemporal model of the CA. In
addition, as both expressions (2.2) and (2.1) imply a "ceteris paribus" negative relationship
5The ’usual suspects’ for the PVM rejection by the data have been identified by Nason and Rogers (2006)
as the non-separable preferences, fiscal policy, real interest rate shocks, external imperfect international capital
mobility, and internalized risk premium.
6This factor alters the labor market response to permanent income shocks.
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between government spending and the CA, it is natural that this relationship would be altered
if the model’s variables are endogenous (in particular if the cyclical components of output
and those of government spending are correlated). Therefore, I consider that fiscal cyclicality
can provide an explanation to the discrepancy in the literature that has been discussed in the
previous section. This assumption is all the more justified by the fact that fiscal cyclicality
has been reported to vary across countries (see following section).
2.4 Literature on cyclicality
Expectations regarding fiscal cyclicality in the literature vary based on the theoretical frame-
work. The traditional Keynesian view is based on the idea that public expenditures should
move in a countercyclical fashion and act as a catalyst for aggregate demand in times of
recession. In contrast, the neoclassical framework precludes any countercyclical role for fis-
cal policy and often considers that government expenditures follow an exogenously given
process (see Lucas Jr and Stokey (1983)).7
Empirical studies on fiscal cyclicality have also led to mixed results. The most common
findings indicate that policy tends to be less countercyclical than what the Keynesian theory
suggests. More specifically, several empirical studies have found that fiscal policy in de-
veloping countries is procyclical (Gavin and Perotti (1997); Talvi and Végh (2005); Braun
(2001); Lane (2003); Thornton (2008)). Conversely, research on OECD economies usually
reports an acyclical or slightly countercyclical fiscal policy (Lane (2003); Wyplosz (2002)).
On the other hand, according to Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), the CA would
be procyclical in the standard model, since borrowing from abroad should be countercyclical
to ensure consumption-smoothing.8 They provided the following explanations to a counter-
cyclical CA: a procyclical investment that dominates the savings effect, distortions in con-
sumption induced by temporary policies leading to countercyclical savings (since consump-
tion increases in prosperous times), and residents’ dissaving as capital inflows increase in
prosperous times.
7Lane (2003) noted that, in the neoclassical framework, government consumption would be expected to be
countercyclical if public and private consumption were substitutes in utility, and procyclical if they were comple-
ments.
8Changes in the CA can be explained by the capital account if the impact of international reserves is ignored.
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2.5 Data and Approach
This study is conducted in three steps. In the first step, I calculate cyclicality measures
and perform a correlation analysis. Second, I estimate a panel VAR model based on the
heterogeneous structural approach of Pedroni (2013). In a final step, I use a time series VAR
model to proceed with a country by country analysis.
2.5.1 Correlation analysis and cyclicality measures
For the first step, quarterly data for a sample of 57 high- and middle-income countries for the
period 1995Q1–2019Q2 are used (Data description is provided in Appendix D). Data are ex-
tracted in real terms or deflated through a GDP deflator, and are on a per capita basis. Fiscal
cyclicality is measured in line with the recommendations of Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh
(2004). They argued that the concept of fiscal policy cyclicality should be defined based
on policy instruments, that is, government consumption and tax rates, as opposed to endoge-
nously determined outcomes (the fiscal balance or tax revenues).9 Further, they demonstrated
how the use of any variable expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) could
be misleading in analyzing cyclical dynamics. Therefore, I choose to rely on data in domes-
tic currencies instead of ratios over GDP. The cyclical components are extracted through
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter as it is a frequently used approach in the literature on fiscal
cyclicality.10
After a general examination of the HP-de-trended data, from which I draw some stylized
facts, I introduce disaggregate fiscal data into the analysis. This additional step is justified by
the need to explain the mechanism through which fiscal spending can affect the CA with more
clarity. The use of disaggregate spending data has been done in many previous studies on
various topics (e.g. Lane (2003), Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), Castles and Dowrick
(1990), Marattin and Salotti (2011)) but can be more rarely found in the literature related to
the relationship between the CA and fiscal variables.
Disaggregate data of government expenditures are obtained from the Government Fi-
nance Statistics (GFS) databases of Eurostat and the IMF. The Eurostat database is based
on the ESA 2010 accounting standards. Government expenditures are defined as the sum of
9Tax rates are not used in the present study because data are more difficult to obtain.
10Talvi and Végh (2005), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), Calderon et al. (2017).
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12 ESA categories11 (see the definitions provided in Appendix E), which I reduce to the 6
major components that are used in the IMF GFS database, in order to combine data from
the two sources. Due to data availability, the sample is reduced to 51 countries for the pe-
riod 2002Q1–2018Q4 when disaggregate data are included. Using disaggregate data, I also
proceed with cyclical components extraction and correlation coefficients analysis.
2.5.2 Panel VAR approach
In the second step, I estimate a linear VAR model for the Current Account using variables
from the intertemporal model of equation (2.2). At this stage, data are converted from do-
mestic currency to percentage of GDP to be able to conduct panel analysis. I also proceed
with a demeaning of the data. The employed estimation method is the heterogeneous struc-
tural VAR approach of Pedroni (2013). Its unique feature is the fact that it accounts for the
presence of heterogeneity within the panel. The heterogeneity that is accounted for goes be-
yond the simple fixed effects and extends to all of the dynamics of the model. And it can
be concretely observed through the decomposition of the different impulse responses into
responses to idiosyncratic and common shocks. The estimated VAR model for a country i is
expressed as follows
Zit = AZi,t−1 + εit (2.6)
With the vector Zit defined as
Zit = [Git rit NFAit Iit CAit]
′
where Git is total government expenditures of country i and is replaced by disaggregate
government spending variables in a subsequent step, rit is the short-term interest rate, NFAit
represents the net foreign assets, Iit is net investment, and CAit the Current Account Balance.
As opposed to the PVM of equation (2.5), two additional variables are included: Net foreign
assets as they have often been found to affect CA volatility (e.g., Das (2016),Chinn and
Prasad (2003)) and short-term interest rates since they improve the fit of the present value
model when included (Bergin and Sheffrin (2000)).
11ESA 2010 Manual, p. 274.
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I use the model to study the impact of changes in government spending on the CA for
groups based on fiscal cyclicality measures (terciles). The econometric approach12 can be
summarized as follows (see more details in Appendix F):
1. Estimating the reduced-form VAR model (2.6) country by country





and using them to estimate a VAR model for the sample (or group)
3. Using the identifying restrictions to obtain the structural composite and common shocks
estimates from the estimations in steps 1 and 2, respectively
4. For each country, running a regression between its composite shocks and the common
shocks to obtain the idiosyncratic shocks (corresponding to the residuals)
5. Computing the composite, common and member-specific impulse response functions
6. Using the distribution of the estimated responses to describe properties of the sample
(median, first and third quartiles)
The decomposition of the different responses between those to idiosyncratic and those to
common shocks provides many advantages. The first advantage is the control for cross-
sectional dependence, since responses of shocks that are common across members of the
panel can be isolated. The second advantage is the ability to assess the homogeneity within
groups of countries by comparing between idiosyncratic and common responses to shocks of
the same nature, both in terms of sign and magnitude. More precisely, it is expected that most
of the responses would be to common shocks for a group that is highly homogeneous. On the
other hand, if the relationship between variables is the same across countries but shocks are
mostly idiosyncratic (low dependence within the group), then the share of the idiosyncratic
response from the total response would be higher but the sign of this response would be the
same as the common response.
The identification strategy is based on a scenario of an exogenous fiscal policy and an
endogenous CA balance. Thereby government expenditures are placed first and the CA last
in the Cholesky ordering (same ordering as in equation (2.6)). Also, as a robustness check,
different orderings are tried for the model’s variables in the first estimation of the model with
12Implemented using an algorithm by Góes (2016) based on Pedroni (2013).
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aggregate data. Finally, in the model with disaggregate data, Granger causality tests are used
as a reference to order disaggregate fiscal variables.
2.5.3 Country by country analysis
In a subsequent step, the study is supplemented with a time-series analysis of CA fiscal
determinants using a Bayesian VAR approach based on an independent normal-Wishart prior
and Gibbs sampling with 10000 iterations and 200 burn-in draws for distribution properties
of unconditional posteriors. I also compare results from this estimation with those based on
a Litterman-Minnesota prior (more details are provided in Appendix G).
2.6 Stylized facts
This section presents an overview of the main stylized facts uncovered through a general
examination of the collected data. Different sample splits are applied, comparing OECD
with non-OECD countries, as well as different regional and income groups.
Stylized fact 1: Generally, fiscal policy tends to be countercyclical or acyclical in the
OECD group and procyclical in non-OECD economies
In line with results of previous empirical studies, I find that the fiscal policy in OECD coun-
tries is, in most cases, either acyclical or countercyclical whereas in developing economies,
and particularly Latin American countries, it is procyclical (Table 2.1).
Stylized fact 2: The CA tends to behave acyclically or countercyclically
As opposed to expectations, the CA does not appear to be procyclical during the studied pe-
riod (Table 2.1). The correlation coefficient between cyclical components of the CA and GDP
is negative in 33 countries and positive in 18.13 This result could be due to dynamics of the
exchange rate (a positive reaction to output) or as previously stated in section 2, to counter-
cylical savings, high capital inflows in expansions or procyclical investments that overpower
the savings effects. It could also be explained by a positive correlation between output and
expectations of future income, leading to a positive response of private consumption and
thereby a negative impact on the CA (based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis).
13Countries with the most procyclical CA include Croatia (0.77) and Canada (0.56).
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Stylized fact 3: The correlation between the CA and government consumption ex-
penditure differs across countries leading to poor average coefficients by groups
The average correlation coefficients between cyclical components of the CA and general gov-
ernment consumption expenditures by income groups and by regions are weak (Table 2.1).
Nonetheless, coefficients by country are not small, they just differ substantially within each
group. This result is not surprising given the fact that countries are characterized by different
cyclicality of both fiscal policy and the current account.
After inclusion of disaggregate data, I then examine the share of each category of public
spending in total expenditures and estimate the correlation with GDP and the CA.
Stylized fact 4: The most significant components of government spending are “Com-
pensation of employees’,’ “Social benefits” and “Intermediate consumption of goods
and services”
The most significant components appear to be “Compensation of employees,” “Social bene-
fits,” and “Intermediate consumption of goods and services,” with a total share of 75% in all
expenditures (Table 2.2). It can also be noted that the shares for “Compensation for employ-
ees” and, especially, “Intermediate consumption of goods and services” are relatively larger
for non-OECD/ middle-income economies compared to OECD/high-income economies. The
opposite is true for social benefits.
Stylized fact 5: Procyclicality of middle-income economies appears more notably in
“Compensation of employees” and “Intermediate consumption”
Fiscal cyclicality measures for disaggregate spending data (Table 2.3) indicate that the pro-
cyclicality of non-OECD/middle-income is more notable in “Compensation of employees”
and “Intermediate consumption of goods and services.”
Stylized fact 6: Average correlation by groups between disaggregate government
expenditures and the CA is small due to differences across countries
Average correlation coefficients (Tables 2.3 and 2.4) reveal an overall weak relationship be-
tween cyclical components of disaggregate expenditures and the CA, by groups of countries.
As in stylized fact 3, these small figures result from significant discrepancies between coun-
tries of each group and not from a weak interrelation between fiscal variables and the CA.
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2.7 The CA and Aggregate Government Spending
In the following sections, I use the structural panel VAR approach of Pedroni (2013) to an-
alyze the relationship between government spending and the CA by groups of countries.
This approach controls for country fixed effects and allows for full heterogeneity of dynam-
ics across countries. Its main advantage compared to standard panel VAR methods is the
decomposition of individual shocks into idiosyncratic and common components. The identi-
fication strategy is based on a scenario of an exogenous fiscal policy and an endogenous CA.
Thereby, in the ordering of the variables, government expenditures are placed first and the
CA last (alternative orderings are tried in Appendix H).
2.7.1 General estimation of the CA model for the whole sample
In a first step, I proceed with a general estimation of median composite impulse responses
of the CA to a one-unit shock in the other variables of the model (Equation (2.6)). The
result is shown on Figure 2.1 with confidence intervals based on 100 bootstrap repetitions.
From previous theoretical discussions and empirical studies, it would be expected that total
government spending would have a negative impact on the CA balance. Results show a
negative median response. However, the wideness of confidence bands suggests that the
relationship is not statistically strong.
To verify the robustness of this finding, I use the distribution of all individual responses
to plot the median, average, and the 1st and 3rd quartiles of responses. Since this repre-
sentation shows the response of most of the sample, it is more informative than the median
with bootstrap confidence intervals or the traditional averaging methods used for panels. The
resulting figure (Figure 2.2) shows that the response of the CA to total government expen-
ditures and to interest rate shocks is disparate across sample countries.14 Conversely, the
CA responds positively and significantly to a change in net foreign assets and negatively to
a change in gross fixed capital formation in both Figures 2.1 and 2.2. It is also important
to note that the magnitude of the response to government spending and interest rate shocks
is smaller than the magnitude of the response to net foreign assets.15 Finally, to verify the
validity of the identification strategy, the model is re-estimated using different orderings of
14More precisely, 22 out of the 51 countries show an immediate positive response
15Responses of the CA to net foreign assets, gross fixed capital formation and the interest rate are not discussed
in the remainder of the paper as they do not differ, in subsequent estimations, from those in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
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the variables. Results (reported on Appendix H) show no significant difference between the
alternative specifications.
2.7.2 The impact of cyclicality on the relationship between the CA and total
government spending
In this section, I examine whether fiscal cyclicality explains the discrepancy across countries
in the relationship between the two key variables. To do so, I first divide the sample into
terciles based on fiscal cyclicality (i.e. the correlation between cyclical components of GDP
and total government expenditures, as in Table 2.1). The aim is to separate the sample into
countercyclical, acyclical, and procyclical countries. The following groups are obtained:
• Group 1: countercyclical countries, corresponding to the 1st tercile group in terms of
measures of fiscal cyclicality (correlation with GDP < -0.09)
• Group 2: countries in the 2nd tercile group, with a fiscal cyclicality measure between
-0.09 and 0.05
• Group 3: group of procyclical countries (3rd tercile group) with a fiscal cyclicality
measure > 0.05
I also distinguish, within each group, between countries in which the CA is positively cor-
related with GDP and those with a negative correlation. The model is then re-estimated for
each of these groups. If the ability of fiscal policy to affect the CA depends on its interaction
with the business cycle, then the response of the CA to fiscal shocks would be homogeneous
within groups of similar cyclicality. For example, if the CA is procyclical, then a negative
relationship between government spending and the CA would be clearly visible in counter-
cyclical economies. On the other hand, the relationship would be less predictable if fiscal
policy or the current account are acyclical.
This assumption is confirmed through an estimation of average correlation coefficients
by cyclicality group (Table 2.5). First, I remark that the correlation between the CA and gov-
ernment spending is higher in countercyclical economies. Second, I note that this correlation
is only negative in countercyclical economies with a procyclical CA (10 out of 51 countries)
or -with a smaller coefficient- in procyclical economies with a countercyclical CA (also 10
out of 51 countries). The relationship between the two variables is on the other hand positive
for countercylical economies with a countercyclical CA.
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Using the structural panel VAR model, quartile composite impulse responses are esti-
mated for the cyclical groups of Table 2.5. The outcome, on Figure 2.3, confirms the findings
from the correlation analysis for countercyclical economies. Response in the case of pro-
cyclical economies is statistically less significant as the median lies close to zero. I conclude
from this section that, as opposed to predictions from the theory, a positive shock to aggre-
gate government spending does not necessarily induce a negative response from the current
account. Cyclicality of both fiscal policy and the CA affect the relationship between the
two variables. Finally, response of the CA to public spending shocks is more uniform and
significant in countercyclical economies.
2.8 The CA and Disaggregate Government Spending
I then replace total government expenditures in the model by disaggregate fiscal data.16 A
first analysis is made on the countercyclical group, where a significant response was noted in
the previous section (more details on this group are provided in Appendix I).
2.8.1 Response of the CA to disaggregate fiscal spending variables in counter-
cyclical economies
After separating the group of countercyclical economies based on CA cyclicality, the follow-
ing conclusions are drawn.
In the countercylical group with a countercyclical CA
As reported in the previous section, the CA responds positively to a positive government
spending shock in the group of countercyclical economies with a countercyclical CA. De-
tailed responses by country show that all 7 countries of the group respond positively to the
shock, except for Switzerland. By spending component, the average response of the CA is
positive after a shock to all variables, except subsidies. Nonetheless, the highest responses
on impact are those to social benefits and compensation of employees. At the second quarter,
the responses to intermediate consumption and subsidies get significantly higher (and also
compensation of employees to a lesser extent), whereas the responses to property income17
16As it is difficult to order disaggregate expenditures based on economic logic, Granger causality tests are used
as a reference. The following ordering of the variables is obtained: property income, subsidies, compensation of
employees, intermediate consumption, social benefits, other expenditures, interest rate, net foreign assets, gross
fixed capital formation, and the CA.
17Property income comprises payable income such as interests, dividends and rents on natural resources. The
share of interest payments is however the most significant one (particularly interests on debt securities).
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and social benefits drop.
This implies that the immediate response of the CA to social benefits and compensation
of employees is the main driver behind the positive response to total government spending on
impact, while responses to intermediate consumption and subsidies also explain the positive
response in the second quarter. Details by country indicate that the response to social benefits
is positive on impact in all countries, except France. On the other hand, the group’s average
response to compensation of employees, intermediate consumption and subsidies is mainly
driven by responses of two countries: Latvia and Slovakia. Therefore, I conclude that the
positive response in this group is essentially explained by the positive response of the CA to
social benefits, which also represent the largest and most countercyclical component of total
government spending, on average (see Appendix I).
In the countercylical group with a procyclical CA
In this group of 10 countries, the CA responds negatively to a positive government spending
shock. The average response of the CA to this shock is negative in all countries, except
Denmark. By component, the average response of the CA is negative on impact only after
a shock to property income (and to a lesser extent “other expenses”). The highest positive
responses are the ones to intermediate consumption and to subsidies. These responses get
negative in the third quarter.
Details by country indicate that, on impact, the response of the CA to property income
shocks is negative in all countries, except Austria and Belgium. In the following quarters,
the response of Japan and Croatia gets notably positive. The negative weight of the response
to property income in total government spending is mitigated by the positive response to
intermediate consumption and subsidies, that can be observed in most countries. Finally,
the response to social benefits is negative in most countries but appears positive on average,
primarily because of a positive and high response in Luxembourg and Belgium. To sum up,
in this group, there is a negative response in total spending because of a negative response
to property income and (although less homogeneous) a negative response to social benefits.
This can be seen on Figure 2.4.
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2.8.2 Decomposition between common and idiosyncratic shocks in the model
with disaggregate fiscal variables
It has been seen from the previous section that there are differences across countries in terms
of the response of the CA to the different spending components. These differences are even
more marked in the groups of acyclical and procyclical economies. Although different other
groupings of countries are tried (such as regions and income), it is difficult to detect obvious
patterns for each component. The heterogeneity that characterizes the relationship between
the CA and spending components is confirmed by the decomposition of composite shocks
into idiosyncratic and common shocks.
Figure 2.5 (based on fiscal cyclicality groups) reveals that most composite responses are
characterized as responses to idiosyncratic rather than to common shocks.18 Further, re-
sponses to common shocks are opposite in direction to responses to idiosyncratic shocks in
some cases. That is because countries within each panel do not respond in a similar way to
global shocks.19 For instance, the 2007 financial crisis led to a deterioration of the fundamen-
tals of some countries (a negative shock, especially in 2008Q4), but countries that have been
able to weather the crisis or those that were affected after a delay, do not exhibit a significant
change in the variables at the same period (the changes in the residuals are small). Conse-
quently, in the latter group, common shocks and composite shocks are negatively related.
Figure 2.6 provides an example based on the decomposition of the median composite re-
sponse to property income in the fiscal cyclicality group 1.20 In this case, the reason common
and composite shocks are negatively correlated is that the average property income for the
countries in the group received a negative shock in 2008Q4, but at the individual level, many
countries were either less affected or received this fiscal shock on a different date in 2008 or
2009.21
18The corresponding quartile impulse response functions (based on fiscal cyclicality groups) are reported in
Appendix J
19While decomposing individual composite shocks, the term of the loading matrix corresponding to common
shocks is negative, implying a negative correlation between individual and common shocks.
20In Figure 2.6, I separate group 1 into two subgroups: subgroup (a), with countries for which responses to
common shocks and those to composite shocks have opposite signs; and subgroup (b), in which both responses
have the same direction. I find that, at the time of the crisis, the interest rate is the main driving factor behind
property income shocks in almost all countries. In most countries in the group, this variable was negatively
affected in 2018Q4, as a result of governments’ intervention at the time. However, while in countries of subgroup
(a) the resulting structural shock to property income is positive due to a negative effect from interest rates, in
subgroup (b), the resulting structural shock is negative.
21Expressing the structural shock to the variable s at time t as εst = βs−1µt, where µt is a vector of reduced-
form shocks at t and βs a vector of contemporaneous effects on s from the Cholesky factor. The main element in
µt in the example is the interest rate (in 2018Q4) with a significant negative shock. However, in subgroup (a), the
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2.8.3 A time-series analysis of the CA model with disaggregate data
The heterogeneity of responses to disaggregate government spending shocks suggests the
absence of a strong and robust relationship between a particular spending category and the
CA, for a given group of countries. Therefore, I run a time-series analysis to uncover the
strongest contributors to CA determination by country. Bayesian VAR estimation is used
based on an independent normal-Wishart prior with Gibbs sampling (see Appendix G) to
derive the variance decomposition of the CA by country (Table 2.6). The choice of this
method is justified by the need to account for the uncertainties related to the determination
of parameter values. As a robustness check, the same model is re-estimated with a different
prior specification based on the Litterman-Minnesota approach (Table 2.7). In a few countries
(e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore), the two approaches yield substantially different outcomes
but for most of the sample, the results are consistent.
The variance decomposition (values after 8 quarters) clearly indicates the absence of
common patterns within groups of similar fiscal cyclicality. It can also be noted that the
relationship between the CA and the variables of property income and social benefits in
countercyclical economies is not particularly strong (despite findings of section 2.8.1). The
main explanation is the fact that CA’s response to shocks to these two variables is lower in
magnitude when compared to other variables of the model (e.g. NFAs) for each country. This
is confirmed by plotting responses of the CA by country after a shock to all variables on the
same chart.22 Therefore, results of section 2.8.1 imply that there is a relatively homogeneous
relationship (in terms of sign) between the CA and the variables of property income and
social benefits in countercyclical economies. They do not imply that these variables are the
most important determinant of CA variations.
In general, the variance decomposition shows that the three largest components of gov-
ernment expenditures (compensation of employees, intermediate consumption, and social
benefits) play a minor role in CA determination. That is an interesting finding since many
authors believe that the main channel through which fiscal policy influences the CA is aggre-
gate demand as changes in government consumption and wages affect imports of goods and
corresponding factor in βs−1is also negative, leading to an overall positive structural shock, while in subgroup
(b), this term is positive
22Unreported here due to space limits.
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services. But the weak contribution of compensation of employees and intermediate con-
sumption is an indication that this is not the case. Exceptionally, the share of government
compensation of employees in the cases of Estonia and Slovenia is higher than that of all
other variables.23
A high share of subsidies in the CA variance decomposition could be an indication that
subsidized industries strongly rely on imports or exports, but further investigation is nec-
essary to confirm it. In countercyclical economies, this category plays a significant role in
Croatia and to a lesser extent Austria and Germany.24 In acyclical economies, and under
both specifications, the highest contribution of subsidies can be seen in Spain. In procyclical
economies, there is a relatively marked contribution of subsidies in Bolivia. In the particular
Bolivian case, the government sector is strongly intertwined with the external sector, and par-
ticularly the hydrocarbons sector (natural gas), which accounts for approximately half of the
total exports, and is managed by SOEs.25 The importance of SOEs is also a notable feature
of the Croatian economy.26
Property income27 appears to be a significant contributor to CA variation in some high-
income countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Among middle-income economies,
there is a marked contribution of property income to the CA variation in Armenia, Indonesia
and Kazakhstan. As many of these countries are characterized by high net borrowing from
abroad over the recent years, external indebtedness could be a viable explanation to this find-
ing. To verify this assumption, the obtained results for property income’s contribution (from
table 2.6) are plotted along with values of average net external debt to GDP over the last
decade for the sample.28 The scatter plot (Figure 2.7) shows a positive correlation between
the two. Further, I examine several fiscal space indicators for these countries (over the period
23The overall value of compensation of employees in the Estonian CA balance has also significantly increased
after 2004. In fact, after joining the EU, the rapid expansion of the Estonian economy and growth of employment
coupled with the negative population growth contributed to the need of foreign skilled labour thereby increasing
the share of non-resident employment.
24Under the Independent Normal Wishart prior specification (Table 2.6), this is also the case in Japan and the
United States but this result is not robust under the alternative prior specification and also does not appear if
impulse reponse functions are calculated.
25After its privatization in the 1990s, this sector was renationalized in 2006.
26SOEs are present in various industries among which the energy sector (making up a large share of imports
and exports) where they generate 70% of total revenues (see Tabak and Zildzovic (2018)). In addition, the level
of subsidies is considered to be relatively high in Croatia with a value of almost 2.5% of GDP (when the average
for the EU is 1%).
27Mainly interest payments.
28Depending on data availability, used sources are the WDI and Eurostat’s "Balance of Payment and other
external statistics" databases.
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of study and in 2019) and compare them with a benchmark of other countries where property
income was found to contribute poorly to the CA.29 Results are shown on Table 2.8.
Although these countries have a lower fiscal space on average compared to the bench-
mark (higher debt and deficits over tax revenues), their level of external debt is not superior
to the one in the benchmark. On the contrary, it appears that many countries with excessively
high external debt ratios have an almost null contribution of property income to CA variation
(e.g. Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland and United Kingdom). Conversely, the main difference
with the benchmark group is in the market perception. Countries with a high contribution of
property income appear to be characterized by high CDS spreads and relatively lower ratings
of foreign currency long-term sovereign debt. This lower perception by the market may ex-
plain a higher volatility of interest payments on external public debt. It can also be noted that
the share of short-term central government debt in this group is on average higher. Thereby,
I conclude that property income contributes more significantly to CA variation in countries
where sovereign credit risk is perceived as high by the market. This finding corroborates
conclusions from Nason and Rogers (2006) on the important role played by interest rates and
in particular countries’ risk premium to explain CA volatility.
Unsurprisingly, net foreign assets strongly affect the CA of Luxembourg, Belgium, and
the United Kingdom. This component exhibits, on average, less weight in middle-income
economies, except in Turkey, which has emerged as a significant capital investor abroad in
recent decades. Gross fixed capital formation generally plays a small role in CA determina-
tion, with the exception of Ireland, the Netherlands, and, to a much lesser extent, Lithuania,
Belarus and Croatia. Finally, in both estimated models, the highest level of CA persistence
is noted in the cases of France and Colombia.
29Data are taken from the database of Kose et al. (2017). I focus on seven indicators: the level of government
debt and the fiscal balance over tax revenues, the share of government debt held by non-residents, the level of
central government debt maturing in less than 12 months over GDP, the level of external debt over GDP. Two
indicators reflecting market perception are also included: the 5-year sovereign CDS spreads (in basis points) and
the foreign currency long-term sovereign debt ratings (based on an index from 1-21, where 1 is the worst rating
and 21 the best rating)
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2.9 Concluding remarks
Using various statistical methods, I investigated the relationship between the CA and gov-
ernment expenditure. The main findings confirm previously reported difficulties in obtaining
strong empirical evidence in favor of the PVM for a panel of advanced and developing coun-
tries. But they also provide some explanations as to why the existing literature is character-
ized by many discrepancies.
The main conclusions are as follows. First, as opposed to predictions from several previ-
ous studies and theories, a positive shock to aggregate government spending does not always
induce a negative response in the current account. Cyclicality of both fiscal policy and the
CA affect this response. More particularly, this response is negative and significant only in
the case of countercylical economies with a procyclical current account. In this particular
group, the CA responds negatively to shocks to property income and (in some countries) so-
cial benefits. CA’s response is also significant but positive in countercyclical economies with
a countercyclical CA, which is mainly explained by a positive response to social benefits.
One reason for the significance of the relationship with social benefits is the fact that it is the
only spending component that is always countercyclical, in countercyclical economies.
Second, the relationship between disaggregate government spending categories and the
CA is characterized by a strong heterogeneity, that shows in the decomposition of shocks
between common and idiosyncratic components. The main results from a time series ap-
proach imply that changes in wages and government consumption of goods and services are
not the main channels through which fiscal policy affects the current account. In contrast,
subsidies are found to play an important role in the CA variation of some countries such as
Croatia, Austria, Spain and Bolivia. In addition, property income expenditures affect the CA
more markedly in economies where sovereign credit risk is perceived as relatively high by
the market.
Finally, interactions between the CA and disaggregate public spending are too complex to
be uncovered through a panel approach. Not only do they vary from one country to the other
but also within the same country, between periods, depending on government orientations
and policies, in addition to structural and conjunctural factors. Further scrutiny within the
conditions and channels through which each spending component affects the CA falls beyond
the scope of this study but could be an interesting avenue for future research.
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Tables
TABLE 2.1: Correlation coefficient between detrended current account and
fiscal variables and cyclicality of the current account and government expen-
ditures by group of countries
Correlation of the Current Account with Cyclicality Measures
Government Expenditures Fiscal Balance Current Account Government Expenditures
All -0.07 0.00 -0.13 0.08
OECD -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 0.04
non-OECD -0.11 0.04 -0.18 0.14
Income groups
High Income -0.06 -0.01 -0.12 0.07
Middle-Income -0.10 0.02 -0.14 0.12
Regions
East Asia 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 0.01
Eastern Europe -0.16 0.09 -0.22 0.09
Latin America -0.01 -0.02 -0.18 0.20
North America 0.24 0.01 -0.05 -0.27
Pacific -0.02 -0.09 -0.23 0.19
South-East Asia -0.18 0.05 -0.13 0.14
Southern Africa -0.16 -0.10 -0.19 0.28
West and Central Asia -0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.08
Western Europe -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.05
Notes: All variables are in real terms per capita, detrended using the Hodrick Prescott filter. The values in the table
represent average correlation coefficients over groups (calculated on a country by country basis). Cyclicality measures
correspond to the correlation coefficients with GDP.
TABLE 2.2: Breakdown of government expenses by category
Government Expenses categories All subsample Income group OECD groupHigh Income Middle income non-OECD OECD
Compensation of employees 27% 27% 29% 30% 26%
Intermediate consumption 19% 17% 23% 24% 15%
Property income 6% 5% 8% 6% 7%
Subsidies 4% 4% 5% 5% 4%
Social benefits 34% 38% 25% 27% 40%
Other expenses 10% 9% 10% 10% 9%
Notes: The share of each component is calculated based on the average values per country (based on variables in real
terms per capita). The obtained shares per country are then averaged over groups of countries. For EU countries, data
for government expenses are extracted from the Government Finance Statistics database of Eurostat (based on ESA 2010
standards). For non EU countries, data are extracted from the Government Finance Statistics database of International
Financial Statistics (IMF). Values in bold correspond to shares above 10%.
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TABLE 2.3: Cyclicality measures, correlation of government expenses cat-
egories with the current account
Government expenses All Income group OECD groupHigh Income Middle income non-OECD OECD
Correlation with GDP
Compensation of employees 0.17 0.02 0.51 0.38 0.03
Intermediate consumption 0.15 0.03 0.41 0.34 0.02
Property Income 0.12 0.05 0.27 0.15 0.09
Subsidies 0.02 -0.08 0.27 0.19 -0.09
Social Benefits 0.00 -0.16 0.34 0.18 -0.13
Other expenses -0.01 -0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.04
Correlation with the Current Account
Compensation of employees 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05
Intermediate consumption -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01
Property Income 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
Subsidies 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 0.07
Social Benefits 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06
Other expenses -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02
Notes: The values in the table represent average correlation coefficients (calculated on a country by country basis). The
underlying data correspond to cyclical components of the variables.
TABLE 2.4: Correlation of disaggregate government expenditures with the












East Asia 0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.07 0.003 -0.12
Eastern Europe 0.08 -0.18 0.15 -0.05 0.21 -0.12
Latin America 0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.04
North America 0.06 0.09 0.15 -0.04 -0.01 0.24
Pacific -0.02 -0.13 -0.28 0.07 -0.09 -0.04
South-East Asia 0.07 0.06 -0.17 -0.26 -0.02 -0.03
Southern Africa 0.24 -0.09 -0.12 -0.17 -0.17 -0.35
West and Central Asia 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.08
Western Europe 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.01
Total 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.05
Notes: The values in the table represent average correlation coefficients (calculated on a country by country basis). The
underlying data correspond to cyclical components of the variables.
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TABLE 2.5: Correlation between the Current Account and Total govern-
ment expenditures by cyclicality groups
Correlation of the CA with GDP
Total Average
Fiscal cylicality group Negative Positive
Countercyclical (group 1) 0.26 -0.14 0.02
Acyclical (group 2) 0.02 0.04 0.02
Procyclical (group 3) -0.09 0.09 -0.03
Total Average 0.04 -0.05 0.01
Notes: The table values correspond to correlation coefficients between the current account and total government expen-
ditures for each group. Fiscal cyclicality groups (rows) are each subdivided in two groups based on the correlation sign
between the CA and GDP (columns). The fiscal cyclicality group 1 includes countries of the 1st tercile in terms of mea-
sures of fiscal cyclicality defined as the correlation between cyclical components of GDP and government expenditures
(corresponding to a fiscal cyclicality < -0.09). Group 2 is the group of countries of the 2nd tercile in terms of measures of
fiscal cyclicality (fiscal cyclicality measure between -0.09 and 0.05). Group 3 is the group of countries of the 3rd tercile
in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality (fiscal cyclicality measure above 0.05).
TABLE 2.6: Variance decomposition of the CA by country after 8 quarters
(Independent Normal-Wishart prior)
a. Group 1 (countercyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Austria 0.03 0.33 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.11
Belgium 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.45 0.03 0.15
Canada 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.26
Chile 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.03 0.30
Croatia 0.05 0.52 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.10
Denmark 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.08 0.15
Finland 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.26
France 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.51
Germany 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.26
Japan 0.15 0.39 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.23
Latvia 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.29
Luxembourg 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.39 0.03 0.22
Slovakia 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.43
South Korea 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.26
Sweden 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.36 0.02 0.22
Switzerland 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.03 0.26
United States 0.08 0.51 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.08
Average 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.24
Standard Deviation 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.11
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b. Group 2 (acyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Czech Republic 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.29 0.02 0.11
Estonia 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.19
Greece 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.37
Hong Kong 0.33 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.30
Italy 0.36 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.18
Lithuania 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.20 0.25
Netherlands 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.31 0.11
New Zealand 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.24 0.04 0.16
Portugal 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.20
Singapore 0.45 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.23
Slovenia 0.11 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.27
Spain 0.16 0.26 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.08
United Kingdom 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.30 0.02 0.20
Average 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.20
Standard Deviation 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08
Middle-Income
Bulgaria 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.15
Colombia 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.49
Indonesia 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.29
Romania 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.28
Thailand 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.36
Average 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.31
Standard Deviation 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.11
c. Group 3 (procyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Australia 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.28
Hungary 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.69
Iceland 0.10 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.08
Ireland 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.65 0.06
Norway 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.38
Average 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.30
Standard Deviation 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.24 0.23
Middle-Income
Armenia 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.17
Belarus 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.24 0.19
Bolivia 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.49
Brazil 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.17 0.15
Georgia 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.31
Kazakhstan 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.38
Mexico 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.25 0.02 0.27
Moldova 0.10 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.32
Peru 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.38
South Africa 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.35
Turkey 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.23
Average 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.30
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.10
Notes: ca= current account balance, pi= property income , sub= subsidies, comp= compensation of employees, ic=
intermediate consumption, sb= social benefits, oth= other expenditures, rate= interest rate, nfa= net foreign assets, gfcf=
gross fixed capital formation. Data in domestic currency divided by GDP. Group 1 includes countries of the 1st tercile in
terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality defined as the correlation between cyclical components of GDP and government
expenditures (corresponding to a fiscal cyclicality < -0.09). Group 2 is the group of countries of the 2nd tercile in terms
of measures of fiscal cyclicality (fiscal cyclicality measure between -0.09 and 0.05). Group 3 is the group of countries
of the 3rd tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality (fiscal cyclicality measure above 0.05). Values above 0.2 are
highlighted. Cholesky ordering: pi, sub, comp, ic, sb, oth, rate, nfa, gfcf, ca
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TABLE 2.7: Variance decomposition of the CA by country after 8 quarters
(Litterman-Minnesota prior)
a. Group 1 (countercyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Austria 0.01 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.16 0.23
Belgium 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.44 0.03 0.32
Canada 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.78
Chile 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.69
Croatia 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.33
Denmark 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.33
Finland 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.58
France 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.90
Germany 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.61
Japan 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.74
Latvia 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.49
Luxembourg 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.03 0.36
Slovakia 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.61
South Korea 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.70
Sweden 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.56
Switzerland 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.65
United States 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.43
Average 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.55
Standard Deviation 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.18
b. Group 2 (acyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Czech Republic 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.29
Estonia 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.47
Greece 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.69
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.90
Italy 0.27 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.39
Lithuania 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.54
Netherlands 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.35 0.28
New Zealand 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.35
Portugal 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.38
Singapore 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.81
Slovenia 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.49
Spain 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.26
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.51
Average 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.49
Standard Deviation 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.20
Middle-Income
Bulgaria 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.48
Colombia 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.87
Indonesia 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.66
Romania 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.66
Thailand 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.68
Average 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.67
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.12
84 Chapter 2. Cyclicality, Fiscal Policy and the Current Account Balance
c. Group 3 (procyclical)
Countries pi sub comp ic sb oth rate nfa gfcf ca
High-Income
Australia 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.64
Hungary 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.61
Iceland 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.10 0.27
Ireland 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.72 0.20
Norway 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.59
Average 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.46
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.27 0.19
Middle-Income
Armenia 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.27 0.33
Belarus 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.49
Bolivia 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73
Brazil 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.52
Georgia 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.71
Kazakhstan 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.76
Mexico 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.74
Moldova 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.69
Peru 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.70
South Africa 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.82
Turkey 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.23 0.14 0.31
Average 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.62
Standard Deviation 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.17
Notes: ca= current account balance, pi= property income , sub= subsidies, comp= compensation of employees, ic=
intermediate consumption, sb= social benefits, oth= other expenditures, rate= interest rate, nfa= net foreign assets, gfcf=
gross fixed capital formation. Data in domestic currency divided by GDP. Group 1 is the sample’s 1st tercile in terms of
measures of fiscal cyclicality (< -0.09). Group 2 is the 2nd tercile (between -0.09 and 0.05). Group 3 is the 3rd tercile
(above 0.05). Values greater than 0.2 are highlighted. Cholesky ordering: pi, sub, comp, ic, sb, oth, rate, nfa, gfcf, ca
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TABLE 2.8: Fiscal space indicators of countries with the highest/lowest
contribution of property income to the CA variation
Average measures over the period 2002-2019
Debt/Tax rev FB/Tax rev Debt N res% St debt Ext debt CDS spreads Ext debt rating
Countries with highest contribution of property income to the CA (Tables 2.6 and 2.7 )
Armenia 227.0 -20.9 NA 2.2 68.4 NA 9.1
Greece 682.4 -27.0 78.4 14.3 191.6 3361.3 10.5
Indonesia 285.2 -12.9 56.7 2.2 36.2 236.2 10.1
Italy 430.8 -11.8 34.5 20.0 112.3 129.7 15.9
Kazakhstan 73.8 7.3 NA 6.8 82.9 195.4 12.5
Portugal 446.7 -22.2 57.0 12.8 205.0 194.9 14.8
Spain 343.2 -20.9 40.4 15.7 150.4 110.0 17.4
Average 355.6 -15.5 53.4 10.6 121.0 704.6 12.9
Countries with lowest contribution of property income to the CA (Table 2.6)
Australia 94.6 -7.3 41.1 2.4 95.2 28.3 20.8
Austria 272.5 -9.0 68.6 7.2 177.2 41.6 20.7
Belarus 163.9 -18.3 NA NA 45.5 NA 6.7
Belgium 342.6 -8.6 53.0 12.4 253.3 50.4 19.2
France 314.8 -15.8 52.0 12.9 185.7 40.6 20.2
Ireland 258.7 -18.3 55.2 3.6 768.4 148.5 17.7
Average 241.2 -12.9 54.0 7.7 254.2 61.9 17.5
Countries with lowest contribution of property income to the CA (Table 2.7)
Estonia 37.4 0.4 NA 0.2 91.3 146.1 16.7
Latvia 148.5 -9.2 58.5 3.2 127.0 223.1 14.1
South Africa 166.2 -13.3 29.1 7.2 34.0 172.2 12.9
Sweden 104.8 0.2 23.1 5.1 169.5 20.9 20.9
Switzerland 226.7 0.6 9.0 2.4 240.2 42.2 21.0
United Kingdom 259.5 -19.3 27.5 7.4 313.9 41.9 20.4
Average 157.2 -6.8 29.5 4.3 162.7 107.7 17.7
Measures for 2019
Debt/Tax rev FB/Tax rev Debt N res% St debt Ext debt CDS spreads Ext debt rating
Countries with highest contribution of property income to the CA (Tables 2.6 and 2.7 )
Armenia 311.2 -6.1 NA 5.4 86.9 NA 8.2
Greece 840.3 2.8 88.8 9.9 245.4 261.7 8.3
Indonesia 259.2 -18.9 58.2 2.5 35.9 91.1 12.9
Italy 475.0 -5.5 31.9 18.6 124.8 139.2 12.7
Kazakhstan 103.3 -3.0 NA 5.7 86.0 129.4 12.3
Portugal 517.4 0.4 49.3 9.5 192.2 40.5 12.6
Spain 453.1 -13.6 46.0 12.6 170.2 49.5 14.8
Average 422.8 -6.3 54.8 9.2 134.5 118.6 11.7
Countries with lowest contribution of property income to the CA (Table 2.6)
Australia 168.3 -13.6 39.5 2.8 110.6 17.7 21.0
Austria 255.1 2.4 60.0 6.9 154.2 4.2 20.0
Belarus 189.7 3.6 NA NA 63.2 NA 6.7
Belgium 332.9 -6.6 55.7 9.8 243.5 6.2 18.3
France 368.4 -11.3 48.8 11.3 230.7 NA 19.0
Ireland 233.9 2.1 58.8 6.0 715.9 31.3 16.7
Average 258.0 -3.9 52.6 7.4 253.0 14.9 16.9
Countries with lowest contribution of property income to the CA (Table 2.7)
Estonia 40.3 0.2 NA 0.4 74.1 NA 17.7
Latvia 182.1 -1.9 67.8 4.5 117.7 NA 15.3
South Africa 242.8 -20.6 38.0 9.5 53.4 181.9 11.0
Sweden 88.1 1.3 14.2 4.3 170.0 3.6 21.0
Switzerland 199.2 7.0 7.2 1.6 271.1 NA 21.0
United Kingdom 327.3 -8.9 37.4 9.4 312.0 10.9 19.0
Average 180.0 -3.8 32.9 4.9 166.4 65.5 17.5
Notes: Debt/Tax rev: General government gross debt in % of average tax revenues, FB/Tax rev: Fiscal balance in % of
average tax revenues, Debt Nres%: General government debt held by nonresidents in % of total, St debt: Central govern-
ment debt maturing in 12 months or less in % of GDP, Ext debt: Total external debt stocks in % of GDP, CDS spreads:
5-year sovereign CDS spreads (basis points), Ext debt rating: Foreign currency long-term sovereign debt ratings (index
from 1-21, with 21 the best rating). Data source: Kose et al. (2017)
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Figures
FIGURE 2.1: Median response of the current account to one unit composite
shocks for the whole sample with bootstrap confidence intervals based on
100 repetitions
FIGURE 2.2: Quartile composite impulse responses of the CA to one unit
shocks to the model variables for the whole sample
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FIGURE 2.3: Quartile composite impulse responses of the CA to a one unit
shock to total government expenditures by groups of fiscal and CA cyclical-
ity
Notes: The correlation between cyclical components of GDP and total government spending is used as a measure for fiscal
cyclicality. Countries are said to be countercyclical if they belong to the first tercile (correlation < -0.09) and procyclical if
they belong to the third tercile (correlation above 0.05). To reproduce the same groups as Table 5, the CA is considered as
countercylical if the correlation between its cyclical component and that of GDP is negative and procyclical otherwise.
FIGURE 2.4: Quartile composite impulse responses of the CA to a one unit
shock to social benefits and property income in countercyclical economies
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FIGURE 2.5: Decomposition of the median composite response of the cur-
rent account to a one-unit composite shock to disaggregate government ex-
penditures between common and idiosyncratic responses (by fiscal cyclical-
ity group)
a. Group 1 (countercyclical)
b. Group 2 (acyclical)
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c. Group 3 (procyclical)
Notes: CA= current account balance, PI= property income, SUB= subsidies, COMP= Compensation of employees, IC=
intermediate consumption, SB= social benefits, OTH= Other expenditures. Data in domestic currency divided by GDP. Group
1 is the group of countries of the 1st tercile in terms of measures of fiscal cyclicality defined as the correlation between
cyclical components of GDP and government expenditures (< -0.09). Group 2 is the group of countries of the 2nd tercile
(between -0.09 and 0.05). Group 3 is the the 3rd tercile (fiscal cyclicality measure above 0.05).
FIGURE 2.6: Decomposition of the median composite response of the cur-
rent account to a one unit composite shock to property income expenditures
between common and idiosyncratic responses (by subgroups of group 1)
Notes: CA= ratio of current account balance/GDP, PI= property income/GDP. Group 1 contains countries of the 1st tercile in
terms of fiscal cyclicality (value < -0.09). Subgroup (b) includes the countries of Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg
and Switzerland and subgroup (a) the remaining 11 countercyclical economies
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FIGURE 2.7: Scatter plot of property income contribution to the CA vari-
ation based on results of the variance decomposition in Table 6, by level of
average net external debt to GDP
Notes: Data for the X axis are from results on Table 2.6. Data of Net External Debt to GDP correspond to the average of net
external debt over the last 10 years, available for 34 out of the 51 sample countries and calculated from the databases of the
WDI and Eurostat’s "Balance of Payments and other external statistics".
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Appendix B: The Intertemporal model of the Current Account
The intertemporal model of the current account is based on an expression for the current
account that can be derived from two elements. The first element is the national income
identity Yt = It + Gt + NXt + Ct where the net exports NXt are the difference between
the CA and income from net foreign assets NXt = CAt − rt At. This identity leads to the
following relation of the CA
CAt = rt At + Yt − Ct − Gt − It (2.7)
where At is the economy’s stock of net foreign claims at the end of period (t − 1), rt is
the net interest rate paid on these assets, Yt is the net domestic product, Gt is government
consumption, and It is net investment.
By definition, it is also established that CAt = At+1 − At. Forward iteration of this








Rt,s (Ys − Gs − Is) (2.8)
where Rt,s is defined as Rt,s = 1∏sv=t+1(1+rv) with Rt,t = 1
The second element is the permanent income hypothesis which implies that the perma-
nent level of consumption is determined by the permanent levels of the net domestic product,
investment, and government expenditures. This relationship can be inferred from the opti-
mality condition u′ (Ct) = β (1 + rt+1) u′ (Ct+1) , based on the assumption of intertemporal
separability of consumer’s utility. For σ > 0 representing the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution and u (C) = C
1−1/σ−1
1−1/σ , this condition implies that Ct+1 = β
σ(1 + rt+1)
σCt where
β ∈ (0, 1). Using this expression in (2.8) leads to (2.9).
Ct =
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, and using the fact
that 1+rt∑∞s=t Rt,s = r̃t since ∑
∞
s=t+1 Rt,srs = 1, the following expression for the CA is obtained






r̃t At + Ỹt − G̃t − Ĩt
)
Where the letters with a tilde represent the permanent level of the variables and (β̃/R)σ is









Appendix C: The Present Value Model of the Current Account










where the net output NOt is given by NOt = Yt − It − Gt and ∆NOt+i = NOt+i −
NOt+i−1, with Yt, It, Gt representing output, investment and government spending, respec-
tively. This model can be derived from the total income identity, expressed as





(1 + r)−iEt {Yt+i − It+i − Gt+i} (2.13)
where the net exports NXt are the difference between the CA and income from net foreign
assets NXt = CAt − rAt and consumption has been replaced by the following equation30





(1 + r)−iEt {Yt+i − It+i − Gt+i}
An expression for the CA can be inferred from (2.13)









30See Nason and Rogers (2006).
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equation (2.12) is obtained.
To empirically verify this model, the approach of Campbell and Shiller (1987) and Camp-
bell (1987) is usually applied. It consists in estimating the following VAR model and then
testing some restrictions
Zt = AZt−1 + µt (2.14)
Where Zt = [∆NOt, CAt]′, A is the compaion matrix and µt a vector of mean zero and
homoscedastic errors. The forecast of Zt+i for any period i can therefore be expressed as
EtZt+i = AiZt (2.15)
This can be generalized to VAR models of p higher orders where Zt would be a 2p dimen-
sional vector such that Zt = [∆NOt, . . . , ∆NOt−p+1, CAt, . . . , CAt−p+1]′. The restrictions










Where g′ and h′ are row vectors with 2p elements, all of which are zero except for the p+ 1st








A first test of the present value model consists in regressing CA f ,t (estimated through the
VAR system) on the vector Zt and verifying the p + 1st coefficient or in performing a χ2
test for the values of g′. Another test consists in verifying the implied restrictions on the
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As shown in Campbell (1987), if it is assumed that the matrix A corresponds to
A =

a1 . . . . . . ap b1 . . . . . . . bp
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
c1 . . . . . . cp d1 . . . . . . dp
. . . . . .
. . . . . .

Then the condition (2.18) is equivalent to the following restrictions on individual coefficients
a1 = c1, . . . , ap = cp, d1 − b1 = (1 + r), b2 = d2,. . . , bp = dp. To test those restrictions, it
is possible to subtract the ∆NOt equation in the VAR model from the CAt equation to get




∆NOt−p + (d1 − b1)CAt−1




CAt−p + u2t − u1t
In that case, it is possible to use a single-equation regression to verify that
CAt − ∆NOt − (1 + r)CAt−1 = u2t − u1t
Meaning that the left hand side (usually expressed with a script notation as CAt) cannot
be predicted with lagged ∆NOt and CAt. This can be checked using a Wald test. Several
extensions have been provided to the basic PVM. For example, İşcan (2002) included the
categories of durable and non-traded goods in the model. Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) also
included the distinction between traded and non-traded goods and added the variables of
interest rate and exchange rate.
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Appendix D: Data description
Data have been extracted from the following sources, in millions of domestic currency, used
in real terms and divided by the population (population data from the IFS)
Variable Data source Adjustment
Gross Domestic
Product
Data in real terms from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics
(IFS) database
Gaps completed using nominal
series and GDP deflator calcu-
lated from annual series, or using
growth rate of annual real series









Data in nominal terms from
Datastream (DS mnemonic =
"country code" & CURBALA)
Deflated using calculated GDP
deflator. For data only avail-
able in US dollars, data for other
variables converted to US dollars





Data in real terms from Datas-
tream (DS mnemonic: "country
code" & XGCSA.D, if absent data
without seasonal adjustment taken




Data in current prices from
Datastream ("country code" &
GFCF.C), or from the IFS
Converted to real terms using a de-
flator calculated based on annual
nominal and real series from IFS
Private con-
sumption
Data in current prices from Datas-
tream ("country code" & CN-
PER.D), or from the IFS
Short-term inter-
est rates
Short-term interest rates from IFS
(IMF)
Gaps completed based on
Short-term interest rates from
Datastream (OECD: "country
code" & OCFISTR, Oxford
economics: "country code" &
XRCB..R) or the Policy rate
(Datastream: "country code" &
PRATE.) or the Money Market
rates (IFS)
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Variable Data source Adjustment
Fiscal balance Data in current prices from Datas-
tream ("country code" & GOV-
BALA) or from the IFS








/database (access from website:
General and regional statistics
>>Economy and Finance >>Gov-
ernment Statistics)
Deflator calculated from real Gov-
ernment consumption expendi-
tures series and nominal series ex-
tracted from IFS (when unavail-










Deflator calculated from real Gov-
ernment consumption expendi-
tures series and nominal series ex-
tracted from IFS, averaged yearly
(when unavailable, calculation is
made from annual data)
Additional adjustments
The initial dataset comprises 57 countries with data from 1995Q1 to 2019Q2. For reasons of data
availability, 6 non-EU countries are excluded from the sample when disaggregate data are added to
the analysis. Eurostat disaggregate fiscal data are available for the 28 European Union (EU) countries,
starting from 2002. The values match those of the Government Finance Statistics of the IMF (except
that the latter excludes the categories of tax expenses and transfers). For non-EU countries, data
are extracted from the IMF Government Finance Statistics database. This subsample consists of
23 non-EU countries. Disaggregate fiscal data are deflated using a price deflator calculated from
nominal and real government consumption expenditures. The series are then divided by the population
size. For fiscal data of countries that were available on an annual basis, temporal disaggregation is
performed through JDemetra+ software31(provided by Eurostat). The quarterly values are estimated
using quarterly GDP as the higher frequency indicator series, based on the Chow-Lin method (Chow
and Lin (1971)) that assumes the quarterly residuals follow an autoregressive process of order 1 (AR1).
After those adjustments, the resulting dataset is a balanced panel of 51 countries over the period
2002Q1-2018Q4.
31http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/content/download_en (replacing old Ecotrim)
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Government expenditure comprises the following ESA categories. These definitions have been taken
from the ESA 2010 manual (Chapters 3 and 4).
• P2 Intermediate consumption: intermediate consumption consists of goods and services con-
sumed as inputs by a process of production, excluding fixed assets whose consumption is
recorded as consumption of fixed capital. The goods and services are either transformed or
used up by the production process.
• P5 Gross capital formation: includes in addition to gross fixed capital formation, changes in
inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables.
• D1 Compensation of employees: defined as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable
by an employer to an employee in return for work done by the latter during an accounting
period. It includes wages and salaries in addition to social contributions such as pensions.
• D29 Other taxes on production, payable: consist of all taxes that enterprises incur as a result
of engaging in production, independent of the quantity or value of the goods and services
produced or sold.
• D3 Subsidies, payable: current unrequited payments which general government or the institu-
tions of the European Union make to resident producers.
• D4 Property income, payable: property income (D.4) accrues when the owners of financial
assets and natural resources put them at the disposal of other institutional units. The income
payable for the use of financial assets is called investment income (e.g., interests and divi-
dends), while that payable for the use of a natural resource is called rent. Property income is
the sum of investment income and rent.
• D5 Current taxes on incomes, wealth, etc.: “current taxes on income, wealth, etc.” (D.5)
cover all compulsory, unrequited payments, in cash or in kind, levied periodically by general
government and by the rest of the world on the income and wealth of institutional units, and
some periodic taxes which are assessed neither on that income nor that wealth.
• Social benefits: social benefits include the following:
– D62 Social benefits other than social transfers in kind, made up of:
* Social security benefits in cash: social security benefits in cash are social insurance
benefits payable in cash to households by social security funds. Reimbursements
are excluded and treated as social transfers in kind (D.632).
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* Other social insurance benefits: other social insurance benefits correspond to ben-
efits payable by employers in the context of other employment related social in-
surance schemes. Other employment-related social insurance benefits are social
benefits (in cash or in kind) payable by social insurance schemes other than social
security to contributors to the schemes, their dependents or their survivors.
* Social assistance benefits in cash: social assistance benefits in cash are current trans-
fers payable to households by government units or NPISHs to meet the same needs
as social insurance benefits but which are not made under a social insurance scheme
requiring participation usually by means of social contributions.
– D632 Social transfers in kind- purchased market production: individual goods and
services in the form of reimbursements by social security funds of approved expenditures
made by households on specific goods and services; or provided directly to the beneficia-
ries by market producers from which general government purchases the corresponding
goods and services.
• D7 Other current transfers: include net non-life insurance premiums, non-life insurance
claims, Current transfers within general government, Current international cooperation, mis-
cellaneous current transfers and VAT- and GNI-based EU own resources.
• D8 Adjustment for the change in pension entitlements: the adjustment for the change in
pension entitlements (D.8) represents the adjustment needed to make appear in the savings
of households the change in the pension entitlements on which households have a definite
claim. The pension entitlement change comes from contributions and benefits recorded in the
secondary distribution of income account.
• D9 Capital transfers, payable: capital transfers require the acquisition or disposal of an asset,
or assets, by at least one of the parties to the transaction. Whether made in cash or in kind, they
result in a commensurate change in the financial, or non-financial, assets shown in the balance
sheets of one or both parties to the transaction.
• NP Acquisitions less disposals of non-produced assets: non-produced assets consist of as-
sets that have not been produced within the production boundary, and that may be used in
the production of goods and services. This includes acquisitions of natural resources, con-
tracts/leases/licenses, goodwill and marketing assets.
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I briefly describe Pedroni (2013) approach in the following. Consider a panel composed of i =
1, . . . , N individual members, each of which consists of an M × 1 vector of observed endogenous
variables yit. The data are assumed to be observed over T time periods (t = 1, ..., T) for each member
and used after de-meaning, where the M× 1 vector of de-meaned data is zit = yit − ȳi. Structural
composite white noise shocks εit may be cross-sectionally dependent as expressed by the relation
εit = Λi ε̄t + ε̃it, where ε̄t and ε̃it represent common white noise shocks shared by all members and
member-specific idiosyncratic white noise shocks, respectively, and Λi is an M×M diagonal matrix
with the loading coefficients. The two types of shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to each other.
The moving average representation of the model is as follows: Ri (L) zit = µit, where Ri (L) =
I −∑Pij=1 RijL
j, with Pi the lag truncation value, which can differ from one cross section to the other.
The associated structural form model is zit = Ai (L) εit or Bi (L) zit = εit, where Bi (L) = Ai(L)
−1.
Short-run restrictions can be imposed on the Bi (0) matrix. In the special case of recursive restrictions
(used in the present study), this is equivalent to the Cholesky orthogonalization. The identification
strategy is based on a scenario of an exogenous fiscal policy and an endogenous CA balance. Thereby,
government expenditures are placed first and the CA last in the Cholesky ordering.
The first step of the methodology is to estimate the reduced-form VAR through ordinary least
squares (OLS) . Initially, the model is estimated separately for each cross section. Then, to capture
the common dynamics, the M × 1 vector of common time effects z̄t = N−1t ∑
Nt
i=1 zit is calculated
and the corresponding reduced-form VAR model R̄ (L) z̄t = µ̄t is estimated. Then, the appropriate
identifying restrictions are used to obtain the structural shock estimates εit = Bi (L) Ri(L)
−1µit and
ε̄t = B̄ (L) R̄(L)
−1µ̄t. Moreover, to obtain the elements of the loadings matrix Λi, N × M OLS
regressions of εit on ε̄t are run, based on the relation εit = Λi ε̄t + ε̃it. At this stage, I report the
median impulse responses for the subsamples along with bootstrap confidence intervals from 100
repetitions.
In the final step, the quartile impulse responses are estimated with the decomposition of responses
between those to common and those to idiosyncratic shocks. The composite impulse response func-
tions calculated from the individual structural VAR estimation can be decomposed into common and
idiosyncratic shocks as follows: First, a re-scaling of the responses to idiosyncratic shocks is re-









(Λi ε̄t + ε̃it) (Λi ε̄t + ε̃it)
′
]
= Ωi,ε = ΛiΩi,ε̄Λ′i + Ωi,ε̃. Setting Ωi,ε̄ = Ωi,ε = I,
implies Ωi,ε̃ = I−ΛiΛi ′. This means that responses to common shocks for unity-sized shocks would
correspond to responses to idiosyncratic shocks for shocks of size 1−Λ(m, m)2, where m = 1, ..., M
(since Λi is diagonal). To perform the re-scaling, the expression for composite structural shocks can
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ε̃∗it. Finally, this re-scaled form can be used to decom-








, leading to the
decomposition (for a one unit shock) Ai (L) = Āi (L) + Ãi (L) where Āi (L) = Ai (L)Λi and




2 = Ai (L)− Āi (L). The sample distribution of estimated responses
can be used to describe the properties of the sample (with the median, and the 1st and 3rd quartiles
used as confidence intervals) or to create fitted values for member-specific impulse responses.
Appendix G: Methodology for estimating individual Bayesian VAR
models by country
The time-series Bayesian VAR approach used on the paper is based on independent normal-Wishart
priors with Gibbs sampling, from which the variance decomposition is derived. The independent
normal-Wishart priors set for β and Σ (respectively the vector of parameters and the residual variance-
covariance matrix) are
β ∼ N (β0, V0)
Σ ∼ IW (S0, α0)
β0 is a vector of nearly all zeros except the diagonal elements corresponding to coefficients of a
variable's first own lag (hyper-parameter µ1) that can be set to a different value, usually 1 for a random
walk or less for a AR(1) process. In the present case, the prior means are set to zero. For V0, the
following hyperparameters are used λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.5 , λ3 = 1 and λ4 = 100 , common in the
literature. The residual standard deviations of the variables are calculated based on an unrestricted
least square estimate. Conditional posterior distributions for the dataset y are




















S̄ = S0 + E′E
ᾱ = α0 + T
where S−10 = λ1 I, V0
−1 = λ2 I, and α0 = λ3. With the residual matrix E = Y − XB for β =
vec (B), y = vec (Y) and X the regressors matrix. The scale matrix S̄ and the degrees of freedom ᾱ
are calculated based on prior error variance of endogenous variables S032 and prior degrees of freedom
of the error-term α0. The prior degrees of freedom to are set to be equal to 10 (number of endogenous
variables). Based on an initial estimate of Σ, a Gibb’s sampler is used to obtain properties of the
32Following Karlsson (2012), S0 can be set to be the diagonal variance covariance matrix obtained from indi-
vidual AR regressions.
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unconditional posteriors with 10000 iterations and 200 burn-in draws. As a robustness check, I also
estimate the same model using the Litterman-Minnesota prior based on hyper-parameters λ1 = 0.1,
λ2 = 0.99 , λ3 = 1 and determination of the residual variance-covariance matrix from univariate
autoregressive estimates.
Appendix H: Estimation of the CA model with Aggregate Govern-
ment Spending based on different Cholesky orderings
To verify the validity of the identification strategy, different other orderings of the variables in the
VAR model are tried. In a first step, the following alternatives are used and compared with the baseline
ordering (all with exogenous spending and endogenous CA):
• Baseline government expenditures, the short-term interest rate, net foreign assets, net invest-
ment, and the Current Account Balance.
• Alternative 1 government expenditures, the short-term interest rate, net investment, net foreign
assets, and the Current Account Balance.
• Alternative 2 government expenditures, net foreign assets, the short-term interest rate, net
investment, and the Current Account Balance.
• Alternative 3 government expenditures, net foreign assets, net investment, the short-term in-
terest rate, and the Current Account Balance.
• Alternative 4 government expenditures, net investment, the short-term interest rate, net foreign
assets, and the Current Account Balance.
• Alternative 5 government expenditures, net investment, net foreign assets, the short-term in-
terest rate, and the Current Account Balance.
Estimation results are identical across these alternative specifications. An example of impulse re-
sponse functions of the CA to a shock to government spending is shown in Figure (a).
In a second step, government spending is placed at different other positions. At this stage, the
response of the CA remains similar in shape but the number of countries with a positive response
slighlty decreases (lower upper quartile) as government spending gets closer to the fourth position
(see Figure (b)).33 Finally, Figure (c) shows some responses if the CA is placed at different positions
in the Cholesky ordering. It can be noted that if the CA is placed before government spending,
then the response is much less significant (interquartile range between -0.6 and 0.4). On the other
hand, placing the CA before or after the interest rate does not change much. To conclude, it appears
33If government spending is placed last and the CA fourth, the response resembles the one in Figure (c) (CA
placed before government spending).
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that different orderings do not significantly affect the CA’s response to government spending shocks,
unless the CA is placed before government spending. But even in that case, the main conclusion from
the first estimation of the model does not change.
Figure (a)
Response of the CA to a positive government spending shock for 5 alternative orderings
Figure (b)
Response of the CA to a positive government spending shock with different orderings of government
spending
Figure (c)
Response of the CA to a positive government spending shock with different orderings of the CA
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First, some descriptive figures on the group of countercyclical economies are extracted (displayed on
the following tables).
Table (a): Average values of the CA, total Government spending and shares of spending




Share from total spending
COMP IC PI SUB SB OTH
Countercyclical economies with countercyclical CA
Chile -0.003 0.22 0.28 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.23 0.15
France -0.004 0.52 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.48 0.09
Latvia -0.054 0.29 0.30 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.33 0.10
Slovakia -0.044 0.37 0.22 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.48 0.07
South Korea 0.023 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.26 0.18
Switzerland 0.102 0.30 0.24 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.37 0.11
United States -0.035 0.33 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.40 0.02
Average -0.002 0.32 0.26 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.36 0.10
Countercyclical economies with procyclical CA
Austria 0.024 0.49 0.22 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.46 0.10
Belgium 0.017 0.53 0.24 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.47 0.07
Canada -0.013 0.35 0.32 0.23 0.11 0.03 0.25 0.06
Croatia -0.006 0.44 0.27 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.37 0.08
Denmark 0.053 0.51 0.32 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.36 0.07
Finland 0.014 0.50 0.28 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.40 0.06
Germany 0.060 0.44 0.18 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.56 0.08
Japan 0.030 0.35 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.58 0.07
Luxembourg 0.072 0.33 0.23 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.53 0.11
Sweden 0.054 0.51 0.27 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.37 0.12
Average 0.03 0.44 0.25 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.43 0.08
Table (b): Cyclicality measures by variable
Countries CA Gov. Spend. COMP IC PI SUB SB OTH
Countercyclical economies with countercyclical CA
Chile -0.34 -0.42 -0.13 0.14 0.13 0.10 -0.04 -0.45
France -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 0.05 0.31 -0.43 -0.16 -0.06
Latvia -0.77 -0.18 0.35 0.05 -0.60 0.08 -0.50 0.02
Slovakia -0.28 -0.20 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.17 -0.17
South Korea -0.47 -0.23 -0.19 -0.35 0.37 -0.23 0.20 0.00
Switzerland -0.16 -0.15 -0.58 -0.38 0.50 -0.48 -0.57 0.38
United States -0.68 -0.67 -0.55 -0.42 -0.02 -0.22 -0.63 -0.68
Average -0.41 -0.28 -0.18 -0.13 0.09 -0.16 -0.27 -0.14
Countercyclical economies with procyclical CA
Austria 0.09 -0.12 -0.09 0.04 0.12 0.00 -0.07 -0.08
Belgium 0.06 -0.13 0.11 -0.16 0.20 0.37 -0.15 -0.13
Canada 0.65 -0.36 -0.44 -0.07 0.53 -0.09 -0.72 -0.13
Croatia 0.81 -0.25 0.37 0.56 -0.39 -0.56 -0.12 -0.21
Denmark 0.01 -0.22 -0.26 -0.08 -0.35 -0.26 -0.17 0.00
Finland 0.11 -0.29 -0.04 0.06 0.32 0.10 -0.33 -0.13
Germany 0.30 -0.23 -0.11 0.05 0.32 -0.42 -0.19 -0.07
Japan 0.25 -0.73 0.01 -0.14 0.18 -0.69 -0.38 -0.64
Luxembourg 0.11 -0.22 0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.19 -0.04
Sweden 0.36 -0.14 0.02 -0.02 0.19 0.00 -0.26 -0.08
Average 0.28 -0.27 -0.03 0.03 0.11 -0.16 -0.26 -0.15
Notes: CA= current account balance, Gov. Spend.= Total Government spending, COMP= Compensation of employees,
IC= intermediate consumption, PI= property income, SUB= subsidies, SB= social benefits, OTH= Other expenditures.
Cyclicality measures correspond to the correlation coefficients between cyclical components of the variables and those of
GDP.
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From Table (a), it appears that countries with a procyclical CA tend to have a positive CA bal-
ance. The ratio of total government spending over GDP is on average between 0.30 and 0.55 for all
countercyclical economies. Also, the major contributors to total government spending in the group
appear to be social benefits and compensation of employees. In Table (b), the most countercyclical
spending components are highlighted for each country. The categories of spending with the highest
negative correlation values differ country by country. Nevertheless, it can be seen that social benefits
is the only category of spending that is always countercyclical.34 Compensation of employees is on
the other hand more often countercyclical in the group with a countercyclical CA than in the one with
a procyclical CA.
Then, to explain the significant responses of the CA to aggregate government spending in the
countercyclical group (see section 2.7.2), quartile impulse responses are estimated at the aggregate
level, by government spending component and by country (unreported here due to space constraints).
The main conclusions from this analysis are reported in the following.
Countercylical economies with a countercyclical CA
In this subgroup, the response of the CA is positive after a government spending shock. By coun-
try, the CA in all countries responds positively to positive government spending shocks, except for
Switzerland (where the response only gets positive from the second quarter). By component, the av-
erage response of the CA is positive on impact after a shock to all variables except subsidies. The
highest responses on impact are those to social benefits, compensation of employees. At the second
quarter, the responses to intermediate consumption and subsidies get significantly higher (and also
compensation of employees to a lesser extent), whereas the responses to property income and social
benefits drop. By country and spending component, the main conclusions are as follows:
• The CA responds positively to social benefits on impact in all countries, except France. The
highest immediate response is noted in Switzerland and Chile. This response gets negative in
the second quarter for Slovakia (then positive for the rest of the period).
• The immediate response of the CA to compensation of employees’ shocks is positive in only
three countries: Slovakia, Latvia and (with a lower magnitude) Chile.
• The response to intermediate consumption shocks is also positive on impact in all countries,
except Switzerland. The highest response is noted in Slovakia and Latvia. The response of
Slovakia gets very high at the second quarter.
• Finally, the average response of the CA to subsidies shocks is driven mainly by the response of
Latvia (only positive response). At the second quarter, the response of Slovakia also becomes
positive and high.
34There is only one exception which is South Korea.
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Countercylical economies with a procyclical CA
In this subgroup, the response of the CA is negative after a government spending shock. By coun-
try, the CA responds negatively to positive government spending shocks in all countries, except for
Denmark. By spending component, the average response of the CA on impact is negative only after a
shock to property income and to a lesser extent other expenses. The highest positive responses are the
ones to intermediate consumption and to subsidies. These responses get negative in the third quarter.
Finally, by country and spending component, the following can be noted:
• On impact, the response of the CA to property income shocks is negative in all countries,
except Austria and Belgium. The strongest decline is observed in Luxembourg (-0.015).35 In
the following quarters, the responses of Japan and Croatia get notably positive.
• The response to intermediate consumption is positive on impact in all countries, except Croatia
and Sweden. The highest response is observed for Luxembourg. In the third quarter, the
response in Luxembourg, and to a lesser extent Finland, gets negative.
• The response to subsidies on impact is positive in half of the cases (5 countries). The highest
positive response is noted in Luxembourg. The response of Austria gets negative in the third
quarter.
• It can be noted that for social benefits, the response is positive on impact in 4 out of the 10
countries (Japan, Belgium, Croatia and Luxembourg). The response in Luxembourg is partic-
ularly higher.36 In addition, over the following periods, responses of Denmark and Finland get
positive as well.
• Lastly, the response to compensation of employees is negative on impact in all countries, except
Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany. In the following periods, responses of Denmark, Finland
and Croatia get also positive.
35With a lower magnitude, a significant decline is also observed in Denmark (-0.004), Finland and Canada
(both -0.003)
36An overall negative impact can be obtained if Luxembourg and Belgium are both removed
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Appendix J: Quartile impulse responses of the CA to a one-unit
composite shock to disaggregate government expenditures (by fis-
cal cyclicality group)
a. Group 1 (countercyclical)
b. Group 2 (acyclical)
Appendix J: Quartile impulse responses of the CA to a one-unit composite shock to
disaggregate government expenditures (by fiscal cyclicality group)
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c. Group 3 (procyclical)
Notes: CA= current account balance, PI= property income, SUB= subsidies, COMP= Compensation of employees, IC=
intermediate consumption, SB= social benefits, OTH= Other expenditures. Data in domestic currency divided by GDP. Group
1 contains countries of the 1st tercile in terms of fiscal cyclicality (measure < -0.09). Group 2 is the second tercile (acyclical
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3.1 Introduction
For a long time, monetary policy was considered as the primary tool to conduct stabilization
policy. Then, the challenges it faced in the recent years brought the debate over the use of
fiscal policy to the fore.1 Yet, the understanding of fiscal policy effects on the economy is
still insufficient. And although fiscal stimulus measures were undertaken during the Great
Recession in many countries, fiscal policy effectiveness as an instrument for macroeconomic
stabilization is still a matter of uncertainty.
Such an uncertainty is conspicuous in the disagreement prevailing in the literature on the
fiscal multiplier, which extends to fiscal policy effects on GDP components such as private
consumption. Nonetheless, recent developments of this literature give new hopes for a more
efficient use of fiscal policy. More particularly, it has been recently found that fiscal multi-
pliers can become large and above unity under some conditions. Usually this happens when
a larger share of households has a non-optimizing behavior2 or in exceptional circumstances
that affect monetary policy or cause a situation of underutilization of resources (e.g., ZLB,
long and deep recessions). A better understanding of the economy’s behavior in these un-
usual cases has the potential to provide us with a better insight as to how to make stabilization
policies more efficient.
In the present paper, I use a New-Keynesian model that includes rule-of-thumb con-
sumers to analyze the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption at and outside the ZLB.
The focus on private consumption is partly justified by the fact that it is usually the most
significant component of output. Thereby, the disagreement over fiscal multipliers could be
resulting from the varying effects on private consumption. This also makes it a critical el-
ement in devising successful fiscal stimulus measures or conducting fiscal consolidations.
An additional reason to study consumption is the controversy around the direction and size
of its reaction to fiscal policy in the theoretical and empirical literature. Lastly, consumers’
1This view on monetary policy has not always been the predominant one. Blinder et al. (2004) points out
that during the 1960s, discretionary fiscal policy was cast in the lead role while central bank policies were
considered as playing more of an accommodating role for fiscal policy. But then several theoretical and empirical
works called into question the ability of fiscal policy to accomplish countercyclical stabilization (e.g., Ricardian
equivalence), in addition to some practical challenges. In particular, one strong argument against the use of
fiscal policy is the fact that lags in the implementation of adequate measures are typically too long to be useful
for combatting recessions (which is not the case for monetary policy). As a result, a paradigm shift occurred
in the 1980s in the literature, leading to the belief in the preeminence of monetary policy as a macroeconomic
stabilization tool.
2In that case, they are less prone to act following the Ricardian equivalence principle.
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behavior is often found to play a key role in the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy (e.g.
Krusell and Smith (1996), Colciago (2011)).
The model I use is based on the benchmark of Smets and Wouters (2003) and is esti-
mated in two versions. The first version (called "baseline model") includes rule-of-thumb
consumers with two regimes (at and outside the ZLB) and fiscal policy based on lump-sum
taxation; the second one (called "extended model") also includes rule-of-thumb consumers
and the two regimes but adds distortionary taxation (on consumption, wages and capital in-
come). Estimation of the model is based on Japanese quarterly data from 1980Q1 to 2020Q3,
using a Markov-switching regimes approach. Japan is an interesting case of study for this
topic because it experiences a very long ZLB episode with near-zero interest rates since the
mid-1990s. In addition, as a drop in the aggregate consumption level occurred after the tax
hikes of 2014 and 2019, devising optimal measures to boost demand is an important stake at
present.
The main contributions of this research are as follows. Even after inclusion of the rule-
of-thumb consumers, consumption does not respond positively to fiscal stimulus measures.
This is explained, first, by the fact that Ricardian behavior remains prevalent in the model,
irrespective of the share of non-Ricardian households. And this behavior is closely linked to
lump-sum taxes that are kept in both versions of the model. Second, although consumption
also tracks income more closely compared to the benchmark model of Smets and Wouters
(2003) that does not have hand-to-mouth consumers,3 real wages decline after most mea-
sures, thereby contributing negatively to consumption’s response.
The inclusion of distortionary taxation is found to alter the model’s behavior after a fiscal
shock through movements of the different tax rates. In particular, the model with distor-
tionary taxes shows that measures that affect the capital income tax generate positive effects
over the long-run, through an increase in capital and inflation (at the ZLB or interest rates
outside the bound).
No significant difference is found across regimes (outside and at the ZLB) in the model’s
behavior after a government spending increase or a capital income tax cut. But a difference
between the two regimes can be seen after a cut in the consumption tax or the wage income
tax. Outside the ZLB, both measures have negative effects on the economy. At the ZLB, both
3And also to models for Japan that are based on Smets and Wouters (2003) such as Iiboshi, Nishiyama, and
Watanabe (2006).
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policies have harmful effects in the short-run but the potential to yield better results over the
long-run via an impact on investment through the expectations channel.
A comparison between the different fiscal policy measures indicates that a capital income
tax cut is the most beneficial policy and also yields better results than a government spending
increase. It has the disadvantage of increasing public debt more significantly. Finally, a
variance decomposition analysis shows that labor supply and technology shocks are the most
significant contributors to the variation of private consumption, whereas fiscal shocks play a
small role.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview
of the main literature on the relationship between fiscal policy, private consumption and
output. The third section provides a description of the theoretical model. The fourth section
shows a general depiction of the basic workings of the model based on a full calibration of
its log-linearized version. The fifth section summarizes the main settings for the model’s
solution and estimation through a Markov-switching regimes approach, and discusses the
main results. Finally, the last section summarizes the main points of the study.
3.2 Literature review
Although many macroeconomic models agree on a positive effect from government spend-
ing to output, different theoretical specifications give very different predictions of the mag-
nitude of the fiscal multiplier.4 Typically, analyses based on linearized models such as Smets
and Wouters (2007), Cogan et al. (2010) tend to predict smaller multipliers while recent
non-linear approaches yield higher multipliers under some conditions. Some examples in-
clude models that account for the Zero Lower Bound5 (Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Woodford
(2011)),6or changes in the business cycle reflected in the unemployment rate (Nakamura
and Steinsson (2014)) or in financial frictions (Canzoneri et al. (2016), Fernández-Villaverde
(2010)).
4Usually defined as the percentage change in GDP in response to a change in government spending equal to
one percent GDP.
5In that case, the non-linearity is accounted for through the monetary policy rule.
6Higher multipliers result from an increase in inflation expectations when interest rates are held constant.
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There is an even stronger disagreement in the literature regarding the impact on private
consumption. Usually, negative or very small multipliers for consumption are found in analy-
ses based on neoclassical models (Hall (2009)) and are considered to be the result of negative
wealth effects. According to Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007), consumers in neoclassi-
cal models (especially RBC models) act in a Ricardian fashion, as opposed to the traditional
IS-LM frameworks. Therefore, an increase in government spending lowers the present-value
of after-tax income thereby inducing a negative wealth effect that decreases consumption. In
contrast, Keynesian models usually imply high multipliers for both output and consumption
since the size of the multiplier mostly depends on the marginal propensity to consume. New
Keynesian models on the other hand usually yield a negative response of consumption. Since
they are constructed by adding rigidities to a neoclassical foundation, neoclassical effects
tend to mute the Keynesian multiplier.
One way of increasing consumption’s response in a New Keynesian model is the inclu-
sion of rule-of-thumb (or non-Ricardian) consumers. That way, the marginal propensity to
consume becomes much higher than it would be if consumers behaved optimally, and the
Keynesian mechanism takes over. Rule-of-thumb consumers are individuals that do not bor-
row or save but consume their entire income. In practice, there are many factors that could
explain this behavior; for instance: myopia, liquidity or borrowing constraints, lack of con-
fidence in economic conditions, inability to form expectations in an uncertain context, etc.
Some examples of models that yield higher multipliers after inclusion of non-Ricardian con-
sumers in the literature include Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) and Coenen and Straub
(2005).7 However, in both cases, the authors stress the fact that the share of rule-of-thumb
consumers has to be very high in order to alter the model’s behavior. In addition, Galí,
López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) state that it should be accompanied by a high value of the
price stickiness parameter so that real wages increase and drive consumption up.
Still, the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers makes models more realistic especially
that an extensive empirical and theoretical literature shows a strong dependence of consump-
tion on current income (Hall (1978), Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Erceg, Guerrieri, and
Gust (2005), López Salido and Rabanal (2006)). In addition, a proportion of households has
no access to bank credit and is therefore unable to smooth consumption over the business
7Perotti (1999) also uses a model that assumes the coexistence of credit-constrained individuals and individ-
uals with free access to credit, albeit with an opposite outcome (negative correlation in bad times).
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cycle. Therefore, I include the assumption of the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers in
this study. In addition, I introduce two other assumptions taken from the fiscal multiplier
literature. These two assumptions usually make fiscal policy more effective in stimulating
the economy even without resorting to widespread non-optimizing behavior.
The first additional assumption is the inclusion of lump-sum taxes in the fiscal rule speci-
fication. Usually, models featuring expenditures that are financed through distortionary taxes
lead to low output multipliers, in comparison with those in which expenditures are financed
through current or future lump-sum taxes.8 The second assumption is the Zero Lower Bound
on interest rates.9 As both assumptions often lead to higher fiscal multipliers, they have the
potential to make consumption more responsive to fiscal shocks in the model.
The model used in this chapter is estimated based on data for Japan over the period
1980Q1-2020Q3. A number of factors make Japan an interesting case for studying the econ-
omy’s dynamics after fiscal shocks at the ZLB. One of these factors is the fact that Japan
experiences a very long ZLB episode with interest rates being close to zero since the mid-
1990s. Another one is that even within the low interest rates period, different patterns in
interest rates movements can be found, resulting in separate episodes, each characterized by
distinct macroeconomic conditions (e.g., different levels of inflation).
Evidence of fiscal policy effects in Japan in periods of low interest rates is mixed. For
example, Ko and Morita (2013) found fiscal policy to be ineffective in stimulating consump-
tion during the low interest rates period.10 One explanation provided by the authors is a
8Fiscal policy effects also tend to be smaller if the increase of expenses is perceived by consumers as transitory
rather than permanent (see Hall (2009), Ramey (2011), Baxter and King (1993)). In the latter case, consumers
work more after the fiscal stimulus which generates a positive wealth effect; whereas in the former case, con-
sumers simply smooth their labor and consumption by investing less. In other words, higher government spending
leads to a reduction in investment instead of stimulating output.
9As stated before, the size of the multiplier is often found to be higher when accounting for markets failures:
cases of high unemployment (Lee et al. (2020)), the presence of borrowing constraints (Canzoneri et al. (2016))
or liquidity constraints caused by the zero lower bound as monetary policy cannot be used to stimulate the
economy. These factors reflect conditions that often occur during recessions and many empirical studies based
on non-linear estimation methods show higher multiplier effects during recessionary episodes (e.g., Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), Batini, Callegari, and Melina (2012), Mittnik
and Semmler (2012)).
10They followed an empirical approach using a MS-VAR model. Results showed the presence of four major
structural changes in Japanese fiscal policy between the 1970s and the recent period. These break-points occurred
in the mid-1970s (oil shock), early 1990s (recession), late 1990s (liquidity trap and slight recovery) and late 2000s
(global recession and recovery). But fiscal policy appeared to be effective in stimulating consumption only during
the first, second and fifth regime.
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low expectations of future income increase by households, resulting from the sluggish econ-
omy.11 In contrast, using the Jordà (2005) local projection method, Miyamoto, Nguyen,
and Sergeyev (2018) reached the conclusion that a government spending increase crowds
out private consumption and investment in the normal period and crowds them in during the
ZLB period. They also found CPI inflation and expected inflation to respond positively and
significantly at the ZLB, compared to the normal period.
Finally, incorporating non-linearities arising from the ZLB in DSGE models has become
increasingly widespread in macroeconomic modelling and can be done following different
methods. In this study, a regime-switching approach that builds on the contribution of Bin-
ning and Maih (2017) is adopted. Through this approach, perturbation methods can be ap-
plied to derive an approximated solution for the model.
3.3 Theoretical model
I consider a standard New-Keynesian DSGE model in the vein of Smets and Wouters (2003),
augmented with rule-of-thumb consumers and an extended fiscal policy framework as in Co-
enen and Straub (2005), Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) and Iwata (2009). However,
as opposed to these papers, money is not removed from the Ricardian households utility func-
tion and a quadratic form of capital adjustment costs is assumed. Two versions of the model
are studied. The first version (called "baseline model") includes rule-of-thumb consumers
with two regimes (at and outside the ZLB) and fiscal policy based on lump-sum taxation; the
second one (called "extended model") also includes rule-of-thumb consumers and the two
regimes but adds distortionary taxation (on consumption, wages and capital).
3.3.1 Baseline model
3.3.1.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ (0, 1). This continuum includes two
types of households: a share of 1− µ of households corresponds to Ricardian consumers,
with unrestricted access to financial markets where they can trade government bonds and
physical capital. The remaining µ households have no access to financial markets. Ricardian
11An investment crowding-out effect was also observed in the 2000s period. According to the authors this
could be explained by the fact that a large share of public spending during this phase was made to bailout poorly
productive, debt-ridden firms.
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households maximize their intertemporal utility as follows:
E0 ∑∞t=0 βtURt (3.1)

























The external habit stock Ht is proportional to aggregate past consumption Ht = hCt−1. The
term σc represents relative risk aversion, σl is the inverse of the elasticity of work effort with
respect to real wage and σm is the inverse of the elasticity of money holding with respect
to the interest rate. The utility function includes three types of shocks that follow an AR(1)
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+ YRt − TRt − CRt − IRt (3.3)
TRt are lump-sum taxes and I
R
t investment. As in Ireland (2001), it is assumed that in order
to generate new units of capital, households must pay an adjustment cost, measured through


























t represent total payments from supplying units of capital and Div
R
t dividends
from firms of intermediate goods. The capital accumulation process is given by
KRt+1 = (1− δ)KRt + xt IRt (3.5)
Where δ is the rate of depreciation of capital with 0 < δ < 1 and xt represents a shock to the
marginal efficiency of investment and is expressed as ln(xt) = ρxln (xt−1) + ηxt .
On the other hand, Non-Ricardian households do not optimize their consumption decision
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and fully consume their labor income as follows
CNRt = wtL
NR
t − TNRt (3.6)
3.3.1.2 Labor markets
Wages are determined in the labor market by a continuum of unions acting as wage setters.
The probability that a particular union changes its nominal wage in period t is constant and















λw,t a stochastic parameter representing the wage mark-up with λw,t = λw + ηwt and the
shock ηwt is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. Aggregate labor demand Lt and aggregate nominal





















The optimization problem leads to the following mark-up equation for the optimized wage
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12Λt+i can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier equivalent to the marginal utility of consumption.
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Aggregate consumption is given by
Ct = (1− µ)CRt + µCNRt (3.13)
And aggregate labor
Lt = (1− µ) LRt + µLNRt (3.14)
With Lt = LRt = L
NR
t at equilibrium. Aggregate lump-sum taxes are
Tt = (1− µ) TRt + µTNRt (3.15)
The fact that only Ricardian households hold government bonds, accumulate capital, invest
and receive dividends implies the following aggregate expressions
Bt = (1− µ) BRt (3.16)
Kt+1 = (1− µ)KRt+1 (3.17)
It = (1− µ) IRt (3.18)
Divt = (1− µ) DivRt (3.19)
3.3.1.3 Firms
Final goods sector












Where yjt is the quantity of domestic intermediate goods j and λp,t a stochastic parameter
representing mark-up in goods market with λp,t = λp + η
p
t and the shock η
p
t is assumed
to be i.i.d. normal. Using the previous relation in the firms’ profit maximization expression
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)− 1λp,t dj]−λp,t (3.22)
Intermediate goods
Intermediate goods’ producers use the following production technology based on labor and




































Based on a Calvo price setting model with partial indexation, a share of intermediate goods
firms can re-optimize their price with a probability 1− ξp to a new level p̃jt. The remaining
share of firms index the price to the previous period’s inflation with a probability ξp. The
former category of firms chooses their price by solving the problem of maximization of











yjt+i = 0 (3.27)
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And the aggregate price index is given by
(Pt)

























Where φr captures the degree of interest rate smoothing, φπ measures the response of mone-
tary policy to inflation and φY to output (both expressed as deviations from the steady state).
3.3.1.5 Fiscal policy







As in Gali et al. (2007), the fiscal policy rule is assumed to be as follows
tt = φbbt + φggt (3.32)
With tt ≡ (Tt − T) /Y , gt ≡ (Gt − G) /Y, bt ≡ ((Bt/Pt+1)− (B/P)) /Y and the pa-
rameters φb and φg are positive coefficients. Government spending is assumed to follow an
exogenously given AR(1) process
gt = ρggt−1 + η
g
t (3.33)
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3.3.1.6 Market equilibrium
The final goods market will be in equilibrium if production equals demand by households
and the government such that









3.3.2 Extended model with an alternative fiscal rule
To assess the importance of the fiscal rule specification, I extend the baseline model by in-
cluding distortionary taxation and additional rules in a subsequent step. In that case, the





















+ (1− τk,t) DivRt + τk,tδKRt − TRt − (1 + τc,t)CRt −
KRt+1 − (1− δ)KRt
xt
(3.35)
Where τc,t τw,t and τk,t are consumption, labor and capital income taxes, respectively. Non-
Ricardian households’ budget constraint is
(1 + τc,t)CNRt = (1− τw,t)wtLNRt − TNRt (3.36)
The government budget constraint becomes
Bt/Rt
Pt




The fiscal rule is also changed. As in Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2014), government spending,
transfers and consumption tax rate are assumed to respond to deviations of output and debt
from their steady states. Labor and capital tax rates are assumed to respond to deviations of
labor hours and investment, respectively, in addition to debt.
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τ̂w,t = ρwtτ̂w,t−1 + (1− ρwt)
(
ρwtl L̂t + ρwtbbt−1
)
+ ηwtt (3.40)
τ̂k,t = ρktτ̂k,t−1 + (1− ρkt)
(
ρktI Ît + ρktbbt−1
)
+ ηktt (3.41)









3.4 Model preliminary simulation with no binding constraint
3.4.1 Log-linearization of the baseline model around the steady state
In a first step, the model is log-linearized and the Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumption
equations are combined (more details are provided in Appendix B). The resulting equations
are as follows.
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L̂t = −ŵt + r̂kt + K̂t (3.46)
Ŷt = θ
[
ε̂at + αK̂t + (1− α) L̂t
]
(3.47)
































































+ ηwt − ŵt
]
(1− βξw) (1− ξw)





















x̂t = ρx x̂t−1 + η̂xt (3.56)





gt = ρggt−1 + η
g
t (3.58)
λp,t = λp + η
p
t (3.59)
λw,t = λw + η
w
t (3.60)
3.4.2 Baseline model calibration, simulation and basic mechanisms
I proceed with a preliminary simulation of the baseline model without any binding constraint
to shed some light on the model’s underlying mechanisms. This preliminary analysis is also
useful to distinguish between results that are explained by the model specification and those
that are explained by the data in later steps. The calibrated parameters are taken from the
existing literature. The discount factor β is set to the value of 0.99, the elasticity of output
with respect to capital α to 0.3, the depreciation rate of capital δ to 0.025. The steady-
state ratios of consumption, investment and government spending over output are assumed
to be respectively equal to 0.57, 0.2, 0.22 (corresponding to the average ratios calculated
from collected data on Japan13). The steady-state ratio of money to output is taken as 0.9
(calculated based on average M2 to GDP over the period) and the ratio of capital to output is
set to 2.2 as in previous similar studies.14
13See following section.
14See Watanabe (2009), Iwata (2009), Iiboshi, Nishiyama, and Watanabe (2006), Smets and Wouters (2003).
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λw is set to the value of 0.5 and the share of non-Ricardian households to 0.35 (as in Iwata
(2009)). The share of fixed costs over total production is considered equal to 0.4515 and λp to
0.45.16. The capital adjustment cost parameter Θk is considered to be equal to 10 as in Ireland
(2001) and the inverse of the elasticity of money holding with respect to the interest rate σM
is set to 2 (Kuo and Miyamoto (2016)) To calibrate the remaining parameters, the posterior
means obtained by Iiboshi, Nishiyama, and Watanabe (2006) from Japanese data are used
(see Table 3.1). Finally, parameters of the fiscal rule are taken from Galí, López-Salido, and
Vallés (2007) and those of the monetary policy rule from Smets and Wouters (2003).
Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation positive shock to government
spending are shown on Figure 3.1. Based on zero steady state values, these preliminary
results indicate that an increase in government spending induces a decline in consumption,
investment, inflation, capital and real wages. At the same time, the shock generates a hike in
labor supply and output and raises the public debt level. Most of these outcomes are in line
with the model of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Iiboshi, Nishiyama, and Watanabe (2006)
(for Japan).
From these responses and equation (3.44), it appears that the decline in private consump-
tion is a direct consequence of a government spending crowding-out effect which manifests
through higher taxes and higher public debt (both of which affect households’ consumption
through the budget constraint). The reduction in inflation (explained by lower wages) also
negatively affects consumption through a positive change in money holdings, but this impact
remains relatively weak in magnitude, even if the share of Ricardian households is increased.
The positive effect of higher labor is offset by the decline in wages, resulting in an over-
all negative impact. This impact is also relatively small compared to that of government
spending. But it can be increased if the parameters of the elasticity of output with respect to
capital or the price markup are smaller or if the share of fixed costs in production is higher,
since these parameters affect the steady state ratio of labor income over output. The effect of
wages and labor also slightly increases with the share of non-Ricardian households (because
consumption tracks income more closely).
The decline in consumption is strongly cushioned by the increase in output which enters
the Ricardian households consumers’ equation through dividends. And this increase in output
15As in Iiboshi, Nishiyama, and Watanabe (2006), Coenen and Straub (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003).
16Such that 1 + λp = 1 + ΦY , implying zero profits at the steady state.
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is also a direct effect of higher government spending. In other words, this model shows that
the increase in government spending only stimulates the consumption of households that own
firms, through higher profits generated by the higher government demand. On the other hand,
the decrease in investment is favorable for consumption since more income is available for
Ricardian consumers, but it plays a limited role due to the small magnitude of the response.
Estimation of consumption’s impulse response functions for different values of the share
of rule-of-thumb consumers is shown on Figure 3.2. No matter the value of this parameter,
response of consumption does not get positive. On the contrary, the decline in consumption is
more marked when the parameter increases. This is unsurprising since the stimulating effect
on the economy in this model mainly affects Ricardian households through firms’ profits.
3.4.3 Basic workings of the extended model with distortionary taxation
I use the same calibration described previously to simulate the extended model with dis-
tortionary taxation. In addition, the steady state tax rates are set to the values τw = 0.32,
τc = 0.08, τk = 0.61.17 At this stage, autoregressive parameters in the tax rules are set to
0.818 and the remaining parameters of the rules to 0.1.19 The changes to the log-linearized
model are included in Appendix C.
Figure 3.3 shows a comparison between the impulse responses in the extended version of
the model and those of the baseline model. On impact, consumption decreases more strongly
in the baseline model, but the opposite becomes true after two quarters. The primary reason
for this is that the decline in the baseline model (as opposed to the second model) mainly
results from the direct impact of government spending (through the fiscal rule). Therefore,
this response weakens as spending converges to the steady state. Conversely, based on the
aggregate consumption equation of the second model (equation (3.179) in Appendix C), con-
sumption’s decline is mainly driven by the declining wages (a direct effect on income and to
a lesser extent an indirect effect through lower inflation).
As before, the increase in output in the extended version is mainly a result of the increase
in government spending since both consumption and investment decline (the same shock
is applied in both models). The slight difference in output response results from a higher
17Taken from Iwata (2009).
18Drygalla, Holtemöller, and Kiesel (2020), Iwata (2009), Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2014).
19Prior means in Iwata (2009).
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response of labor in the extended model. Another reason is that government spending con-
verges more rapidly to the steady state in the baseline model compared to the extended model.
Finally, lump-sum taxes and tax rates gradually increase after the spending shock. They all
contribute equivalently to the debt repayment except the capital income tax rate which in-
creases with a smaller amount compared to the other taxes. The divergence of capital in the
baseline model, although not observed in the extended model, is consistent with the response
in the benchmark model of Smets and Wouters (2003) and also in Iiboshi, Nishiyama, and
Watanabe (2006).
3.5 Markov-Switching Bayesian approach
I then proceed with the model estimation through Bayesian methods using Japanese data
from 1980 Q1 to 2020 Q3. Since Japan experiences a long ZLB episode during the period of
study (nominal interest rates have been close to zero since 1995 Q3), relying on non-linear
solution and estimation techniques is necessary.
3.5.1 Solution methodology
Binning and Maih (2016) provide a brief description of the main solution approaches to solve
non-linear DSGE models and which include: extended path solutions, piecewise-linear solu-
tions, anticipated shocks, projection methods and regime-switching methods. In the present
study, the regime-switching model approach is adopted. Based on Maih (2015), the regime-






πrt,rt+1 (Ωt)d̃rt (ν) = 0 (3.61)
d̃rt : IR
(nν) → IR(nd) is a ndx1 vector of possibly non-linear functions of their argument ν
The variable rt corresponds to the regime at time t
πrt,rt+1 (Ωt) is the transition probability for going from regime rt at time t to regime rt+1
in the following period. It depends on the information set at time t represented by Ωt. The
special case where transition probabilities are constant is referred to as the Markov-Switching
DSGE model.
The argument ν represents a nν vector that includes the stacked vectors of the following
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categories of variables: static variables (st), forward-looking variables ( ft), predetermined
variables (pt), variables that are both predetermined and forward looking (bt), shocks (εt)
and switching parameters appearing with a lead in the model (θrt+1).






drt,rt+1 (ν) = 0 (3.62)
It is assumed that if agents have information for all or some of the shocks k periods ahead
of time, then the state variables vector zt can be expressed as a nzx1 vector that contains the
variables (pt−1), (bt−1), a perturbation parameter σ, the present shock and k future shocks,
with nz = np + nb + (k + 1) nε + 1. This is an important distinction with the traditional
approach based on "news shocks", usually included in the system by adding additional terms
to the law of motion of the shock process. Another difference is that anticipated shocks are
considered as structural shocks and therefore can be related to other parts of the system.
For yt (rt) being the nyx1 vector of all endogenous variables with ny = ns + np + nb +
















To solve the model, a perturbation method is used to approximate the decision rules above.
To do so, the vector yt is decomposed to isolate the predetermined from the forward-looking
components. Similarly the vector zt is also partitioned so that all variables of the system can
be expressed in terms of the state variables vector zt. Thus, the vector ν becomes
ν =

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Where λb f is the matrix that selects the variables b and f and mg refers to a ngxnz matrix






drt,rt+1 (ν (zt, u)) = 0 (3.65)
Using this expression, successive Taylor approximations around an approximation point can
be performed up to higher orders to find the perturbation solutions. Several algorithms to
solve the approximated problem are discussed in Maih (2015) and Farmer, Waggoner, and
Zha (2011). In the present study, the model is solved using a functional iteration algorithm
that offers the advantage of converging fast when a solution is found.20
3.5.2 Calibration, prior specification and data
Bayesian estimation of the model is based on the following quarterly macroeconomic series:
output, private consumption, private investment, nominal interest rate, labor hours and real
hourly wage. Data for the first three series are obtained from the database of the Cabinet
Office and divided by the labor force. Labor hours are calculated based on the series of
aggregate weekly labor hours for non-agricultural industries obtained from the Portal Site
of Official Statistics of Japan. Real wages are calculated based on real wage indices from
the monthly labor survey of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare and the value of
real hourly wage at 2020Q3 taken from statistics of the Japan Institute for Labor Policy and
Training. The short-term nominal interest rates correspond to the overnight call rates taken
from the Bank of Japan database. All variables are transformed to logarithms and detrended
using a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter,21 except the interest rate, that is detrended without
log-transformation.
As is usual in the literature, the parameter values of β, α, δ, λp, λw, Θk and the ratios over
output are fixed, using the calibration values of the previous section. The prior distributions
for estimated parameters are reported on Table 3.3. In setting these values, I follow similar
studies based on variants of Smets and Wouters (2003) for Japan such as Iiboshi, Nishiyama,
and Watanabe (2006), Iwata (2009) and Watanabe (2009). All standard deviations of shocks
are assumed to follow an inverted gamma distribution with degrees of freedom equal to two.
20The mfi algorithm implemented in the Rationality In Switching Environments (RISE) Toolbox.
21Non-causal filters such as the two-sided HP or Baxter-King filters are not used since they take future values
to construct present data.
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The distribution of autoregressive parameters is on the other hand assumed to follow a beta
distribution with mean 0.8 and standard error 0.1. Prior of the inverse of the elasticity of
money holding with respect to the interest rate σM is set based on Kuo and Miyamoto (2016)
and the standard error of money demand shock ηt M from Kano (2019). Priors for the fiscal
rule parameters are taken from Coenen and Straub (2005) in the case of the baseline model,
and from Iwata (2009) in the case of the extended model.
Priors for the monetary policy rule in the first regime are taken from Smets and Wouters
(2003). At the ZLB, parameters of the monetary rule are more difficult to obtain. I therefore
decide to keep the same type of probability distribution as in the first regime but set estimates
of the mean and standard deviation based on a regression model. This necessitates a definition
of the ZLB period. Looking at interest rates data, it can be noted that interest rates have been
almost steadily declining since 1991Q3.22 But despite this decline, interest rates were not
close to zero in the first quarters of the 1991Q3-2020Q3 period. Within this period, one
major drop occurred in 1995Q3 when interest rates went below 1%. They then stayed below
this level for the remaining part of the sample period. For this reason, many studies define the
ZLB period as the entire period that follows this drop, and which is characterized by interest
rates that are within the unit interval (in percentage). For example, all the post-1995Q4 period
is chosen as the ZLB period in Miyamoto, Nguyen, and Sergeyev (2018), Borağan Aruoba,
Cuba-Borda, and Schorfheide (2018) and Adjemian and Juillard (2010). On the other hand,
Hayashi and Koeda (2014) follow a different approach and define the ZLB as the period
where interest rates are below the critical rate of 0.05%.23
In the present study, the chosen period to estimate the model is 1995Q3-2016Q1 (the
remaining quarters are excluded because interest rates are negative). One difficulty that arises
from the choice of this period is the changing behavior of inflation (see Figure 3.4). More
specifically, the long deflationary period imposes a negative relationship between interest
rates and inflation, which in reality does not apply to the whole low interest rates period. To
overcome this problem, a threshold regression approach is adopted. That way, it is possible
to distinguish between different patterns of relationships between the interest rate and the
22By applying a Zivot-Andrews unit root test over the whole data series, I also find one breakpoint at 1992Q1.
23This corresponds to the rate below which bank reserves in Japan are greater than required reserves (and often
several times greater). Based on this definition, the ZLB corresponds to the following episodes: March 1999 -
July 2000, March 2001 - June 2006, and December 2008 to the end of the period of study (2014).
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monetary rule variables depending on the interest rate level.24 Results of this regression
are reported on Table 3.2. Prior means of the monetary rule parameters are set based on
an average of these coefficients. Finally, the Markov process is defined based on constant
transition probabilities for which the prior is defined as on Table 3.3.
3.5.3 Results
3.5.3.1 Estimation settings and smoothed probabilities
Estimation of the posterior distribution is based on a stochastic optimizer with 1000 itera-
tions. After multiple runs of the optimization procedure, the estimation result with the highest
log marginal data density (Laplace approximation) is selected. This corresponds to a value
of -1465 for the baseline model and -1346 for the extended model. In a subsequent step, the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is applied with 1000 parameter draws from the distribution
(in addition to a ratio of 0.1 burnin). Finally, impulse response functions are constructed
based on random parameter draws (300 replications) from the MCMC simulation.
Then, the smoothed probabilities are calculated to detect the timing of regime shifts.
These probabilities are plotted on Figure 3.5 along with the time series of short-term nominal
interest rates. It can be noted that regime 1 switches abruptly at the following dates: 2001Q3-
2006Q1, 2009Q3-2011Q2, 2011Q4-2015Q4 and 2016Q3-2018Q2. These shifts suggest that
the second regime represents all periods with interest rates below 0.10. There are however
two main exceptions. First, the model does not capture the period 1999Q2-2000Q2 in which
interest rates are also below the 0.1 threshold. Second, there is a regime change that occurs
during the low interest-rates period, at 2016Q2, when interest rates turn negative. Conversely,
the model perfectly captures the period 2001Q3-2006Q1 where interest rates are in most
quarters close to or below 0.001, with probabilities of being in regime 1 that are close to
zero for this entire interval. To conclude, the timing of these shifts suggests that regime 1
corresponds to a period where interest rates are unbounded whereas regime 2 is the ZLB
period.
24The most common approach in estimating the monetary policy rule is an IV tobit regression (e.g., Kiesel and
Wolters (2014), Kim and Mizen (2010), Kato and Nishiyama (2005)) since the variable of short-term interest rates
is left-censored. However, the threshold regression approach is chosen in this study; first because no significant
differences are obtained in the estimated coefficients compared to a tobit regression for the selected short time
span, and second because the relationship between variables may differ across the different periods of low interest
rates.
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3.5.3.2 Parameters’ posterior mode estimates
Estimated posterior modes are provided on Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The estimated parameter of
rule-of-thumb consumers appears as lower than the prior mean in the baseline model and
higher in the extended model. The parameter of Calvo price stickiness has a small value in
both models,25 suggesting a higher price flexibility than expected. In the extended model,
estimates for the fiscal rules are close to the prior in the case of consumption, wage income
and capital income tax rates. Conversely, the parameters of response of government spend-
ing to deviations in output and public debt are extremely small. This implies that budget
adjustments made after an increase in public debt are mainly made through tax rates and not
government spending. Response of lump-sum taxes to public debt is also relatively smaller
than the prior mean. Finally, among fiscal rule variables, lump-sum taxes show the least
persistence.
3.5.3.3 Impact of a government spending shock
I then apply a positive shock to government spending. Although a shock of the same magni-
tude is applied in both the baseline and extended models (+0.34), there are some differences
in terms of responses between both. For example, there is almost no difference between
variables’ reaction at and outside the ZLB in the baseline model (Figure 3.6), but a slight dif-
ference can be seen between both regimes in the extended model (Figure 3.7). Nonetheless,
the response of consumption on impact is negative in all cases. Even at the ZLB, the model
does not produce the crowding-in effect of consumption that has been discussed in some
previous studies. It can however be noted that in the extended model, consumption’s reac-
tion gets positive over the long-run (after 6 quarters outside the ZLB and 5 at the ZLB). The
shape of consumption’s response in this case suggests an impact from tax rate adjustments
that follow the spending increase (see Figure 3.8).
The aggregate consumption equations26 are used to uncover the main contributors to
consumption’s response. In the baseline model, the decline in consumption (about -0.11),
both at and outside the ZLB, is found to be mainly a direct crowding-out effect of government
spending (through higher taxes and public debt). This decline is mitigated by a higher output
25This parameter is considered by Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) as an important factor to generate an
increase in real wages (if it is sufficiently high) and thereby a positive response in consumption.
26Equation (3.44) in section 3.4 for the baseline model and equation (3.179) in Appendix C for the extended
model.
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and an increase in labor that offsets the effect of falling real wages (overall positive effect
of labor income). In the extended model, consumption drops by 0.12 after the shock in
both regimes. This effect results essentially from the increase in lump-sum taxes (negative
transfers) and a decline in wages. In particular, it can be seen that the path of consumption
closely tracks real wages’ response.
Turning to output, a positive reaction is observed in all cases (+0.269 outside the ZLB
and +0.266 at the ZLB in the baseline model and +0.31 outside the ZLB and +0.35 at the
ZLB in the extended version). The fiscal multiplier on impact is relatively higher in the
extended model, especially at the ZLB (where it slighlty exceeds unity with a value of 1.03).
This positive response is mostly explained by the government spending increase itself which
raises aggregate demand. The higher aggregate demand also induces higher labor, which
plays a significant role in explaining output through the production function.
One important distinction between the baseline and the extended model is a different
response of capital, investment, inflation and interest rates. Inflation (at the ZLB) and in-
terest rates (outside the bound) respond positively in the extended model as opposed to the
baseline model. At the same time, there is almost no difference between the two models in
the responses of the rental rate of capital and real wages. This implies that the difference
in the reaction of inflation at the ZLB is not explained by the marginal cost and can only
be attributed to different inflation’s expectations or parameter estimates. It is true that the
estimated parameter of the degree of partial indexation of price γp is lower in the extended
model while Calvo price stickiness ξp is slightly higher but this difference is not sufficient in
explaining the opposite sign of inflation’s response. Therefore, different inflation’s response
is mainly due to different expectations. The positive response of capital in the second model
is also affected by higher expectations, in addition to a higher steady state of the rental rate
of capital27 and more particularly the impact of the capital income tax.28 The difference
between capital’s evolution at and outside the bound is explained by the difference in the
evolution of the tax rate in both regimes. On the other hand, the path of investment is mainly
explained by capital.
Based on these results, I conclude that the fiscal rule specification plays an important role
in determining the model’s response to fiscal shocks. In a model that does not account for
27Impact of the steady state capital income tax rate.
28Capital is a predetermined variable in the model and therefore positively affected by the tax rate at time t.
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distortionary taxation, a crowding-out effect of investment is obtained, which is consistent
with the main findings of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Iiboshi, Nishiyama, and Watanabe
(2006). But the presence of taxes alters this impact by affecting the path of the model’s
variables. The increase in capital in the extended model has a positive effect on the economy
since it eventually leads to an increase in consumption and wages although their immediate
response to the spending increase is negative.
Overall, the way consumption reacts to government spending in both the baseline and
extended model suggests that Ricardian behavior remains important even after inclusion of
rule-of-thumb consumers. Such a conclusion is corroborated by the model’s response to a
contractionary fiscal policy (a reduction of government spending) as shown on Figure 3.10.
It can be seen from the figure that private consumption responds positively to a cut in gov-
ernment spending. And the shape of this response reveals its relationship with the movement
of lump-sum taxes (Figure 3.9). To sum up, consumption appears to be driven by two key
factors in both models: lump-sum taxes and real wages. Real wages play a negative role in
this model because they decline after the positive government spending shock, but they can
be increased in the long-run if there is a positive accumulation of capital, in which case they
contribute to boosting consumption. Finally, output’s response is strongly linked to labor.
3.5.3.4 Effects of tax cut policies
I then simulate different tax cuts and compare their outcomes. In case of a consumption
income tax cut (see Figure 3.11), there is a slight difference between the model’s behavior
outside and at the ZLB. In the first regime, consumption increases on impact. On the other
hand, there is a small drop in output and interest rates. In the second regime, consumption
also increases on impact but declines after two quarters to go up again before the tenth quarter.
Response of output is negative and more acute than in the first regime. Finally, as interest
rates are bounded, a deflationary response is caused by the shock, which further depresses
the economy.
A similarity can be observed between consumption’s response and the response of real
wages. On impact, there is a slight increase of wages and consumption in both regimes
resulting from the lower consumption tax. Then the path of both variables is negatively
affected by the increase in other taxes. Both variables rise again as taxes converge to their
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steady states. Therefore, movements in both variables correspond to the inverse of those of
taxes which follow a hump-shaped pattern.
Overall, it appears that this policy is ineffective. First, it causes a drop in labor (and
thereby in output). Second, even the immediate positive response of consumption is ex-
tremely small. This can be justified by the parameterization of the model. The parameters
that determine the impact of a consumption tax are small (especially compared to other taxes).
The consumption tax rate steady state value is 0.08 (compared to 0.61 for the capital income
tax). The steady state ratio of consumption over output is 0.57 (compared to 2.2 for capital).
The estimated posterior mode for the standard deviations of shocks is also smaller compared
to other taxes. Third, the immediate positive effect of the tax cut on consumption is offset
by the negative effect of other tax increases. Finally, at the ZLB, this policy is even more
detrimental in the short-run because of the negative reaction of inflation.
Although a consumption tax cut is inefficient in stimulating the economy, it is not as
disadvantageous in the short-run as a wage income tax cut (Figure 3.12). A wage income
tax cut causes a drop in consumption and output both at and outside the ZLB. The behavior
of interest rates and inflation is the same as in the consumption tax cut. There is a negative
response of labor, capital and investment on impact, causing the decline in output.
Nevertheless, in the long-run, at the ZLB, the impact of both consumption tax and wage
income tax cuts becomes positive. This can be justified by an increase in investment after
the second quarter which increases the capital stock and inverts the response of inflation, real
wages, consumption and output. The higher investment is linked to the increase in capital
income tax rate which is more marked at the ZLB. The model specification implies that a
future increase in the capital income tax rate has a negative effect on present capital, but a
present increase has a positive effect because of the expected decrease of the tax.
The most advantageous policy in all tax cut policies is a capital income tax cut (Figure
3.13). Although it causes a drop in consumption on impact, consumption tends to increase
over time both at and outside the ZLB. The response of output is positive over the whole
simulation period. One main driver of these dynamics is the jump in investment that follows
the policy, which is accompanied by higher labor. Over time, there is a positive accumulation
of capital, which induces a progressive decline in the rental rate of capital. As opposed to the
previous tax cuts, inflation’s response is positive at the ZLB. Still, this inflationary effect does
not significantly alter the model’s behavior which stays almost the same across both regimes.
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Finally, one can remark that successful policies are those that increase inflation (at the
ZLB or interest rates outside the bound) and generate higher investment. Capital accumula-
tion plays an important role by shifting wages and production upward.
3.5.3.5 Comparison between policies of a government spending increase and a capital
income tax cut
I compare between the effect of a government spending increase and a capital income tax cut.
Plots are reported on Figure 3.14. On impact, many responses are almost at the same level
for both measures (consumption, output, labor, rental rate of capital, real wages and interest
rates). However, after a few quarters, a capital income tax cut has a better stimulating effect
on the economy than a government spending increase. This mainly results from the higher
increase in investment and the ensuing capital accumulation which shifts the economy’s pro-
ductive potential upward, resulting in a higher level of output. This process also leads to a
substantial increase in real wages over the long run, which eventually decreases labor. How-
ever, one negative aspect of this measure is that it generates a higher level of debt compared
to a government spending increase. As a result, tax rates also increase more significantly to
repay the debt, as shown on Figure 3.15.
3.5.3.6 Variance decomposition of private consumption
Based on the extended model, I calculate the variance decomposition of private consumption,
output, investment and real wages to detect what structural shocks drive these variables.
Results are shown in Table 3.5 with various horizons (short-run: one quarter, medium-run:
10 quarters and long-run: 20 quarters).
One significant difference between the obtained results and those of the benchmark model
of Smets and Wouters (2003) is that preference shocks are not found to be the main drivers
of consumption. Conversely, labor supply shocks and technology shocks contribute signif-
icantly to the variance of this variable in both regimes, especially in the first period. In
addition, the decomposition also shows that the respective shares of shocks to the marginal
efficiency of investment and capital income tax shocks progressively grow over time, in both
regimes. The main difference between both regimes lies in the fact that lump-sum taxes play
a much more important role in the variation of private consumption at the ZLB than outside
it. Finally, Sugo and Ueda (2007) that used a model close to Smets and Wouters (2003) for
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Japan29 also found consumption to be mainly driven by technology shocks, but the weight of
preference shocks was not as insignificant in their model as in the present model.
Overall, fiscal shocks do not affect private consumption significantly. In comparison, they
contribute more notably in variations of output and investment. As shown in Table 3.5, output
is significantly affected by wage income tax rate fluctuations, in addition to government
spending (in the short-run), capital income tax rate shocks (over the long-run), and also
lump-sum taxes at the ZLB. In the case of the investment variable, there is a significant
contribution of the capital income tax shock (in addition to lump-sum taxes at the ZLB).
Finally, the variance decomposition of consumption is closer to the one of real wages. Real
wages’ variation is mainly explained by a technology shock, a shock to the mark-up in goods
market, a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (over the long-run) and lump-sum
taxes at the ZLB.
Figure 3.16 shows the response of private consumption to the shocks that contribute the
most to its variance. It can be seen that an exogenous positive technology shock generates a
positive and high response in consumption.30 On the other hand, a labor supply shock gen-
erates a small negative response, which is consistent with Iiboshi, Nishiyama, and Watanabe
(2006). It is important to note that this shock is accompanied by a decrease in labor hours.31
A shock to the marginal efficiency of investment has a positive and progressively growing im-
pact on consumption (hump-shaped). Finally, response of consumption to a negative shock
to lump-sum taxes is negative at the ZLB.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effects of fiscal shocks on private consumption through a standard
new Keynesian model that includes rule-of-thumb consumers and the ZLB on interest rates.
A Markov-switching approach is used for the estimation. In addition, to assess the impor-
tance of the fiscal rule specification, findings from a baseline model with lump-sum taxes are
compared with those from an extended model with distortionary taxation.
29Sugo and Ueda (2007) made two main modifications: they used actual capital utilization rate data for esti-
mation, and they incorporated a negative correlation between capital utilization rates and rental costs of capital.
30A technology shock also induces a positive response in output and a negative response in public debt.
31It affects the model through the wage equation.
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Results indicate that the presence of Non-Ricardian consumers is not sufficient to reduce
the weight of Ricardian behavior which still plays a major role in shaping consumption’s re-
sponse. The presence of Non-Ricardian consumers does however strengthen the dependence
of consumption on wage fluctuations. The inclusion of distortionary taxation also alters the
model’s behavior through movements in the tax rates.
It is particularly noted that successful fiscal policies are those that increase investment
and inflation (at the ZLB) or interest rates (outside the bound). Investment plays a funda-
mental role in the model as it affects the economy’s production level through the capital
accumulation process.
There is no significant difference between the model’s behavior at and outside the ZLB
after a government spending increase or a capital income tax cut. But a difference across
regimes can be observed after a consumption tax or a wage income tax cut. Outside the
ZLB, both measures have a negative impact on the economy. At the ZLB, both policies have
harmful effects in the short-run but the potential to yield better results over the long-run. A
comparison between the different policies indicates that a capital income tax cut is the most
beneficial measure because of its stimulating impact on investment. Nonetheless, it generates
a much higher level of public debt which causes future tax hikes.
Finally, a variance decomposition of private consumption reveals that it is mainly driven
by shocks to the labor supply and technology shocks. At the ZLB, shocks to lump-sum taxes
are also found to play an important role. Among these shocks, a technology shock is the one
that generates the highest positive response in consumption.
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Tables
TABLE 3.1: Calibration of baseline model
Parameter Calibration Smets and Wouters (2003)*
Structural parameters
Habit of consumption h 0.795 0.592
Inverse of elasticity of work effort σL 2.077 2.503
Relative risk aversion of Ricardian households σc 1.912 1.391
Inverse of the elasticity of money holding
with respect to the interest rate
σM 2 ____




Share of non-Ricardian consumers µ 0.35 ____
Degree of partial indexation of price γp 0.579 0.477
Degree of partial ind. of wage γw 0.581 0.728
Calvo price stickiness ξp 0.791 0.905
Calvo wage stickiness ξw 0.275 0.742
Policy Parameters
Response of monetary policy to inflation φπ 1.70 1.688
Autoregressive coefficient of interest rate φr 0.80 0.956
Response of monetary policy to output gap φY 0.125 0.098
Fiscal rule parameter with respect to debt φb 0.33 ____
Fiscal rule par. with respect to government spending φg 0.10 ____
Shock persistence
Autoregressive parameter of preference shock ρB 0.214 0.838
Autoregressive parameter of labor supply shock ρL 0.406 0.881
Autoregressive parameter of shock
to the marginal efficiency of investment
ρx 0.933 0.913
Autoregressive parameter of technology shock ρa 0.818 0.811
Autoregressive parameter of government spending shock ρg 0.793 0.943
Autoregressive parameter of a money demand shock ρM 0.800 ____
* Posterior mean
TABLE 3.2: Threshold regression estimation of the monetary policy rule
using Japanese data over the period 1995Q3-2016Q1
IR threshold <0.001 <0.01 <0.1 Average
Coeff S.E. P-value Coeff S.E. P-value Coeff S.E. P-value Coeff
φr 0.28*** 5x10−15 0 0.33*** 0.02 0 0.58** 0.18 0.0021 0.40
φπ -0.001*** 3x10−18 0 -0.001*** 0.0003 0 0.012 0.008 0.13 0.003
φy 0.00003*** 6x10−18 0 0.0013* 0.0005 0.017 0.015* 0.006 0.02 0.005
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
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TABLE 3.3: Prior distributions and posterior mode of parameters for the
Markov-switching baseline model estimation
Parameter Distribution Prior mean Standard deviation Posterior Mode Mode SD
Structural parameters
h beta 0.795 0.1 0.624 0.082
σl gamma 2 0.375 2.251 0.947
σc gamma 1.5 0.2 2.078 0.708
σM gamma 2 0.5 1.452 0.939
θ gamma 1.45 0.25 1.613 0.471
µ beta 0.2 0.05 0.100 0.041
γp beta 0.75 0.15 0.819 0.083
γw beta 0.75 0.15 0.823 0.189
ξp beta 0.75 0.15 0.011 0.069
ξw beta 0.75 0.15 0.018 0.122
Fiscal Policy Parameters
φb Inverse gamma 0.1 2 0.034 0.179
φg normal 0.1 0.05 0.099 0.075
Shock persistence
ρB beta 0.8 0.1 0.998 0.270
ρL beta 0.8 0.1 0.295 0.201
ρx beta 0.8 0.1 0.990 0.054
ρa beta 0.8 0.1 0.846 0.186
ρg beta 0.8 0.1 0.745 0.132
ρM beta 0.8 0.1 0.931 0.067
Standard deviation of shocks
ηBt Inverse gamma 0.2 2 10.000 0.791
ηLt Inverse gamma 1 2 6.962 1.155
ηxt Inverse gamma 0.1 2 8.545 2.960
ηat Inverse gamma 0.4 2 0.888 0.868
η
g
t Inverse gamma 0.3 2 0.339 0.099
η
p
t Inverse gamma 0.15 2 0.050 3.149
ηwt Inverse gamma 0.25 2 0.084 0.470
ηMt Inverse gamma 0.5 2 10.000 0.543
Switching Monetary Policy Parameters
Regime 1
φπ normal 1.7 0.1 1.790 0.201
φr beta 0.8 0.1 0.571 0.111
φY normal 0.125 0.05 0.120 0.097
Regime 2
φπ normal 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.001
φr beta 0.4 0.1 0.857 0.224
φY normal 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.002
Transition probabilities
TP (1 to 2) beta 0.005 0.15 0.030 0.161
TP (2 to 1) beta 0.005 0.15 0.247 0.239
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TABLE 3.4: Prior distributions and posterior mode of parameters for the
Markov-switching extended model estimation
Parameter Distribution Prior mean Standard deviation Posterior Mode Mode SD
Structural parameters
h beta 0.795 0.1 0.490 0.111
σl gamma 2 0.375 1.602 0.348
σc gamma 1.5 0.2 1.817 0.236
σM gamma 2 0.5 4.563 0.552
θ gamma 1.45 0.25 1.999 0.151
µ beta 0.2 0.05 0.422 0.036
γp beta 0.75 0.15 0.488 0.202
γw beta 0.75 0.15 0.564 0.183
ξp beta 0.75 0.15 0.036 0.076
ξw beta 0.75 0.15 0.011 0.079
Fiscal Policy Parameters
ρtr beta 0.8 0.1 0.217 0.126
ρct beta 0.8 0.1 0.853 0.172
ρwt beta 0.8 0.1 0.771 0.130
ρkt beta 0.8 0.1 0.847 0.146
ρtry normal 0.1 0.05 0.102 0.048
ρcty normal 0.1 0.05 0.100 0.105
ρwtl normal 0.1 0.05 0.102 0.047
ρktI normal 0.1 0.05 0.098 0.081
ρgy normal 0.1 0.05 -0.026 0.047
ρtrb normal 0.1 0.05 0.068 0.106
ρctb normal 0.1 0.05 0.092 0.051
ρwtb normal 0.1 0.05 0.110 0.100
ρktb normal 0.1 0.05 0.096 0.063
ρgb normal 0.1 0.05 0.005 0.076
Shock persistence
ρB beta 0.8 0.1 0.846 0.153
ρL beta 0.8 0.1 0.333 0.196
ρx beta 0.8 0.1 0.874 0.088
ρa beta 0.8 0.1 0.357 0.130
ρg beta 0.8 0.1 0.704 0.064
ρM beta 0.8 0.1 0.917 0.174
Standard deviation of shocks
ηBt Inverse gamma 0.2 2 0.067 0.886
ηLt Inverse gamma 1 2 4.523 1.879
ηxt Inverse gamma 0.1 2 6.084 1.089
ηat Inverse gamma 0.4 2 0.687 1.083
η
g
t Inverse gamma 0.3 2 0.338 1.007
η
p
t Inverse gamma 0.15 2 0.049 2.938
ηwt Inverse gamma 0.25 2 0.083 2.414
ηMt Inverse gamma 0.5 2 6.749 1.906
ηtrt Inverse gamma 0.1 2 6.405 0.472
ηctt Inverse gamma 0.1 2 0.033 0.808
ηwtt Inverse gamma 0.1 2 0.057 3.370
ηktt Inverse gamma 0.4 2 6.024 1.197
Switching Monetary Policy Parameters
Regime 1
φπ normal 1.7 0.1 1.694 0.073
φr beta 0.8 0.1 0.694 0.106
φY normal 0.125 0.05 0.102 0.057
Regime 2
φπ normal 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003
φr beta 0.4 0.1 0.799 0.178
φY normal 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001
Transition probabilities
TP (1 to 2) beta 0.005 0.15 0.057 0.209
TP (2 to 1) beta 0.005 0.15 0.217 0.058
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TABLE 3.5: Forecast error variance decomposition of consumption, output,
investment and real wages at various horizons (extended model)
Private consumption
Regime 1 Regime 2 (ZLB)
t=1 t=10 t=20 t=1 t=10 t=20
Labor supply shock ηLt 0.65 0.31 0.19 0.44 0.25 0.14
Technology shock ηat 0.25 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.04
Shock to mark-up in goods markets ηpt 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Wage mark-up shock ηwt 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Shock to the marg. effic. of inv. ηxt 0.01 0.49 0.48 0.02 0.29 0.25
Government spending shock ηgt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Capital income tax shock ηktt 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.19
Lump-sum taxes shock ηtrt 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.29 0.35
Wage-income tax shock ηwtt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Money demand shock ηMt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01
Consumption tax shock ηctt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Preference shock ηBt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output
Regime 1 Regime 2 (ZLB)
t=1 t=10 t=20 t=1 t=10 t=20
Wage-income tax shock ηwtt 0.32 0.17 0.10 0.29 0.14 0.11
Technology shock ηat 0.28 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.05
Shock to the marg. effic. of inv. ηxt 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.07
Government spending shock ηgt 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Capital income tax shock ηktt 0.07 0.38 0.56 0.04 0.20 0.31
Shock to mark-up in goods markets ηpt 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Wage mark-up shock ηwt 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Labor supply shock ηLt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Lump-sum taxes shock ηtrt 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.35 0.40 0.36
Money demand shock ηMt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03
Preference shock ηBt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03
Consumption tax shock ηctt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment
Regime 1 Regime 2 (ZLB)
t=1 t=10 t=20 t=1 t=10 t=20
Shock to the marg. effic. of inv. ηxt 0.65 0.82 0.89 0.43 0.60 0.70
Capital income tax shock ηktt 0.30 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.09
Lump-sum taxes shock ηtrt 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.22 0.16
Technology shock ηat 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Government spending shock ηgt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Money demand shock ηMt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Preference shock ηBt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.02
Shock to mark-up in goods markets ηpt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labor supply shock ηLt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wage mark-up shock ηwt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wage-income tax shock ηwtt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
Consumption tax shock ηctt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real wages
Regime 1 Regime 2 (ZLB)
t=1 t=10 t=20 t=1 t=10 t=20
Technology shock ηat 0.51 0.22 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.09
Shock to mark-up in goods markets ηpt 0.46 0.17 0.09 0.27 0.11 0.06
Wage-income tax shock ηwtt 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Shock to the marg. effic. of inv. ηxt 0.01 0.54 0.62 0.00 0.37 0.45
Government spending shock ηgt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital income tax shock ηktt 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.14
Wage mark-up shock ηwt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lump-sum taxes shock ηtrt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.14
Labor supply shock ηLt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Preference shock ηBt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.05
Money demand shock ηMt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.04
Consumption tax shock ηctt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Figures
FIGURE 3.1: Baseline model’s response to a government spending positive
shock in the absence of a binding constraint
FIGURE 3.2: Response of consumption to a government spending shock
for different values of the share of rule-of-thumb consumers (calibrated base-
line model)
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FIGURE 3.3: Response to a positive government spending shock in the
baseline and extended model (fully calibrated model with no binding con-
straint)
Figures 151
FIGURE 3.4: CPI inflation and interest rates over the period of study
FIGURE 3.5: Interest rates Vs smoothed probabilities of an unbounded
interest rates regime
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FIGURE 3.6: Response to a positive government spending shock in the
baseline model (regime-switching)
Figures 153
FIGURE 3.7: Response to a positive government spending shock in the
extended model (regime-switching)
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FIGURE 3.8: Lump-sum taxes and tax rate adjustments after a positive
government spending shock in the extended model (regime-switching)
FIGURE 3.9: Lump-sum taxes and tax rate adjustments after a negative
government spending shock in the extended model (regime-switching)
Figures 155
FIGURE 3.10: Response to a negative shock to government spending
(regime-switching)
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FIGURE 3.11: Response to a negative shock to the consumption tax rate
(regime-switching)
Figures 157
FIGURE 3.12: Response to a negative shock to the wage income tax rate
(regime-switching)
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FIGURE 3.13: Response to a negative shock to the capital income tax rate
(regime-switching)
Figures 159
FIGURE 3.14: Comparison between a government spending increase mea-
sure and a capital income tax cut
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FIGURE 3.15: Spending and tax adjustments after a government spending
increase and a capital income tax cut
FIGURE 3.16: Response of private consumption to various shocks (ex-
tended model)
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Appendix A: Baseline model summary
Households




















































t − TRt − CRt
−
KRt+1 − (1− δ)KRt
xt
(3.67)



































































































































































As stated in the model description, the capital accumulation process is given by
KRt+1 = (1− δ)KRt + xt IRt (3.75)




























ln(xt) = ρxln (xt−1) + ηxt (3.79)
The non-ricardian consumers budget constraint is given by
CNRt = wtL
NR
t − TNRt (3.80)
Aggregate variables
Ct = (1− µ)CRt + µCNRt (3.81)
Lt = (1− µ) LRt + µLNRt (3.82)
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With Lt = LRt = L
NR
t at equilibrium.
Tt = (1− µ) TRt + µTNRt (3.83)
Bt = (1− µ) BRt (3.84)
Kt+1 = (1− µ)KRt+1 (3.85)
It = (1− µ) IRt (3.86)
Divt = (1− µ) DivRt (3.87)
Wage equation




















Where Λt+i can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier equivalent to the marginal utility of
consumption. In other words, the expression shows the gain in utility of consumption based




































































 = Et ∞∑
i=0
(βξw)
























 = Et ∞∑
i=0
(βξw)
i (1 + λw,t+i) Lh,t+iU′L
(3.94)
Where U′c is the marginal utility of an additional unit of consumption and U′L the marginal


































)− 1λp,t dj]−λp,t (3.97)





















Appendix A: Baseline model summary 165



































And the aggregate price index is given by
(Pt)













Monetary and fiscal authorities


















The fiscal policy rule
tt = φbbt + φggt (3.106)
The government spending process
gt = ρggt−1 + η
g
t (3.107)
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Goods market equilibrium
The final goods market equilibrium condition









Appendix B: log-linearization of the baseline model with lump-
sum taxes
Steady States





= ηxt = η
a
t = 0, implying that ε









− 1 + δ (3.110)
It is assumed that the debt level is null at the steady state and that the budget is balanced
B = 0 (3.111)
T = G (3.112)




















Where θ = 1 + ΦY




1 + λp − θ
1 + λp
(3.115)
Appendix B: log-linearization of the baseline model with lump-sum taxes 167
As in Gali et al (2007), steady state consumption is assumed to be the same across all house-
holds
C = CR = CNR (3.116)
And as stated before
L = LR = LNR (3.117)
Log-linearized model excluding prices and wages equations
Letters with a hat represent the log-linearized variables around the steady state, i.e.X̂t =
ln (Xt)− ln (X) ≈ Xt−XX










R̂t = Etπ̂t+1 + λ̂t − λ̂t+1 (3.119)









σc (1 + h)
(
R̂t − Etπ̂t+1 + Et ε̂Bt+1 − ε̂Bt
)
(3.120)





λ̂t − βEtλ̂t+1 + βEtπ̂t+1
)
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Where tNRt =
TNRt −TNR
Y . Aggregate consumption is given by
Ĉt = (1− µ) ĈRt + µĈNRt (3.125)
Log-linearization of 3.72
























































1 + λp − θ
Ŷt −
θ
1 + λp − θ
m̂ct (3.129)





















































m̂ct = (1− α) ŵt + αr̂kt − ε̂at (3.131)


























































































(1− α) L̂Rt + αK̂t + ε̂at
]
(3.133)
Replacing in the aggregate consumption equation
C
Y


















































Using the fiscal rule
C
Y















































Aggregate labor is given by
L̂t = (1− µ) L̂Rt + µL̂NRt (3.136)
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Replacing in the expression
C
Y







1− β R̂t −
1






































The following equation for aggregate consumption is obtained
C
Y







1− β R̂t −
1





























Log-linearization of the capital accumulation equation 3.75, the labor demand equation 3.99
and firms production function gives
K
Y










L̂t = −ŵt + r̂kt + K̂t (3.140)
Ŷt = θ
[
ε̂at + αK̂t + (1− α) L̂t
]
(3.141)
The monetary policy equation when the ZLB is not binding





Based on a zero debt level at the steady state and a balanced budget, the following expression
holds
bt = R (gt + bt−1 − tt) (3.143)







+ bt−1 (1− φb) (3.144)
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The condition for a non-explosive debt path is R (1− φb) < 1 leading to φb > 1− 1R
















































































The difference between this expression at time t+i and t+i+1 gives
λp(
1 + λp









Replacing with the expression of p̃jt and simplifying yields
λp(
1 + λp
) λ̂p,t + m̂ct = 1(1− βξp) (1− ξp) [π̂t (ξp + βξpγp)− βξpEtπ̂t+1 − ξpγpπ̂t−1]
(3.152)
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 = Et ∞∑
i=0
(βξw)



























i [Ŵ∗h,t − γwP̂t−1]
(3.155)
Since






















By replacing in the linearized relation and calculating the difference between this expression
at time t+i and time t+i+1, the following equation is obtained
[


































































+ ηwt − ŵt
]
(1− βξw) (1− ξw)






The dynamic system also includes















x̂t = ρx x̂t−1 + η̂xt (3.165)





gt = ρggt−1 + η
g
t (3.167)
λp,t = λp + η
p
t (3.168)
λw,t = λw + η
w
t (3.169)
Appendix C: log-linearization of the extended model with distor-
tionary taxation





















+ (1− τk,t) DivRt + τk,tδKRt − TRt − (1 + τc,t)CRt −
KRt+1 − (1− δ)KRt
xt
(3.170)
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+ TRt + (1 + τc,t)C
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Rt (1 + τc,t)
)1/σm
(3.174)
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1− β R̂t −
1









τw (1− α) θ(
1 + λp
) τ̂w,t − µ τcCY τ̂c,t + µŵt (1− τw) (1− α) θ(1 + λp)
(3.179)
Equation 3.126 becomes





+R̂t − Etπ̂t+1 + β (1− δ) Et x̂t+1 − x̂t
(3.180)
Based on a zero-debt level at the steady state and a balanced budget, the log-linearized gov-

























































































































+ ηwt − ŵt
]
(1− βξw) (1− ξw)









In this thesis, I attempted to study effects of fiscal policy on inflation, the current account
balance and private consumption using different theoretical and empirical approaches. At
the end of this research, I reach several important conclusions. The first one is that effects
of fiscal policy on the price level are closely linked with the stance of monetary policy. As
discussed in the first chapter, fiscal policy is less likely to generate inflation when mone-
tary policy is based on targets. On the other hand, budget deficits tend to be inflationary
when there is no solid national monetary policy framework (e.g., dollarized Latin American
economies).
Another notable result of this research is that cyclicality contributes significantly to shap-
ing the interactions between fiscal policy and external balances. More specifically, the neg-
ative relationship between government spending and the current account (CA) that is some-
times reported in the literature is found to hold only in countries with a countercyclical fiscal
policy and a procyclical CA. Studies based on traditional regression methods may show a
negative relationship in a panel setting, especially if they rely on pooled estimates. But the
result in the present study is based on an econometric approach that takes better account of
the heterogeneity within the sample. The negative response in this particular group is ex-
plained essentially by a negative response of the CA to property income shocks, in almost all
the group’s countries.
The panel analysis based on disaggregate fiscal data shows substantial discrepancies be-
tween countries in terms of the relationship between the CA and spending components. Re-
sults from a country by country investigation reveal that subsidies and property income are
the government spending categories that are more likely to affect the CA. In particular, prop-
erty income expenditures affect the CA more markedly in economies where sovereign credit
risk is perceived as relatively high by international markets.
Finally, the study of fiscal stimulus effects on consumption through a New-Keynesian
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model based on Japanese data led to the following conclusions. The inclusion of rule-of-
thumb consumers is not sufficient to yield a positive response of consumption to fiscal stimu-
lus measures. This is explained by two reasons. First, Ricardian behavior remains dominant
in the model, irrespective of the value of the share of non-Ricardian consumers. In particu-
lar, consumption’s response is closely linked to the response of lump-sum taxes (even after
inclusion of distortionary taxes). Second, although consumption also tracks income more
closely (compared to models without non-Ricardian households), real wages decline after
most measures, thereby contributing negatively to the response of consumption.
The introduction of distortionary taxation alters the model’s behavior over the long-run
through the different movements in tax rates. In particular, shocks that affect the capital
income tax rate tend to lead to positive effects over the long-run through an increase (or
expected increase) in capital. Higher capital significantly improves the economy by shifting
its productive capacity upward. This is also the same reason why a capital income tax cut
is found to be the most optimal fiscal stimulus measure for both consumption and output.
Lastly, the variance decomposition analysis shows that consumption is strongly affected by
labor supply and technology shocks. Overall, supply-side shocks are found to contribute
more to economic fluctuations than demand-side shocks.
